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Abstract
In this monograph, first, I argue that democratization in sub-Saharan Africa can
be successful, even if the government is dominated by one major political party.
Indeed, a competitive opposition party (even if too weak to take power) can force
the dominant government party to be more responsive to voter demands overall and
to limit clientelistic practices. This thesis stands in contrast to much of the recent
literature on democratization in Africa, which generally views dominant government
parties as incompatible with democratic consolidation and responsiveness.
Second, I argue that the most important factor for explaining competitiveness degrees
of contemporary opposition party systems in African dominant party systems lies in
historical legacies of cleavages around the time of independence that were able to
spill over into contemporary third wave party competition.
These arguments are tested in a mixed-methods design, which is based on a quanti-
tative analysis of 53 elections in third wave African dominant party systems and an
ensuing in-depth model-testing comparative analysis of four African cases.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie zeigt, dass Demokratisierungsprozesse in Subsahara-Afrika erfolgreich
verlaufen können, selbst wenn die Regierung von einer grossen Partei dominiert wird.
Eine wettbewerbsfähige Oppositionspartei kann – auch wenn nicht stark genug um
die Wahlen zu gewinnen – die dominante Partei zu mehr Responsivität gegenüber den
Wählern zwingen und zur Verminderung klientelistischer Praktiken führen. Damit
liefert die Studie einen originellen Beitrag zum bisherigen Forschungsstand, der dom-
inante Parteien gemeinhin als unvereinbar mit der Konsolidierung der Demokratie
und demokratischer Responsivität erachtet.
Des Weiteren zeigt die Studie, dass ein präsentes Erbe historischer Konfliktlinien aus
der Zeit der Dekolonisierung die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit heutiger Oppositionsparteien
in afrikanischen dominanten Parteiensystemen befördert.
Die Studie basiert auf einem gemischten Untersuchungsdesign, das sowohl quanti-
tative Verfahren als auch die historisch-komparative qualitative Methode anwendet.
Untersucht werden 53 Wahlen in dominanten Parteiensystemen Afrikas sowie vier
detaillierte Fallstudien.
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1 Introduction, State of the Art and Conceptual Frame-
work
Introduction
On March 21, 2012, Mali experienced its first military coup and breakdown of its electoral
regime since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992.1 This came as a surprise
to many. After all, Mali was considered to be one of the few fairly functioning democra-
cies on the African continent that had held eight free, and mostly fair, parliamentary and
presidential elections during its two decades of multiparty competition. Furthermore, con-
ventional wisdom argues that peaceful turnover through the ballot box and the termination
of electoral one-party dominance are strong indicators of a consolidated democracy or at
least provide a window of opportunity for full democratization (Huntington, 1991; Alvarez
et al., 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Levitsky and
Way, 2010). Hence, it is puzzling that Mali’s democracy did not consolidate during the
ten years after its first incumbency change through the ballot box in 2002 and the end
of electoral dominance by the previously governing Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali
(ADEMA).
1Note: The book The Quality of Democracy in Africa – Opposition Competitiveness
Rooted in Legacies of Cleavages, published with Palgrave Macmillan in 2017, is a substan-
tially revised and updated account of this thesis’ content [Link].
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Equally puzzling is the fact that electoral turnover and the end of dominant party systems
in the multiparty electoral regimes of Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002, or Zambia in 2011
neither led to democratic consolidation.2
In contrast to this and contrary to conventional wisdom on dominant party systems in
Africa, which lack turnover by definition, incumbent former Flight Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings
and his electorally dominant party, National Democratic Congress (NDC), initiated demo-
cratic consolidation in Ghana. Rawlings and the NDC substantially reduced the skewness
of the playing field in party competition and increased civil liberties despite their domi-
nance and lack of incumbency change after the formal opening of Ghana’s political regime
in 1992 to formal multiparty democracy. The resulting more balanced playing field in party
competition eventually led to electoral turnover and the end of the NDC’s dominance in
2000. After that, and in contrast to the cases above, Ghana’s democracy consolidated fur-
ther, and the previously dominant party, NDC, remained a strong and cohesive opposition
party despite leadership succession from J.J. Rawlings to John Atta Mills. Eventually,
this led to another successful electoral turnover in 2008 and the consolidation of an in-
stitutionalized two-party system in Ghana. Likewise, Botswana’s quality of democracy
improved between independence and the first decade of the 2000s despite lack of turnover,
i.e., uninterrupted electoral dominance by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) since
1965. Furthermore, South Africa has a comparatively good democratic record since the
introduction of multiracial elections in 1994 despite continued electoral dominance of the
African National Congress (ANC).
If we take a global view, we easily find more examples that run counter to conventional
wisdom on the role of dominant party systems in processes of democratization. Pempel
(1990a) edited a whole volume on these “uncommon democracies”, where one party dom-
2In a dominant party system, one party wins in successive and relatively free, but not necessarily fair
elections an absolute majority in parliament as well as the presidency (Sartori, 2005[1976]; cf. Bogaards,
2004).
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inates electoral competition over a substantial amount of time in countries as diverse as
Italy, Sweden, Japan, Israel, India and Mexico between 1945 and 1990. These dominant
party systems were not necessarily stumbling blocks on a path to democratic consolidation
and higher qualities of democracy. On the contrary, they provided stability for the con-
solidation of their democratic regimes. In Mexico, we even find an interesting parallel to
Ghana, as the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) significantly reduced
the skewness degree of the playing field in multiparty competition since the second half
of the 1990s, which eventually led to incumbency change in 2000, and an institutional-
ized multi-party system thereafter. Taiwan resembles Mexico, as the electorally dominant
party, Kuomintang (KMT), underutilized its coercive power to tilt the playing field in
party competition in its favor, which led to the first electoral turnover, end of dominance
by the KMT, and subsequent democratic consolidation and institutionalization of a multi-
party system with another turnover in 2008 (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 309–318). Hence,
evidence from other regions suggests that dominant party systems in electoral regimes do
not necessarily have to be problematic for democratic consolidation.
However, in opposition to other world regions, dominant party systems are not “uncom-
mon”, but rather prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and consolidated democracies generally
rare.3 Accordingly, it is widely argued that dominant party systems are bad for demo-
cratic consolidation in Africa (Huntington, 1991; Bogaards, 2000; Van de Walle, 2003).
Yet, anecdotal evidence presented at the beginning of this section runs contrary to that.
Mali experienced the breakdown of its electoral regime after electoral turnover and ten
years of seemingly favorable party system conditions while Ghana fully democratized dur-
ing and after ten years of dominance by a party with authoritarian roots. This leads us to
central question of this book: Why does electoral turnover in African electoral regimes not
necessarily lead to higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation, and why do
3Henceforth “Africa”. Note, that this book does not include North African countries in its analysis.
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some of Africa’s dominant party systems, which lack the experience of regular incumbency
change, lead the way to higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation?
The book aims to solve this puzzle by looking into the neglected variance of competi-
tiveness of the opposition in African dominant party systems. I argue that democratization
can be successful in dominant party systems if a competitive opposition – even if too weak
to take power – challenges the dominant government party. I argue that under this condi-
tion the quality of democracy will improve substantially. I test this argument by looking
into a most diverse set of African electoral regimes that featured dominant party systems
in the period between 1990 and 2008. My findings show that first, dominant party systems
with strong and institutionalized opposition parties have more comprehensive civil liberties
and second, are more likely to develop position-taking programmatic means of mobilizing
their voters besides the dominant modes of mobilization through clientelism, valence issues
and personal charisma. The analysis thus suggests that the opposition does not need to
win office. In order to improve the quality of democracy it is enough that competitive
opposition parties challenge the dominant party and force its rulers to be more responsive
to voters’ demands.
Furthermore, I argue that the most important factor for explaining degrees of com-
petitiveness in contemporary opposition party systems in African dominant party systems
lies in historical cleavages that were able to spill over into contemporary third wave party
competition. Opposition parties need non-material sources of cohesiveness in the context
of a dominant governing party and the prevalence of clientelistic and valence competition.
On the one hand, cohesiveness due to legacies of cleavages allows opposition parties to com-
pete more effectively on the dominant party’s “natural” terrain of clientelism and valence
competition because opposition supporters and party-elites are more willing to suspend
demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic and valence promises when they are
bound to the party by non-material means. On the other hand, legacies of historical cleav-
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ages also make position-taking programmatic mobilization a more viable, alternative mode
of mobilization that allows competition with the dominant party on an equal standing.
However, the successful survival of cleavages that were formed around independence is de-
pendent on the occurrence, timing, length and degree of suppression of post-independence
authoritarian regimes.
These arguments are tested in a mixed-methods design, which is based on a quantitative
analysis of 53 elections in 18 third wave African dominant party systems and an ensuing
in-depth model-testing comparative analysis of four crucial cases: The dominant party
systems of Botswana and Lesotho and the formerly dominant party system of Ghana, as
well as the formerly “almost-dominant party system” of Mali. The analysis makes use
of comparative historical analysis and survey-based measurements of party positions and
voter preferences.
The book contributes to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the role of
party systems in late third wave democratization processes in general, and the literature
on dominant party systems and the role of turnovers in particular. The quantitative results
of the book show that it is useful to devise an index that measures the competitiveness
degree of the opposition parties in dominant party systems because not all dominant party
systems have the same consequences for democratic consolidation. The more competitive
opposition parties are in African dominant party systems between 1990 and 2008, the more
comprehensive civil liberties will be.
Furthermore, the book explains late-third wave democratizers’ party system structure
and institutionalization degree by the existence of salient legacies of cleavages that are
rooted in conflicts caused by processes of nationalization and centralization at indepen-
dence. The competitiveness degree of opposition parties in dominant party systems and
the institutionalization degree of non-dominant party systems that evolved out of dominant
party systems are significantly explained by the survival of legacies of cleavages proxied
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by the age of the runner-up opposition party and the number of minimally competitive
pre-third wave elections. These results are then confirmed by a comparative-historic anal-
ysis of four crucial cases. Indeed, we can trace the survival of a territorial center-periphery
cleavage since independence over time and until the beginning of the third wave in both
Botswana and Ghana. The territorial cleavage still structures the party systems of the
two countries and results in contemporary programmatically more structured and more
responsive party systems. In Lesotho and Mali, in turn, survival of territorial legacies of
cleavages was too strongly disrupted during pre-third wave authoritarian phases for their
third wave party systems to still rely on and result in competitive opposition parties dur-
ing dominant party system phases and thereafter. Accordingly, both Lesotho and Mali’s
contemporary party systems are less programmatically structured and less responsive.
Both the finding that dominant party systems have different effects on the quality of
democracy in late third wave democratizers – depending on the different degrees of com-
petitiveness of the opposition – and the finding that party system structures in Africa
can be fruitfully explained by Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage approach are original
contributions to the literature on democratization and party systems. To my knowledge,
this is so far the first approach that systematically quantifies path dependency and histor-
ical explanations and relates African party system’s competitiveness structure to legacies
of historic territorial center-periphery cleavages. These results are substantiated with an
additional in-depth comparative historical analysis of four crucial cases. Last but not least,
the study attempts to measure party system responsiveness degrees in Africa by a survey-
based measurement of the clarity and distinctiveness of parties’ programmatic positions
based on an original elite-survey dataset and relates it to voters’ preferences measured by
Afrobarometer data. Before I further carve out the contribution of the book by discussing
the state of the art, the following section presents the structure of the book.
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In the following two sections, I present the state of the art and the conceptual frame-
work. Afterwards, I demonstrate that it is useful to devise an index that measures the
competitiveness degree of the opposition parties, i.e. “potential incumbency vulnerability”
of the dominant party in dominant party systems, because the index explains the vary-
ing consequences of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic
responsiveness of African dominant party systems to a large degree.
Second, I argue that relatively high opposition competitiveness degrees of contemporary
African third wave dominant party systems can be explained by the existence of salient
historical legacies of cleavages formed in routinized electoral competition shortly before
and after independence. If contemporary opposition parties cannot base their ideological
image on independence cleavages, they lack historic, ideological and symbolic “capital” and
have to exclusively rely on short-term mobilization strategies of the electorate – clientelism,
charisma and valence issues –, which naturally work better for the incumbent dominant
party in an uncertain context of new and non-routinized electoral regimes. The saliency of
such short-term mobilization strategies and concomitant absence of long-term mobilization
strategies and non-material sources of cohesiveness in turn leads to opposition parties
that are more prone to co-optation by the dominant party, factionalism and floor-crossing
(“nomadisme de politique”) – as I will explain later in the book –, which weaken and
de-institutionalize opposition parties and decrease the self-perceived vulnerability degree
of the dominant party.
Both the fact that dominant party systems have varying consequences for the quality
of democracy and the explanation for this are original contributions to the comparative
literature on African democratization. So far, the literature unanimously considers dom-
inant party systems to be stumbling blocks on the way from first elections to democratic
consolidation in late-third wave democratizers (Alvarez, 1996; Bogaards, 2000; 2004; Hunt-
ington, 1991; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2010), or regards them to be
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problematic for democratic consolidation at least (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Van de
Walle, 2003). Explicitly or implicitly, the literature considers opposition party systems to
be homogeneously weak within the group of African dominant party systems.
In the first instance, my findings are based on statistical evidence from a dataset, which
has been collected for this study and comprehends 53 elections in 18 African dominant
party systems.4 Second, from these results, I derive four model-testing comparative case
studies: In a comparative historical analysis and an ensuing party system responsiveness
analysis, I compare the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho, the former
dominant party system of Ghana and the former “almost-dominant” party system of Mali.
It is important to contrast Botswana and Lesotho with two cases of the group of non-
dominant party systems, because the latter are so far generally regarded as favorable for
democratic consolidation in the literature. They set the benchmark against which any
positive assessment of a dominant party system has to be tested.
The comparative historical analysis traces the four different contemporary party sys-
tem configurations back to the political cleavages of the embryonic party system, which
was founded shortly before decolonization. As my analysis shows, a crucial condition for
legacies of cleavages to spill over into present institutionalized party systems in general
and competitive opposition parties in particular, is the requirement that cleavages have
already been regularly invoked and routinized to some degree in pre-third wave elections,
i.e. have not been interrupted by the introduction of too rapidly following and too stable
periods of authoritarian one-party government and/or military government.
Finally, I compare self-collected elite survey data of the four cases with Afrobarometer
mass survey data. I find evidence that parties in dominant party systems with an institu-
tionalized and potentially threatening opposition (Botswana), or in former dominant party
4The cases are the dominant party systems of, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Burkina Faso Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria,
Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia.
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systems that evolved into an institutionalized two-party system (Ghana), which both are
still structured according to the historic cleavage around independence, are programmat-
ically more distinctively set apart and more responsive to the policy preferences of their
electorate than parties in dominant party systems with a perceivable non-institutionalized
opposition (Lesotho), or in former dominant party systems that evolved into a generally
non-institutionalized and chaotic multi-party system (Mali), and which both are not effec-
tively structured anymore according to the historic cleavage around independence. Because
the Ghana two-party system model for democratic consolidation is empirically relatively
rare in Africa, I argue that the Botswana model of a dominant party with an institutional-
ized and potentially threatening opposition can be a viable alternative way to democratic
consolidation than the non-dominant but also generally non-institutionalized Mali “model”
that obviously does not lead to democratic consolidation (as proven by the 2012 military
coup in Mali).
The book has five sections: In this section, I also discuss the state of the art and define
the conceptual framework. After that, in the second section, I conceptualize the central
concept of opposition competitiveness and its measure in African dominant party systems
and theorize its significance for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness
in dominant party systems. Ensuing, I test this first argument in a cross-sectional large-N
analysis of 18 contemporary African dominant and former dominant party systems. The
third section develops a model for the explanation of different opposition competitiveness
degrees in African dominant party systems and tests the argument in a cross sectional
analysis of 18 third wave dominant party systems and a dynamic analysis of 53 third wave
elections in dominant party systems. The fourth and fifth sections re-test the arguments
in a qualitative comparative historical analysis of four crucial cases – Botswana, Lesotho,
Ghana and Mali – and a party system responsiveness analysis through the comparison
of self-collected elite survey data with contemporary Afrobarometer mass survey data in
9
these the four African countries.
Instructions for cross-reading:
Generally, the book is organized to be read in one piece and has five sections. In case of
cross-reading the following explanation of the book’s structure might be useful:
Apart from this introduction, section 1 also includes the sections of the state of the art
and the conceptual framework. Sections 2 and 5 are about the theoretical and empirical
significance of opposition competitiveness for the quality of democracy and democratic
responsiveness in third wave African dominant party systems. Section 2’s empirical part
is about the test of this argument in a large-N setting. Section 5 re-tests the argument
of section 2 in a small-N setting by the use of democratic responsiveness as an important
indicator of the quality of democracy. The general theoretical argument of Section 5 is
identical to section 2 and has to be consulted there.
Sections 3 and 4 are about the theoretical and empirical explanation of opposition
competitiveness in third wave dominant party systems. Section 3’s empirical part tests the
argument in the same large-N setting as in section 2. Hence, the case selection of section 3
should be consulted in section 2. Section 4 re-tests the argument of section 3 in the same
small-N setting as in section 5. Accordingly, the small-N case selection is both valid for
sections 4 and 5 and will not be repeated in section 5. The theoretical argument of section
4, in turn, should be consulted in section 3.
While the two main theoretical arguments and the large-N as well as the small-N case
selections are only described once in the book, every empirical subsection in sections 2, 3,
4 and 5 is preceded by a unique methods subsection.
If someone is only interested in the quantitative tests of the two main arguments, she
should read sections 2 and 3 and neglect parts 4 and 5 entirely. Alternatively, if she is
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exclusively interested in the qualitative tests of the two main arguments, she should only
read the theoretical parts of sections 2 and 3, and sections 4 and 5 both entirely.
State of the Art
The end of the Cold War triggered a wave of ‘electoralization’ in the countries of the so
called late third wave of democratization, amongst them the sub-Saharan part of the African
continent (cf. Huntington, 1991; LeBas, 2011, 5). Almost every sub-Saharan African coun-
try introduced formal multiparty democracy. However, two decades of experimenting with
multiparty elections on the continent yielded mixed results, resulting in many “incomplete“
types of democracy or “hybrid” regimes at best, electoral autocracies at worst, and only few
liberal democracies (O’Donnell, 1996, 34; Carothers, 2002). In contrast to experts’ fears of
excessive fragmentation in Africa’s new party systems, dominant party systems where one
party wins subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections for a considerable amount
of time became Africa’s new modal type of party system during the third wave (Bogaards,
2000; Bogaards, 2004; Van de Walle, 2003; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007).
The unprecedented mass of formal multiparty elections and the variance of its outcomes
during the past two decades triggered a renaissance of comparative political science research
with focus on democratization in Africa: (1) A significant part of this literature concen-
trated on the newly emerging party systems and observed the aforementioned prevalence
of dominant party systems among Africa’s electoral democracies (Bogaards, 2000; 2004;
Van de Walle, 2003; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2013). (2)
Another section of the comparative African party system literature concentrated on the
general fragmentation and/or institutionalization degree of African party systems without
explicitly referring to the phenomenon of dominant party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright,
2001; 2005; Lindberg, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt,
2005). (3) A further important fraction of the literature is less focused on party systems
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per se and concentrates in a more general way on third wave democratization and tran-
sition processes in Africa and other late-third wave countries (Bratton and van de Walle,
1997; Carothers, 2002; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Among them,
Lindberg (2006; 2009) focuses on the – as he argues – path-dependent democratizing ef-
fect of the introduction of formal multi-party elections in Africa. In line with that, (4)
there are studies that specifically identify turnovers as causes of democratic consolidation,
which implicitly points out to the purported negative effect of dominant party systems for
democratic consolidation (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Wahman,
2012b) Last but not least, (5) some of the more recent literature tries to derive generaliza-
tions on causes and consequences of African party systems from detailed comparative case
studies (LeBas, 2011; Osei, 2012; Elischer, 2013).
So far, the existence of a dominant party system has mostly been considered to be prob-
lematic for late third wave democratizers’ democratic consolidation in general, and African
electoral regimes’ democratic consolidation in particular (Bogaards, 2000; 2004; Van de
Walle, 2003; Manning, 2005; Huntington, 1991; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). An electoral
democracy that has never been tested by a change of incumbency through free multiparty
elections, is regarded to be an unconsolidated democracy (cf. Alvarez et al., 1996). Prze-
worski and Limongi (1997, 178) even explicitly define as “democracies only those systems
in which incumbent parties actually did lose [elections]”. However, the assumptions under-
lying these definitions have not been systematically tested in most accounts. Van de Walle
(2003, 309) is the only one that provides evidence for the hypothesis of a bad influence of
dominant party systems on the quality of democracy. Yet, his evidence is based on a small
sample of six African dominant party systems. Furthermore, some of these studies rather
focus on the correct identification of dominant party systems and compare the suitability
of different measurements of party system fragmentation (Bogaards, 2004; Erdmann and
Basedau, 2007). Most of these studies also implicitly or explicitly assume that opposition
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parties in dominant party systems are by definition weak and non-institutionalized without
providing convincing evidence to substantiate this claim (Bogaards, 2000; Van de Walle,
2003; Manning, 2005).
Studies that point out mixed or even positive effects of dominant party systems on
democratic consolidation are few, and are mostly concentrated on single case studies or
sub-regional samples rather than systematic comparison: Both a study on democratiza-
tion in Senegal by Villalon (1994) and a general critique by Suttner (2006) on the “party
dominance” concept exemplified with reference to the case of the dominant ANC in South
Africa criticize the ‘fetishization’ of turnover as an indicator for full democratization. And
according to Du Toit (1999), the electoral dominance of the BDP in Botswana paved the
way for stabilization and liberal democracy. In a study on elections in Southern Africa,
Bogaards (2007b) demonstrates that dominant party systems are not necessarily undemo-
cratic and non-dominant multi-party systems not necessarily democratic. Lastly, Basedau
(2005) who mainly analyzes potential causes of dominant party systems in 38 African elec-
toral regimes emphasizes that dominant party systems rarely lead to full authoritarianism
in Africa.
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) seminal contribution on party systems and democra-
tization in Latin America underlined the importance of institutionalized party systems
for democratic consolidation. Mainwaring and Scully’s work inspired Africanists to adapt
the concept of party system institutionalization to the African continent (Kuenzi and
Lambright, 2001; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005; Lindberg, 2007). In line with Mainwaring
and Scully’s operationalization, Kuenzi and Lambright measure the institutionalization of
African party systems through the degree of volatility, the average age of the parties, the
legitimacy of elections and the independence of the party organization from its contem-
porary leaders. They conclude that African party systems are less institutionalized than
party systems in Latin America. Furthermore, they argue that the duration of experience
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with democracy is decisive for explaining the institutionalization degree of contemporary
party systems in Africa.
In contrast, Lindberg (2007) exclusively concentrates on election-based data to de-
termine the institutionalization degree of African party systems, because – as he correctly
argues – we should not include the age of parties in the measurement of institutionalization
if we want to explain the institutionalization degree by the age of democracy in a country.
His study concludes that there is a trade-off between effective competition and stability.
Stable party systems in Africa mostly feature a dominant party and lack of effective com-
petition while non-dominant party systems, in turn, are volatile and non-institutionalized.
While providing valuable insights into the general nature of party systems in Africa,
both Kuenzi and Lambright as well as Lindberg’s approaches suffer from the fact that
they conflate dominant and non-dominant party systems in Africa in one sample. Yet, in
contrast to non-dominant party systems, the governing party does not change in dominant
party systems. Accordingly, overall volatility scores are lower in dominant party systems
by definition. Consequently, due to the prevalence of dominant party systems in Africa,
we could argue that it is not necessary to measure the volatility degree of African party
systems at all. Looking at the fragmentation degree would suffice because dominant party
systems could be equated with institutionalization, and non-dominant party systems with
volatility. However, regarding dominant party systems, I argue that it is far from sure that
opposition parties in dominant party systems are all equally institutionalized. Accord-
ingly, its important to have a closer look at the structure of the opposition party system
nested within dominant party systems (see also van Eerd, 2010). Hence, an approach that
conflates incumbent and opposition parties’ constituting parts in the measurement of insti-
tutionalization degrees misses important variance among opposition party systems nested
within dominant party systems.
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To summarize the main gaps in the respective literature, first, the consequences of
dominant party systems for democratic consolidation and the quality of democracy of late-
third wave democratizers have not been fully understood so far. Second, the role of the
opposition parties nested within dominant party systems has either been completely ne-
glected or the opposition parties have been described as homogeneously weak and volatile
without presenting convincing evidence for this claim. Third, the relationship between the
fragmentation degree and the institutionalization degree in African party systems has not
been fully understood. Institutionalization of the dominant party has been equated with
institutionalization of the whole party system. This is problematic, because it relies on the
untested assumption that the nature of the opposition party systems nested within domi-
nant party systems does not matter for the description and the consequences of dominant
party systems in late third-wave democratizers in general and Africa in special.
Types of Electoral Regimes in the Third Wave of Democratization
With exception of the south-european countries that started the third wave of democra-
tization in the 1970s (a term famously coined by Huntington (1991)), most of the sub-
sequent third wave transitions produced “incomplete” or “grey area” types of democracy
(O’Donnell, 1996, 34) (Latin American and Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s as
well as Eastern European, former Soviet and sub-Saharan Africa countries in the 1990s).
These so called “hybrid regimes” are somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism.
Their quality of democracy is mixed and less consolidated, i.e. they are more prone to full
authoritarian backlash than consolidated democracies.
Only a minority of these third wave electoral regimes became representative democra-
cies/polyarchies according to Dahl’s (1971, 3) eight criteria of (1) elected incumbents, (2)
free and fair elections, (3) inclusive suffrage, (4) right to run for office, (5) freedom of
expression, (6) alternative information, (7) freedom of association and (8) institutions for
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making government policies depend on votes or other expressions of preference. Democra-
cies as polyarchies have a relatively high quality of democracy and are more democratically
consolidated, which means that “democrats can relax” because democracy breakdown be-
comes unlikely (Schedler, 2001, 85). In other words, democracy is “the only game in town”
and other means to power are not an option (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 5).
At the other end of the spectrum, some third wave electoral regimes are better to
be considered as outright electoral autocracies. Here, elections have façade character and
remain mere plebiscites in order to achieve superficial legitimacy for an autocratic govern-
ment. Important opposition parties are banned and incumbency change through elections
remains highly unlikely if not impossible (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 13).
The middle ground and largest category of third wave electoral regimes can be sub-
sumed under Levitsky and Way’s (2010) regime category of competitive authoritarianism.
Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes have a substantially higher amount of un-
certainty about the electoral outcome than electoral autocracies. Opposition parties find
it worthy to compete because they have a minimum chance of winning. Yet, incumbency
change is less likely than in democracies as polyarchies. Elections in competitive authori-
tarian regimes are basically free, but not sufficiently fair.
More precisely, “free elections” in competitive authoritarian regimes are regular elec-
tions where electoral fraud is neither systematic nor decisive for the electoral outcome.
Intimidation and harassment of voters and opposition parties are not systematic or vir-
tually absent. Elections are competitive in a sense that major candidates and opposition
parties are not systematically excluded (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 5–13). What discerns
competitive authoritarian regimes from democracies as polyarchies is the lack of a level
playing field between incumbents and the opposition. The usual incumbency advantage
between the governing party and the opposition parties is exaggerated compared with pol-
yarchies due to a systematically skewed playing field: E.g., incumbents systematically use
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state resources in electoral campaigning like state finance and infrastructure (vehicles or
buildings). Government contracts may be used to reward entrepreneurs that support the
governing party and punish entrepreneurs that support the opposition parties. And/or,
effective access to media with broad coverage is strongly skewed towards the governing
party. Especially in developing countries, the independent media may only reach a small
urban elite while state-controlled radio, TV and newspapers are able to reach the country-
side and/or other, more peripheral parts of a country. Likewise, the less easily controllable
internet is generally more available to an urban and literate elite than to the the electorally
more relevant masses. Lastly, the judiciary is not independent enough to rule impartially
in crucial disputes between the government and the opposition.
All this makes competition unfair. Yet because elections are substantially free and
competition is meaningful to a certain amount, incumbency change remains possible (cf.
Levitsky and Way, 2010, 9–13).
Although incumbency change is a possibility in competitive authoritarian regimes, I
agree with Levitsky and Way (2010) that even if it actually happens, it does not necessarily
have to lead to a higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation. The new
incumbents may find it useful to profit from the same skewed playing filed that initially
disadvantaged them when they were in opposition. Hence, incumbency change is not a
sufficient condition for a high quality of democracy and democratic consolidation.
Dominant party systems are the main focus of this study. They are situated within
political systems that feature national formal multiparty parliamentary elections (and ad-
ditionally, presidential elections in presidential systems). In the following, these political
systems are called “electoral regimes” to avoid false equation of elections with democracy.
Political systems without any national-level elections (e.g. one-party regimes like China’s
Communist Party) are of no concern in this study. More precisely, this study of dominant
party systems is situated within democratic electoral regimes (polyarchies) and compet-
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itive authoritarian electoral regimes. It is not situated within non-competitive electoral
regimes, i.e. electoral autocracies, where incumbency change is impossible.
Although my study draws on Levitsky and Way’s (2010) concept of competitive au-
thoritarianism I disagree regarding their implicit conclusion that a lack of incumbency
change – i.e. dominant party systems – necessarily signals the existence of a competi-
tive authoritarian regime and a low quality of democracy (cf. Bogaards, 2007b). In the
next section, I outline why African dominant party systems can lead to a higher quality
of democracy and democratic consolidation even if effective incumbency change does not
take place because they have the potential to provide stability and to be responsive to
their citizenry. Accordingly, dominant party systems are not necessarily exclusively to be
found among competitive authoritarian electoral regimes, but might also be found among
electoral regimes with a higher quality of democracy.
Furthermore, as shown in the case selection further below, on the one hand, (1) I define
the boundary between competitive authoritarianism and electoral autocracy more narrowly
than Levitsky and Way (2010) while on the other hand, (2) I am more lenient regarding
the boundary between democracy as polyarchy and competitive authoritarianism. I do
(1), because I consider the reality of political competition for opposition parties to be of
fundamental difference in countries like Zimbabwe or Belarus, where opposition politicians
face regular beatings and imprisonment during elections campaigns and election results
are marred by large fraud vis-à-vis countries like Botswana or Senegal, where opposition
politicians can compete freely although their access to the media and campaign resources is
relatively more restricted compared to the government party (these four countries are cases
of competitive authoritarianism in Levitsky and Way’s study). And I do (2), because –
considering my exclusively regional focus on Africa – I find it useful to be less strict with the
labels of democracy and democratic consolidation than scholars with an intercontinental
focus. I acknowledge that a somewhat skewed access to the media and government resources
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influences competition, but find it misleading to go as far as Levitsky and Way and use the
word “authoritarianism” in such cases: If our definition of democracy is too maximalist,
the empirical basket of democracy in Africa remains empty (cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002;
Munck, 2009). This would defy the general intuition that a significant variance regarding
democracy levels is a reality in Africa. Nonetheless, I embrace Levitsky and Way’s (2010)
emphasis on the level playing field in party competition. They remind us that the word
democracy can be a misleading label for some electoral regimes where the level playing
field is skewed too heavily. In the end, it is a question of drawing a (more or less arbitrary)
line to achieve meaningful categorization.
Party System Responsiveness: A Yardstick for the Quality of
Democracy
Besides a skewed playing field, most third wave electoral regimes have also interrelated and
serious deficits regarding horizontal accountability, the rule of law, as well as party system
responsiveness and vertical accountability (cf. Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 2002).
I focus on party system responsiveness and vertical accountability as important yard-
sticks to assess the quality of democracy in African electoral regimes (cf. Dahl, 1971; Pow-
ell, 2004). In modern representative democracy, where parties are the central agents of
political representation, party system responsiveness is rather synonymous to the con-
cept of democratic responsiveness (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4): Political parties
are virtually the only actors in modern representative democracy with access to elected
positions (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4). Even independent candidates usually
associate themselves with a party in parliament to gain access to a parliamentary group.
And independent presidential candidates usually strive for the stable support of at least
one important political party in campaigning and parliament.
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Party system responsiveness corresponds to Dahl’s (1971, 3) eighth requirement for
representative democracy: “Institutions for making government policies depend on votes
and other expressions of preference.” Expressions of (policy) preferences are most efficiently
organized around party platforms and labels. Party platforms deliver orientation and
shortcuts about bundles of policy preferences and channel conflicts that otherwise would
be expressed in a cacophony of conflicting individual interests. Citizens are able to make an
informed voting decision without investing large amounts of time in informing themselves
about the policy preferences of individual politicians (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4).
Accordingly, it is more easy for voters to assess if actual government policies correspond to
the policy platforms that have been promoted during their campaign. This enables vertical
accountability and increases the possibility that government policies “depend on votes and
other expressions of preferences”.
I understand “party system responsiveness” as the clarity and distinctiveness of par-
ties’ programmatic positions and the congruence between partisan voters’ policy prefer-
ences and their political representatives’ policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004; Luna and
Zechmeister, 2005). Party system responsiveness is the central component in the “chain of
responsiveness” (Powell, 2004), that links citizens’ policy preferences with citizens’ voting
behavior, the election outcomes and the adopted public policies themselves. “Party system
responsiveness” enhances the quality of democracy, because it secures that governments
adopt and implement the policies that arise from the will of the citizens (cf. Dahl, 1971).
A responsive democratic regime is less prone to autocratic reversal, which means that
“democrats can relax” (Schedler, 2001, 85), i.e. democracy consolidates.
Party system responsiveness is based on programmatic modes of voter mobilization.
One of the most important alternative modes of mobilization is clientelism where pri-
vate benefits for specific individual citizens (private goods) or small groups of citizens
(club goods) are exchanged for votes (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).
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Whereas programmatic mobilization provides long-term linkages to the electorate, clien-
telistic mobilization delivers short-term rewards for votes. The two modes of mobilization
are in opposition to each other, but are not necessarily mutually exclusive.5
Two Sides of the Same Coin: Party System Institutionalization and Respon-
siveness
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) seminal contribution teaches us the importance of an in-
stitutionalized party system for a high quality of democracy after democratic transitions.
Without institutionalized parties that link citizens to the political system and provide pre-
dictability to politics, formal democratic institution like national elections are meaningless.
An institutionalized party system facilitates mutual learning and coordination between the
electorate and their political representatives about their respective policy preferences (cf.
Powell, 2004). And this increases programmatic party system responsiveness in turn.
Without a minimally institutionalized party system, programmatic party system re-
sponsiveness is difficult if not impossible. In order to provide the necessary aggregation
of interests, channeling of conflicts and predictability in politics, political parties need to
be institutionalized. If parties‘ competitive interactions do not follow stable patterns of
competition and conflict, it is difficult for voters to understand, which interests the parties
represent. Voters cannot hold the party/parties in power accountable for a bad perfor-
mance and likewise have no identifiable alternative to cast their vote on if parties appear
and disappear from one election to the next. Institutionalized political parties as the main
access point to the government and the state are even more important in the African con-
text where the influence of civil society is much weaker than in the established democracies
of the Western hemisphere.
5Cf. with Singer and Kitschelt’s (2011) “Do Everything” (DoE) parties, which combine clientelistic
and programmatic mobilization.
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Mainwaring and Scully (1995) believe that dominant party systems are symptomatic
for weakly institutionalized and programmatically non-responsive party-voter linkages (cf.
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). I rather argue that dominant party systems provide stabil-
ity by definition because they stay in power for a considerable amount of time. The voter
always knows who is to blame for a bad government performance compared to frequently
changing incumbents who are able to blame the legacy of their forerunner, or parties in
coalition governments who can mutually hide behind their companions. Furthermore, the
long-term grip to power allows the dominant party to develop a long-term public policy
platform and further institutionalize itself. However, dominant party systems tend to go
hand in hand with weaker and less institutionalized opposition parties than party systems
with regular incumbency change. Non-institutionalization and weakness diminishes the
opposition parties’ ability to develop a trustworthy alternative policy platform and the
necessary political orientation for voters in case of a bad dominant party performance.
Accordingly, in opposition to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), I argue that dominant
party systems are not per se non-institutionalized, but rather the opposite. Yet, their
potential for responsiveness and high quality of democracy depends on the strength and
stability of the opposition party/parties.
And, in opposition to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), I do not consider programmatic
responsiveness to be a necessary component of institutionalization. Rather, the other way
round, institutionalization of the party system provides a chance for programmatic respon-
siveness that can be, but does not necessarily have to be taken. E.g., in Latin America, the
party systems of Columbia and Venezuela in the second half of the 20th century were highly
institutionalized and seemingly competitive, yet they were not programmatically responsive
to their electorate and their quality of democracy was rather low (Bornschier, Forthcom-
ing; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Accordingly, my argument is rather probabilistic than
deterministic.
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Generally, It is rather unlikely that young African electoral regimes’ degree of program-
matic responsiveness meets the responsiveness level of the established democracies in the
OECD-world. Nonetheless, I expect to find variation within African electoral democracies
in general, and the large group of African dominant party systems in particular. I argue
that the degree of programmatic party system responsiveness and the clarity and distinc-
tiveness of parties’ programmatic positions– i.e. the realization of the potential of dominant
party system institutionalization – are related to the degree of the self-perceived incum-
bency vulnerability of the dominant party, which, in turn, I will operationalize through
the strength and institutionalization of the opposition party/parties in a dominant party
system.
In the beginning of the following section, I conceptualize dominant party systems with
special emphasis on their opposition competitiveness degree, which is measured by the
strength and institutionalization of the opposition in a dominant party system.
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2 Opposition Competitiveness and its Significance for
Dominant Party System Responsiveness
In dominant party systems, the same party dominates the government and inter-party com-
petition for a considerable amount of time without violating the most fundamental rights
of democratic competition. A dominant party system thwarts the common expectation
that electoral competition leads to periodic changes in government.
In the following, I argue that actual incumbency change is not a necessary condition
for higher party system responsiveness and a high quality of democracy. A relatively
strong and institutionalized opposition (even if too weak to take power) can force the
dominant government party to be programmatically more responsive to voters and advance
the quality of democracy overall.
First, I present the conceptualization of a dominant party system and its disadvan-
tages and advantages for party system responsiveness and the quality of democracy in an
electoral regime. Second, I look at the so far neglected differences in opposition party
system configuration within a dominant party system and explain how a relatively strong
and institutionalized opposition can force the dominant party to advance party system
responsiveness and the quality of democracy. Finally, the section closes by testing the
potentially positive effect of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy in
African dominant party systems.
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Dominant Party Systems and Responsiveness
As discussed above, unlike to authoritarian one-party regimes, dominant party systems
feature regular and minimally free electoral competition with varying degrees of fair-
ness/skewness of the playing field in party competition. A dominant governing party in a
polyarchy or competitive authoritarian regime does not know the election results before the
elections have been held because electoral fraud – if present – is neither systematic nor de-
cisive. On the one hand, the party dominates the government and inter-party competition
for a considerable amount of time, and on the other hand, there is still the theoretical pos-
sibility present that the dominant governing party could loose the elections. Accordingly,
minimal competitiveness is a precondition in dominant party systems.
Whereas the term party system denotes a “network of competitive relationships between
political parties” (Rae, 1971[1967], 47), the adjective dominant signifies that outcomes of
these competitive relationships result in uninterrupted and repeated electoral victories of
the same political party that render the participation of other parties in government un-
necessary (except oversized coalition governments that are formed out of non-arithmetical
reasons). This entails an absolute majority in the lower house and – in presidential systems
– an additional victory in presidential elections for the dominant party. Absolute majority
victories are based on natural absolute majorities in the electorate or on fabricated abso-
lute majorities through the means of majority electoral systems and/or gerrymandering
(redistricting of electoral districts for electoral advantages).
Opposition parties are naturally weaker in dominant party systems than in party sys-
tems with regular change of incumbency. Opposition parties in dominant party systems
lack government experience by definition, because they are neither required for an absolute
majority of the president’s party in parliament nor for coalition government in parliamen-
tary or semi-presidential systems. Accordingly, they can and could not recently prove their
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suitability to form an alternative government. This lack of experience may deter potential
opposition voters from voting for the opposition.
On the one hand, a dominant party system can be problematic for electoral regimes’
quality of democracy overall and party system responsiveness in particular: First, if ma-
jorities in the electorate are natural and opposition parties weak, future electoral victories
for the dominant party are likely even if it performs poorly. Foreseeable electoral victories
for the party in power can lead to arrogance and lack of programmatic responsiveness.
Abuses of power and non-democratic behavior like corruption become more likely. Instead
of being temporarily borrowed from the people, power resembles of being entitled to the
dominant party. At the same time, opposition parties and their voters could become des-
perate, which enhances the probability for problematic or even non-democratic behavior
like unjustified election boycotts or appeals against election results and/or violence on the
side of the opposition in turn. Second, a party that is always in power can never prove that
it would accept a defeat at the polls, which is an important sign for democratic consoli-
dation. Reasonable suspicion remains that a dominant party behaves only democratically
as long as it wins elections (cf. Huntington, 1991; Alvarez et al., 1996, 5–11). Third, if
dominant parties developed out of liberation movements against colonialism, other sup-
pressive regimes or secessionist movements, they tend to equate the new nationstate with
the dominant party itself and delegitimize new democratic opposition parties as traitors
and collaborators of the ancient regime. At the same time, they can base their support
on natural majorities and deep loyalties from the liberation struggle that are not easily
shaken by bad performances in routine politics. Fourth, if dominant parties have extreme
majorities in parliament that are larger than two thirds, they are tempted to change the
constitution and electoral procedures in order to secure their dominant position for the
future.
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On the other hand, a dominant party may also help to enhance the quality of democ-
racy and democratic consolidation of an electoral regime: First and foremost, a dominant
party provides continuity and stability in many ways. It will be able to develop its poli-
cies over a longer period than a governing party that faces electoral defeat any time soon.
It has the opportunity to develop a long-term national project (which it might also find
instrumental to stay in power). This will foster programmatically oriented politics and
responsiveness. Second, in economically and politically insecure regions, electoral stability
might attract foreign investments, which lead to economic growth. Economic growth in
turn is an important implicit promise of democracy in developing countries, which leads to
voter satisfaction and democratic consolidation. Third, responsibility for poor government
performance and policies is maximally transparent. The voter knows who is to blame and
the dominant party has few excuses: It cannot blame a lack of time to develop the country
or a bad heritage of the forerunner government. It cannot hide its responsibility behind a
coalition government. However, if opposition parties in a dominant party system are rel-
atively weak and non-institutionalized, voters will find no trustworthy alternative to cast
their vote on.
The neglected aspect of dominant party systems are the opposition parties that exist be-
sides the dominant party (note, that not all parties other than the dominant party might
be in opposition; some might be included by the dominant party in an oversized coalition
to neutralize a potential opponent, enable consensus democracy and/or two third majori-
ties in parliament). I argue that their strength and degree of institutionalization defines
the self-perceived vulnerability of the dominant party and influences the programmatic
responsiveness of both (1) the dominant party and (2) the opposition parties/party.
(1) In a dominant party system, party competition does not lead to actual turnovers,
yet it nonetheless produces an opposition party system (or opposition party if there is only
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one opposition party) besides the dominant party. I conceptualize the competitiveness of
the opposition party (system) by its strength and institutionalization, which in turn defines
the self-perceived degree of incumbency vulnerability and potential danger of turnover to
the dominant party. This corresponds to the conceptualization of competition as a “type of
interaction which systematically improves the performance of the organization for the social
circle of which the competitors are part” (I follow Bartolini’s (1999, 442) conzeptualization
of competition and vulnerability; see also Bogaards (2000)). In our case, the competitors
are the dominant party and the opposition parties and the organization of the social circle is
the policy-producing electoral regime of which they are part. Accordingly, the improvement
of the electoral regime is a largely unintended social value of the parties’ competitive hunger
for power (cf. Bartolini, 1999, 446–448). More precisely, this means, as long as the dominant
party considers itself to be in potentially threatening competition with the opposition
parties, it will use its institutionalized position in power to be responsive to the electorate
to secure its dominance for the future. Yet, if it perceives the competitive potential of its
opposition to be low, its responsiveness towards its electorate will decrease. In sum, the
more a dominant party perceives the system to resemble a latent two-party or multiparty-
system the higher its responsiveness to the citizenry will be. For example, the former
dominant Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in Italy and the former dominant Swedish Social
Democratic Workers’ Party (SAP) in Sweden had always an incentive to be responsive to
the citizenry as they faced a constant threat of a relatively strong and institutionalized
opposition who would have been ready to take over power.
(2) Besides providing an incentive for the dominant party to be more responsive to the
citizenry, stronger and more institutionalized opposition parties provide more responsive-
ness themselves. If the same opposition parties compete regularly in minimal competitive
elections instead of appearing and disappearing from one election to the next, they enable
mutual learning and adaptation processes between the electorate and themselves about
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their respective policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004). At the same time, if the opposi-
tion parties/party display minimal voter strength they appear as a trustworthy alternative
to the dominant party and potential opposition voters find it worthy to participate in
elections and form long-term linkages to the opposition. Both processes lead to a higher
degree of programmatic responsiveness of the opposition, which in turn provides incentives
for the dominant party to invest in programmatic responsiveness as well. Additionally,
higher opposition responsiveness also provides the basis for accountability on the side of
the opposition in case it would win future elections.
Essentially, higher dominant party system responsiveness derives from a relatively
stronger and more institutionalized opposition party (system) itself and the concomitant
self-perceived higher incumbency vulnerability of the dominant party. Accordingly, the
two-headed concept degree of dominant party vulnerability and opposition competitiveness
should include the two dimensions that, in their sum, enhance the incumbency vulnerabil-
ity of the dominant party by making it more likely that one day the dominant party will be
toppled by democratic means and at the same time signal regularity and trustworthiness
of the opposition itself: (1) Opposition party system strength – at least one opposition
party or a coalition of opposition parties should display significant voter strength. At the
same time – (2) opposition party system institutionalization – opposition parties should not
appear and disappear from one election to next or lose or win substantial vote-shares from
one election to the next as this impedes orientation and confidence on the side of potential
opposition voters and potential long-term linkage with opposition voters. I consider these
two dimensions as necessary and sufficient conditions for my continuous and two-headed
concept of the degree of dominant party vulnerability and opposition party system compet-
itiveness in dominant party systems (in the following, I mainly use the term opposition
competitiveness on its own to enhance readability). Considering Africa’s young and rel-
atively weakly institutionalized democracies, I prefer the more conservative approach of
29
requiring necessity of both dimensions for the conceptualization of opposition competitive-
ness in dominant party systems to a more liberal one where weakness in one dimension
of opposition competitiveness can be substituted by strength in the other dimension (cf.
Goertz, 2006, 27–67).
The Measurement of the Concept of Opposition Competitiveness
in African Dominant Party Systems
In the following, I discuss how we can identify dominant party systems and how we then
can measure competitiveness degrees of opposition party systems within different dominant
party systems. The measurement is exclusively based on election data. This allows (1)
the coding of as many African party systems as possible, (2) to be as transparent as
possible and (3) to avoid tautology problems with potentially fruitful determinants and
consequences the concept could be related to.
Identifying Dominant Party Systems
Dominant party systems are one possible occurrence among different fragmentation degrees
of party systems. Most scholars prefer to measure the fragmentation degree of African party
systems by Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) continuos Effective Number of Parliamentary
Parties Index (ENPP) because of its easy computability, approved application for the
description of western countries’ party systems, and suitability as a dependent variable in
OLS-regression models (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt and
Galaich, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). However, research that deals exclusively with
measuring problems regarding the fragmentation of African party systems demonstrates
that the ENPP-Index is not suitable in the African context because it overestimates the
number of relevant parties and hence a party system’s fragmentation when a party has an
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absolute majority in parliament (Bogaards, 2004; van Eerd, 2009). This problem is even
addressed by Taagepera (1999) himself.
Instead, because I use Sartori’s typology to define dominant party systems, I propose to
use Sartori’s (2005 [1976]) corresponding identification procedure for African party systems
(cf. Bogaards, 2004; van Eerd, 2009). I use it for the purpose of discerning dominant from
non-dominant party systems:6
First, only elections results are included where the country was not rated by the Free-
dom House Political Rights rating with a value higher than 5 for the year of the election (1
indicates most free political system, 7 most unfree political system) so as to only include
countries with minimum freeness in party competition and to exclude electoral autocracies
that lack the theoretical possibility of incumbency change in elections (cf. section 1).7
There must be at least some amount of uncertainty about electoral outcomes. This proce-
dure corresponds roughly with Lindberg’s (2006) categorization of election observer mission
statements: Apart from the Burkina Faso 1992 elections, my large-N sample will include
no election that Lindberg codes as completely unfree and unfair. It also corresponds with
Levitsky and Way’s (2010, 6–13) differentiation between on the one hand “democracy”
and “competitive authoritarianism”, and on the other hand “full authoritarianism“, where
democratic institutions like elections are “reduced to façade status” (cf. section 1).
Following Bogaards’ (2004) application of Sartori’s party system typology, an African
party system is identified as a dominant party system if the same party achieves an absolute
6Sartori’s (2005 [1976], 107–110) identification procedure is based on his rules for counting relevant
parties. Thereby, if we count only one relevant party in a party system, we identify a dominant party
system. To count relevant parties, Sartori focuses on the number of relevant actors in the party competition
and in the formation of a government. Only parties with coalition or blackmail potential are relevant for
competition, and accordingly, have to be counted. A party has coalition potential, if it could be added
on to achieve an absolute majority needed to form a government. A party has blackmail potential, if
its existence affects the tactics of the party competition (cf. Bogaards, 2004). In the same way, parties
are relevant in presidential systems, if they help or obstruct the president’s election and determine the
accomplishment or lack of an absolute majority for the president in parliament.
7Countries with Political Rights values higher than 5 would correspond to Sartori’s category of
dominant-authoritarian party systems; provided there is only one relevant party according to his counting
rules.
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majority and the presidency for at least three times in a row. We need this time criterion
because we can only make valid claims about the character of a party system by observing
it for some time (Coleman, 1970 [1960], 294; cf. Bogaards, 2004). The first and second
election in third wave regimes only indicates a tendency towards dominance while the third
election either confirms dominance or rupture of alleged dominance. The operationalization
follows this standard procedure of dominance identification (cf. Bogaards, 2004): E.g.,
suppose, I look at three or more subsequent elections of a country, where always the same
party dominates since the beginning of the third wave. Regarding the time criterion and
with single parliamentary elections as the unit of analysis, as soon as the third+ elections
results in a dominant party system, the first and second election are coded as incidences
of dominant party system as well. An additional instance to code an election result as an
incidence of a dominant party system outcome occurs when the same party wins an absolute
majority and the presidency in a formal multiparty election with minimum freeness degree,
and it has already been the dominant-authoritarian party in the pre-third wave time period
where no formal multiparty elections with minimum freeness degrees have been hold.8
The Measurement of Opposition Competitiveness in Dominant Party Systems
After having separated African dominant party systems from African non-dominant party
systems, I develop an index that measures the opposition competitiveness degree in domi-
nant party systems in a continuous manner. The index is based on two electoral-data-based
indicators that measure the two dimensions of opposition competitiveness in a dominant
party system: opposition party system strength and opposition party system institution-
alization (dimensions 1 and 2 in section 2).
8E.g., after Kenya’s transition to formal multiparty elections in 1991, the former sole legal party Kenya
African National Union (KANU) won an absolute majority in parliament as well as the presidency in the
first formal multiparty elections with minimum freeness degrees in 1992.
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The seat share of the runner-up party in the lower house measures opposition party
system strength. The volatility score of the opposition parties on their own, in turn,
measures opposition party system institutionalization, i.e., I compute individual seat shares
of opposition parties as shares of the total number of opposition seats in the lower house.
Volatility scores are based on Pedersen’s (1979) volatility index, which adds the net changes
of the parties’ gained and lost seat shares in an election and divides them by two (Volatility
= 1/2 ∗
∑n
i=1 |SeatSharet − SeatSharet−1|) whereby the values range between 0 and 100
and high scores of volatility indicate a low institutionalization degree of a party system.
After that, I rescale the two measures into a scale from 0 to 100, resulting in a continuos
competitiveness scale similar to Pederson’s volatility index. High values signal a high
competitiveness degree:
Hence, as opposition party system strength can reach a theoretical maximum of 50
percent seat share of the runner-up party in the lower house, the measurement has to be
multiplied by two. For opposition party system institutionalization, in turn, the inverse
of the volatility score of the opposition parties should be taken in order to indicate high
opposition institutionalization with high values. As already explained in section 2, to be on
the safe side, it is important to consider the two dimensions as necessary conditions for the
degree of opposition competitiveness in a dominant party system. This means, to measure
the concept opposition competitiveness degree in a dominant party system the lower value
of the two dimensions opposition party system strength and institutionalization will be
used to measure the concept. This procedure ensures that weakness in one dimension
cannot be substituted by strength in another dimension (cf. Goertz, 2006, 44–46). Such
a conservative approach is necessary to err on the safe side when being confronted with
emerging party systems, as it is predominantly the case in Africa.
The following paragraphs discuss five special cases regarding the two-dimensional cod-
ing rules for the opposition competitiveness index in African dominant party systems:
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First, note, that I only rescale but do not standardize the two measures, seat share
of the runner-up and opposition volatility, before I include them in the index of opposi-
tion competitiveness. Because I use a conservative rule for the index construction (the
lower value of the two measures is the final value of the index), the relative impact of
the two measures on the final index of competitiveness depends on the empirical vari-
ance of the two measures. Because we deal with dominant party systems, it is likely that
runner-up seat shares vary generally on a rather low level and accordingly have a bigger
impact than the measure of opposition volatility on the final competitiveness index. This
would not be problematic, because a higher weight of the opposition party system strength
measure vis-à-vis the opposition institutionalization measure in the final competitiveness
index would be consistent with theory and therefore welcomed: I.e., I consider the pro-
grammatic responsiveness-conducing factor of an institutionalized opposition party system
only to come into effect, when the runner-up opposition party has at least some amount
of strength. E.g. imagine an opposition party system of one lonely opposition party that
achieves every four years one seat in parliament while the dominant party holds the other
199 seats. Such an opposition party system would reach zero percent volatility, i.e. 100
percent institutionalization, but it would hardly be conducive to a feeling of insecurity and
incumbency vulnerability on the side of the dominant party. Accordingly, it makes sense
that in this case, the low value of 0.5 percent seat share will be reflected in a final compet-
itiveness index of 1 (on a theoretical range from 0–100). Nonetheless, it is still essential to
check for opposition institutionalization in the construction of the competitiveness index.
E.g., in cases where a newcomer opposition party reaches relatively large seat shares while
established opposition parties fall suddenly into oblivion. This is hardly conducive for pro-
grammatic orientation and responsiveness. The competitiveness index would nonetheless
be sensitive to a repetition of the good result by this particular opposition party in the
next elections, because in that case, the volatility score of the opposition would become
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low and the impact of the high seat share would be reflected in the final competitiveness
index of the second election.
Second, when being confronted with founding first third wave elections, I cannot com-
pute volatility scores for this election. In that case, the opposition competitiveness index
is always based on the strength of the runner-up party in the lower house, which is more
acceptable – as just outlined due to the relatively higher importance of the strength mea-
sure – than the alternative of excluding first elections and losing important observations
of party competition in young electoral regimes.
Third, some parties other than the dominant party in a dominant party system might be
included by the dominant party in an oversized coalition to neutralize a potential opponent,
enable consensus democracy and/or two third majorities in parliament. In case of oversized
coalitions, I do not count such additional governing parties as opposition parties but add
their seat share to the dominant party.9
Fourth, one could find the opposition volatility measure for opposition party system
institutionalization problematic in cases where the seat share of the dominant party drops
drastically from one election to the next, say from 80 percent to 51 percent. In that case,
seat shares from opposition parties could rise strongly but proportionally without funda-
mentally changing the opposition party system structure; and a high opposition volatility
score would falsely indicate a low opposition party system institutionalization value for that
election. Therefore, I checked all observations where the final opposition competitiveness
index is based on a low opposition institutionalization score and where the seat share of
the dominant party dropped for more than 20 percent. For 53 lower house parliamentary
9E.g. in Lesotho’s 2007 elections, the National Independent Party (NIP) obtained four more seats
than the main opposition party All Basotho Convention ABC. Yet it has been co-opted by the dominant
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) (interviews with political experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010).
However, adjusting for that did change the final opposition competitiveness index for the 2007 elections
only marginally.
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elections in 18 African third wave dominant party systems this is only the case for the
elections in Ethiopia 2005, Ghana 1996 and Zambia 2001:
In the Ethiopian 2005 elections, the seat share of the dominant party, Ethiopian Peo-
ple’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its affiliated parties dropped from 88
percent to 60 percent. However, the large opposition volatility score of 99.54 for the 2005
elections is not based on that decline, but on a large restructuring of the opposition land-
scape in that year. Four newly founded parties reached a seat share of 20 percent while
independents and other, minor parties lost 28 of their 29 seats (Nunley, 2009). The same
goes for the 2001 Zambian elections where the dominant party, Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD) even dropped from a comfortable 87 percent to 46 percent and could
only uphold its absolute majority due to gains in by-elections and the co-optation of op-
position MPs. However, also here, the high opposition volatility score of 98.76 is not an
artifact of the large erosion of dominance and a proportional seat share increase of estab-
lished opposition parties, but on huge gains by the newly formed opposition party, United
Party for National Development (UPND) (Nunley, 2009; UPND, 2013). However, Ghana’s
1996 elections indeed would produce an coding procedure artifact of a falsely identified low
opposition party system competitiveness. The main Ghanaian opposition party, National
Patriotic Party (NPP), to the at that time dominant party, National Democratic Congress
(NDC), boycotted the founding 1992 third wave elections and participated in the 1996
elections. Accordingly, the dominant NDC’s seat share dropped from 94 percent in 1992
to 66 percent in 1996 while the NPP’s seat share changed from zero percent to 30 percent
in 1996 (Nunley, 2009). As the NPP’s roots can be traced back to the Danquah-Busia
tradition and the 1947 founded party, United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), it would
be wrong to talk of a newcomer opposition party in that case (Morrison, 2004; Osei, 2012).
Accordingly, I consider the high 1996 opposition volatility score of 92.54 to be an artifact
of the coding procedure and base the opposition competitiveness index for Ghana’s 1996
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elections on the seat-share of the runner-up party (30 ∗ 2 = 60), instead of on the lower
value of the inverted volatility score (100− 92.54 = 7.46).
Fifth, in cases where the dominant party is only confronted with one opposition party,
i.e. the opposition party system consists of one party, opposition volatility scores will
naturally be zero percent as long as this opposition party obtains at least one seat in par-
liament. Regardless of its seat share in comparison to the total party system, its seat share
within the opposition party system will always be 100 percent. In that case, the opposi-
tion competitiveness index is exclusively based on twice the total seat share of this party.
This procedure somewhat favors latent two-party dominant party systems to latent multi-
party dominant party systems, provided that the seat share of this lonely opposition party
reaches some amount of significance. This is consistent with my theory, because visibility
and concentration of opposition party strength in latent two-party systems is naturally
higher than in multi-party systems and should increase opposition competitiveness and
incumbency vulnerability to the same degree (cf. Bogaards, 2000). However, if the seat
share of this lonely opposition party is rather low, resulting opposition competitiveness
scores will correctly remain low, as such an opposition party is unlikely to be a threat to
the dominant party.
Because much of the focus of this study is on long-term explanations, it makes sense
to analyze opposition competitiveness index averages over third wave elections in African
dominant party systems to smooth out contemporary fluctuations of opposition compet-
itiveness due to punctual events like election boycotts by important opposition parties,
which are naturally more likely to occur in dominant party systems (since opposition par-
ties are more likely to become desperate and/or impatient because of the recurring defeats).
When I investigate long term explanations and outcomes of opposition competitiveness in
dominant party systems, it would be arbitrary to take competitiveness values of one sin-
gle election instead of the bigger picture of several elections in a row. Also, as noted in
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the subsection before, claims about the character of a party system, and of an opposition
party system, have a higher validity if we observe it for some minimal amount of time. The
dynamic models on the other hand, will make use of punctual opposition competitiveness,
i.e. an observation is one single third wave election.
Regarding the application of the opposition competitiveness measure on non-dominant
party systems, note that a non-dominant party system is more competitive by definition,
because it experiences effective incumbency change. Hence, it would not make much sense
to devise an analogous opposition competitiveness index in non-dominant party systems.
Accordingly, it also would not be useful to analytically conflate samples of dominant with
non-dominant party systems, because the logic of competition is different and the impor-
tance of volatility of the party system is – in my theoretical framework – reduced to the
opposition part of the party system in dominant party systems, whereas volatility is an
important characteristic of the whole party system in non-dominant party systems.
Nonetheless, it is possible to devise an analogous measure of incumbent vulnerability
and opposition strength for non-dominant party systems. One could measure the seat
share of the runner-up party in non-dominant party systems in order to indicate incum-
bency vulnerability and opposition strength, and combine it with volatility scores of the
whole party system to indicate party system institutionalization. The two measures can be
combined as necessary and sufficient dimensions of the potential programmatic responsive-
ness capacity of a respective non-dominant party system. In the empirical section of the
book, I investigate if the variance of this concept has equivalent outcomes and explanations
as opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems.
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Large-N Case Selection and Data for African Party Systems (for
sections 2 and 3)
This book is about African third wave dominant party systems that are situated within
democratic electoral regimes (polyarchies) and competitive authoritarian electoral regimes.
Dominant authoritarian systems, where incumbency change through peaceful elections is
impossible under any circumstances, i.e. electoral autocracies (subcategory of Levitsky and
Way’s (2010) category of “full authoritarianism”), are not of concern here. Accordingly,
the book has a regional focus, which is temporarily and conceptually restricted. The
history of colonization and democratization in Africa is distinct from other third wave
regions like Southern Europe, Latin America or Eastern Europe. If at all, the timing
of decolonization and democratization is more similar to some of the Asian third wave
countries, but conditions like state capacity were higher in Asia than in Africa with its
generally weak states. Nonetheless, if similar conditions apply in some countries of other
third wave world regions, I do not want to exclude partial portability of the findings.
The large-N case selection includes all national elections for the lower house in African
countries between 1990 and 200810 that meet some minimum freeness standards of party
competition (see above), and where at least two consecutive multiparty elections took
place that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention (cf.
Lindberg, 2007; Freedom House, 2009): We need at least two consecutive elections to
determine important characteristics of the system like stability and institutionalization.
Countries in respective election years, which have a Freedom House Political Rights rating
of 6 and 7 are excluded (category of “not free” countries in Freedom House) because it is
a reasonable assumption to consider their election results to be an exclusively fabricated
product with no uncertainty at all about their election outcome (exemptions are Djibouti
10Including Botswana’s 1989 election.
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1992 and Gabon 2006 – both PR value of 6 – because all of their remaining elections in the
sample meet the criterium). In doing this, I follow Freedom House’s distinction of “free”
and ”partly free“ (political rights values between 1 and 5.5) countries on the one hand and
“not free” (political rights values between 6 and 7) countries on the other hand.11
I consider the measurement of the Freedom House Political Rights index a sufficiently
valid proxy to discern between electoral autocracies on the one hand and competitive
authoritarianism and democracies as polyarchies on the other hand. The Political Rights
index combines three subcategories about the freeness and fairness of the electoral process,
the openness of the political system regarding political pluralism and participation, and
the functioning of the government (cf. with Freedom House (2009) and section 2 on p.
50). Levitsky and Way (2010, 365) consider an electoral regime to be fully authoritarian
if opposition parties and/or candidates are regularly excluded, electoral results severely
falsified or major civic and/or opposition groups severely repressed. Analogously, Political
Rights indices of 6 and 7 indicate countries that have few and very restricted political
rights, opposition groups are severely and violently oppressed, and there is no uncertainty
about electoral outcomes (Freedom House, 2009).
The resulting sample consists of 53 observations – observations are country years of
lower house elections – in 18 sub-Saharan African dominant party systems, which equals
approximately 3 observations/election-years per country. Both the large-N analyses in this
section of the book as well as the ones in the next section of the book are based on this
case selection.
The identification of dominant party systems and the subsequent coding process of the
opposition competitiveness index relies on raw electoral data provided by Nunley’s (2009)
11This procedure allows me to define the boundary between competitive authortarianism and electoral
autocracy more narrowly than Levitsky and Way (2010) as it excludes electoral regimes like Cameron and
Zimbabwe that became increasingly autocratic shortly after first third wave elections, respectively at the
end of the 1990s, to the extent of becoming pure electoral autocracies (Levitsky and Way’s (2010, 32–34)
case selection includes all countries that were competitive authoritarian according to their criteria at the
beginning of the 1990s).
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African Elections Database and Derksen (2009). Amongst other, the electoral data pro-
vides detailed election results of every sub-Saharan African parliamentary and presidential
election since independence including elections that have been organized by the colonial
powers before independence.12
Table 1 on p. 43 reveals the case selection for the large-N section of the book and
each case’s respective average opposition competitiveness index over – on average – three
third wave elections. The effective number of consecutive elections between 1990 and 2008
that have not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention is displayed
for each country.13 Also reported are the respective average Political Rights scores (1,
highest freedom score, 7, lowest freedom score) of each dominant party system because
they are decisive for inclusion of each case in the large-N data set, the respective regime
type (“democracy” for Political Rights values between 1 and 2.5, and “competitive au-
thoritarian” for Political Rights values between 2.5 and 5.5), and the total time period of
12In cases where these two databases itemized unspecified “others” categories, which subsume the elec-
tion results for small parties, I tried to research the content of this category by referring to alternative
sources, and, if trustable, used their specified election results: Carr’s (2007) election archive, data by
Freedom House (1991-2002), the database of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, annual editions of
the Fischer Weltalmanach, the Parline Database, and the data collection Political Parties of the World,
edited by Day (2002). The same goes for reported vacant seats and undecided, postponed or annulled
election results. I also used these sources to check if parties that seemingly belong to the opposition are
not part of an oversized coalition of the dominant party.
13In some countries, the competitiveness index is based on less than three elections: Gambia’s 1992
elections are excluded because of the military coup in 1994 while the 1997 elections are excluded because
they were deeply flawed and indexed by Freedom House with the lowest Political Rights value of 7. Ghana’s
competitiveness index is only based on the 1992 and 1996 elections, because the party system changed
its party system status due the results of the 2000 presidential and legislative elections from dominant
to non-dominant. The same goes for Kenya, that changed its status from dominance to non-dominance
due to the results of the 2002 elections. Additionally, the Kenyan 1997 elections have been excluded
because the freeness of multiparty competition deteriorated drastically after the relatively free founding
third wave elections in 1992 and only recovered in 2002 (Freedom House, 2009). Senegal experienced the
end of its dominant party system with the outcome of the presidential elections in 2000. Accordingly, its
opposition competitiveness index is only based on the 1993 and 1998 elections. Lesotho’s electoral regime
was interrupted after the founding third wave elections in 1993 due to a coup led by the constitutional
monarch Letsie III in 1994. However, a joint diplomatic action by South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe
forced the King to reinstall the government. Likewise, the 1998 election outcome led to widespread violence
in the capital Maseru and a joint military intervention by South Africa and Botswana to restore peace and
order. A reform of the electoral system was enforced by the invaders, which leads to a new beginning of
the electoral cycle in 2002 (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004). Mauritania’s 1992 and 1996
elections were deeply flawed and therefore excluded (Freedom House, 2009).
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dominance for the respective dominant party.14 Generally, as already discussed in section
1, my Freedom House-based distinction between democracy and competitive authoritari-
anism is more lenient than the one of Levitsky and Way (2010) as I consider Botswana
to be a democracy instead of a competitive authoritarian regime. Lesotho, which is not
part of Levitsky and Way’s case selection, is also considered to be a democracy, follow-
ing the Freedom House-based distinction. However, if I would apply Levitsky and Way’s
criteria of competitive authoritarianism instead, I would consider it to be a case of moder-
ate comparative authoritarianism; analogous to Botswana (van Eerd, forthcoming). Last
but not least, during and after its period of dominant party system, Ghana made steady
progress in the democratic conduct of its multiparty elections, and changed its status from
“competitive authoritarianism” to “democracy” in the 2000s (Freedom House, 2009).
Descriptives of the Opposition Competitiveness Index and its Mea-
sures
Table 2 on p. 44 shows the descriptive statistics of the opposition competitiveness index
in African dominant party systems and its two constituting measures, the seat share of
the runner-up party and the opposition volatility. The statistics are based on averages
over third wave lower house elections. Note, that the opposition competitiveness index
values are divided by 10 (theoretical range from 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 100), as this will
ease comparability with other determinants in the inferential statistics that follow further
below.
14Note, that Botswana already experienced uninterrupted free multiparty elections since independence,
which all have been won by the dominant party, Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) (Freedom House,
2009; Nunley, 2009). However, to allow comparability with the rest of the cases, Botswana’s average



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Descriptive statistics of opposition competitiveness index and its constituting mea-
sures
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) 2.85 1.87 0 8.47 18
(average over third wave elections)
% Seat share runner-up (average over third wave elections) 15.61 8.91 0 42.53 18
Opposition volatility (average over third wave elections) 29.92 26.28 0 79.17 18
The descriptive statistics of the two constituting measures of opposition competitive-
ness, the seat share of the runner-up opposition party and the opposition party system
volatility, confirm the prediction stated further above: The seat share of the runner-up
opposition party varies at a lower level than opposition volatility. Hence, it is mostly the
decisive measure for the final opposition competitiveness index. More precisely, the average
seat share of the opposition in an African dominant party system is 15.61 percent, which
is equal to an opposition competitiveness index value of 31.22 (15.61 ∗ 2), and close to the
effective average competitiveness index of 28.5, while the average opposition volatility is
29.92 percent, which is equal to a much higher index value of 70.08 (100−29.92).15 Accord-
ingly, the biggest problem for opposition competitiveness is not opposition volatility but
general opposition weakness. The opposition volatility index is only decisive for the final
opposition competitiveness index in 6 out of 53 elections (the fourth election in Ethiopia,
the second election in Lesotho, the second election in Mozambique and the second to fourth
elections in Zamibia) (see figure 36 on p. 304 in the appendix). Accordingly, it influences
the final average competitiveness index for the 18 cases of dominant party systems only
in four instances: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia. Especially in Zambia, and
to a lesser degree in Lesotho, the main weakness of the opposition does not derive from
generally weak opposition parties but from frequent re-configurations of the opposition
landscape from one election to the next, which makes opposition voter’s orientation diffi-
cult and therefore decreases general opposition competitiveness to a stronger degree than
15The medians are not substantially different from the means (not displayed).
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the overall potential of the opposition’s total vote share would suggest. Hence, it makes
sense to include opposition institutionalization in the competitiveness index.
In comparison to that, not surprisingly, the average opposition strength in African
non-dominant party systems is generally higher (25.39 percent vis-à-vis 15.61 percent)
while the overall party system volatility degree is comparable to the volatility degree of
the opposition in dominant party systems (26.27 percent vis-à-vis 29.92 percent). And as
expected, due to the presence of effective competition in non-dominant party systems (i.e.
frequent change of incumbency), the respective average level of competitiveness is generally
higher than the average level of competitiveness of the opposition parties in dominant party
systems (4.63 vis-à-vis 2.85, on a scale from 0 to 10; see descriptive statistic in table 12 on
p. 303 in the appendix).
The significant difference of the mean level of competitiveness in dominant vis-à-vis
non-dominant African party systems confirms my theoretical presumption that it would
be a comparison of apples and oranges to compare competitiveness levels of dominant
party systems with competitiveness levels of non-dominant party systems because each
group follows its own logic of competition. Whereas theoretical competition is a given to a
certain degree in both families of party systems (depending on the fairness of competition),
party competition is manifest in non-dominant party systems and latent in dominant party
systems; and I am interested in the difference this “latent” competition makes.
Figure 1 on p. 46 visualizes the average opposition competitiveness index for each
African dominant party system case in ascending order. There is a steady increase of
opposition institutionalization from Djibouti (lowest) to Seychelles (DJ and SC in figure
1).16 Mozambique is placed at the higher end of the bar graph and clearly an outlier. The
former civil-war rebel group and main opposition party Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) causes this high opposition competitiveness value. Some describe Mozam-
16In fact, in Djibouti’s third wave elections, no opposition party could ever obtain a single seat in
parliament; amongst others, due to the highly disproportional party-block vote system (Nunley, 2009).
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bique’s political system as an emerging two-party system (e.g. Carbone, 2005; Manning,
2007, 260) However, it has never experienced change of incumbency since founding third
wave elections in 1994.
In the following, I demonstrate the significance of the concept of opposition competi-
tiveness for the quality of democracy in 18 African third wave dominant party systems.
The Empirical Relevance of the Concept of Opposition Compet-
itiveness for the Contemporary Quality Level of Democracy in
African Dominant Party Systems
In this subsection, I test the potentially positive effect of the degree of opposition compet-
itiveness on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems. The analysis is
based on the case selection of 18 African dominant party systems defined above.
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Measuring the Quality of Democracy in a Large-N Design
To test the effects of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy, I refer to
a broad conceptualization of the quality of democracy in an electoral regime and use
Freedom House’ Civil Liberties index. Together with the Political Rights index, it is part
of Freedom House’ annually published data and reports on Freedom in the World. Freedom
House measures several democratic qualities in society that are distinct from the democratic
quality of elections and party competition (cf. Lindberg, 2006, 102), and combines them
in its Civil Liberties index. Accordingly, the measure is sufficiently independent from
my opposition competitiveness index, which allows to avoid tautology. The index ranges
from 1 (wide range of civil liberties realized in society) to 7 (few or no civil liberties
present at all in society) and has its emphasis on the effective presence of civil liberties
“on the ground” compared to their mere constitutional existence (cf. Lindberg, 2006, 101).
The Civil Liberties index captures the extent of the freedoms of expression and belief,
associational rights (non-partisan related), rule of law, and personal autonomy, and is based
on aggregate scores of 15 civil liberties checklist questions, which are currently researched
and answered by 70 analysts and academic advisors (for the complete checklist of questions
see Freedom House, 2009). Freedom House has been criticized for the lack of availability
of disaggregated scores of the index and lack of transparency regarding rules of weighting
and aggregation (cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).17 Despite these objections, the index
has important advantages over alternative indices: First, the index covers an extensive
period of time, since 1972, and every independent country in the world for a dimension of
the quality of democracy outside of the immediate electoral arena and party competition.
Second, the index is widely accepted as capturing most validly empirical realities and to
17Recently, Freedom House made the disaggregated checklist scores for the most recent Political Rights
and Civil Liberties ratings publicly available. However, they are only dating back to 2006.
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be in accordance with evaluations of regional experts and case studies (cf. Lindberg, 2006,
100–103).
To ease interpretation I invert the index so that higher values mean higher quality of
democracy. The data is provided by Freedom House (2011). Freedom House reports and
indices are always based on the precedent year. E.g., for a country’s value for 2008, one
has to take Freedom House’s Civil Liberties assessment of 2009.
Other Determinants of the Quality of Democracy
The model includes two standard explanations of the quality of democracy in a country,
the level of modernization and the level of corruption. Additionally, the number of third
wave elections are included to control for the number of observations, on which the country
average of the opposition competitiveness index is based. The theoretical idea behind the
inclusion of this factor is that the regular “exercise” of formal multiparty elections leads
to path-dependent learning experiences of the involved actors and to more democratic
quality in the society (Lindberg, 2006). Last but not least, the model controls for the
freeness and fairness degree of elections because this factor is usually strongly connected
with the quality of democracy in society. The inclusion of this last variable should be the
most difficult test for my concept of opposition competitiveness because the Political Rights
index that I use for the measurement is not only usually empirically highly related to the
Civil Liberties index but also includes informations about the significance of the opposition
vote in an electoral regime (Pearson’s r of 0.26 between opposition competitiveness and
Political Rights can be considered as acceptable) (cf. Freedom House, 2009).
Amongst others, the modernization theory goes back to Lipset (1959). The theory
claims that nations that are economically better off are also more likely to sustain democ-
racy. According to Lipset, socioeconomic development leads to a wealthier and more
educated lower strata. This should make the masses less susceptible to extreme and un-
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democratic ideologies and demagogues. Additionally, socioeconomic development leads to
the growth of a pro-democratic middle class. In turn, income distribution becomes more
equal and the upper strata has less to fear from a “tyranny of the majority” that could lead
to extreme redistributive laws in a democratic setting (cf. Boix and Stokes, 2003, 539ff.).
To correctly gauge the influence of socioeconomic development on democratic quality,
we have to control for the potentially distorting effect of rentier economies on socioeco-
nomic development and democracy. Because “rentier states” have high levels of natural
resource wealth, they generate large revenues through the resources’ raw export to for-
eign actors while only an negligible proportion of the national workforce is engaged in the
process of the resource extraction. If economic wealth derives from natural resources, the
“modernization effect” associated with economic development does not work. Occupa-
tional specialization and higher levels of education that usually come along with economic
development and cause democracy-promoting social and cultural change are not needed for
economic development through the export of raw natural resources. Additionally, govern-
ments that receive enough revenues from natural resources are less dependent on taxation
and therefore less accountable to their citizens (cf. Ross, 2001; Beblawi, 1987).
Corruption in turn leads to a lower quality of democracy because corruption as an
informal institution is one of the main obstacles for a formal democratic regime to become
an “effective” democracy “on the ground”. Corruption distorts the formally universal
access to policies and institutions of the democratic regime into exclusive access for the
few; the “for the people” part of Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg address becomes dependent
on the arbitrariness of bureaucrats and other gate keepers.18 Especially components F and
G of the Civil Liberties checklist questions, “rule of law” (e.g. equal treatment by the courts
and the police) and “personal autonomy and individual rights” (e.g. freedom of education
or economic freedoms) become severely damaged in the context of rampant corruption.
18“[G]overnment of the people, by the people, for the people.“
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Last but not least, corruption is a sign for a weak and in-effective regime performance. If
a regime does not deliver the basic functions of government, it becomes illegitimate, which
renders formally democratic regimes to become fragile and weak (Lipset, 1959, 86).
Operationalization of the Other Determinants
Socioeconomic development is measured by the logarithmized Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) (PPP constant US-Dollar) per capita. The data is extracted from the Africa
Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2009). Resource dependency is measured
by adding up the export value (constant 2000 US-Dollar) of mineral-based fuels and the
export value of non-fuel ores and metals exports and calculate it as share of GDP (constant
2000 US-Dollar) (cf. Ross, 2001). The World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) provide
the raw data (World Bank, 2009).19 Missing observations are completed by consulting Der
Fischer Weltalmanach (2009). Transparency International’s (2009) Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) measures corruption on a continuous scale from 0 to 10. I invert the index to
signify high corruption levels with high values.
Additionally, a count variable of the number of consecutive third wave elections between
1990 and 2008 that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention
is included (equivalent to the number of observations per country, on which the average
opposition competitiveness index is based). The data is based on Nunley (2009), while
interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual Freedom House
country reports (Freedom House, 2009; Freedom House, 1991-2002).
The measurement of the Freedom House Political Rights index is analogous to the Civil
Liberties index (Freedom House, 2011): The rating process is based on analysts’ answers
to ten political rights checklist questions. The questions on political rights ask – amongst
others – about the freeness and fairness of elections, the openness of the political system
19For the export value, a PPP constant US-Dollar measure is not available. Accordingly, to calculate
the dependency degree, I took the GDP measure in constant 2000 US-Dollar.
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regarding the organization of political parties, the existence of a significant opposition vote
and the functioning of the government. Data is provided by Freedom House (2011). To
ease interpretability, I invert the index so that higher values mean more political rights.
Descriptives of the Contemporary Quality of Democracy and its Determinants,
and Methods
I analyze the empirical relevance of opposition competitiveness index averages over third
wave elections in African dominant party systems on the contemporary quality level of
democracy. Whereas the opposition competitiveness index value as a characteristic of a
dominant party system is based on the average opposition competitiveness over 2–4 ob-
servations/elections between 1990 and 2008 (see section 2), the quality of democracy and
the other independent variables are measured for the year 2008. This should test the con-
duciveness of partially temporally earlier opposition competitiveness to the contemporary
quality of democracy. For the three countries that changed their party system status from
dominance to non-dominance during the observation period – Ghana and Senegal in 2000,
Kenya in 2002 – (see table 1 on p. 43), I also take the Civil Liberties score of 2008 in the
dataset.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that are involved in the test of
the empirical relevance of the opposition competitiveness index for democratic quality.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Freedom House’s Civil Liberties index and its determi-
nants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Civil liberties (Freedom House, inverted, 1–7) 4.5 1.15 3 6 18
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) 2.85 1.87 0 8.47 18
(average over third wave elections, 1990–2008)
GDP / capita (log) 7.77 1.05 6.65 9.89 18
Resource dependency 0.11 0.2 0 0.72 18
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10) 6.63 1.04 4.2 8.1 18
Number of third wave elections 3.33 0.84 2 5 18
Political rights (Freedom House, inverted, 1–7) 4.17 1.42 2 7 18
In 2008, the contemporary and former third wave African dominant party systems’
inverted Civil Liberties score varies around a mean of 4.5 between a minimum of 3 in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon and Gambia and a maximum of 6 in Botswana, Ghana, Namibia
and South Africa. The descriptives of the average competitiveness are identical to table 2
on p. 44, and are reported here for the sake of completeness in the table.
There is considerable variance of GDP per capita in the data set. It varies between a
minimum of 774 PPP constant US-Dollars in Mozambique (not displayed in table, equal
to a logarithmized GDP per capita of 6.65 in Mozambique) and a maximum of 19’758 PPP
constant US-Dollars in Seychelles (logarithmized GDP per capita of 9.89). The mean is at
4359 PPP constant US-Dollars (median of 1438 PPP constant US-Dollars).
The distribution of the level of resource dependency in the dataset is highly positively
skewed as the median is around a low level of 1 percent dependency while the mean is
around 11 percent (measured by the export value of fuels and ores as a share of the GDP).
In 2008, Gabon is the most resource dependent dominant party system with 72 percent
dependency followed in descending order by Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania and South Africa,
which are all above the 75 percent percentile of 8 percent resource dependency.
The sample has a generally high level of corruption with a mean of 6.63 on the inverted
Corruption Perception Index scale from 0 to 10, with Botswana being the least corrupt
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country (index value of 4.2 in 2008) and The Gambia the most corrupt country (index
value of 8.1).
The sample’s mean Political Rights index is slightly lower than the mean Civil Liberties
index (4.17 compared to 4.5 and the range of values is higher because of on the one hand
Gabon’s deteriorated political rights situation since its elections in 2006 (see section 2) and
Mauritania’s military coup in 2008, and on the other hand Ghana’s perfectly free election
in 2008 (Freedom House, 2011).20
With this set of variables and in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, I run
four OLS multiple regression models (m2–m5 in table 4 of the following subsection) based
on 18 cases of African third wave dominant party systems (see case selection in table 1
on p. 43) and contrast it with the simple linear regression between average opposition
competitiveness and the 2008 quality level of democracy (m1 in table 4). I do not aim at
developing a complete model that explains the level of the quality of democracy. Rather I
want to show the general significance of my measure for the quality of democracy and test
it against the most important standard explanations and potential origins of a spurious
relationship.
Results
In all five models of table 4, indeed higher average degrees of opposition competitiveness
in African dominant party systems over the time period of the third wave are conducive to
contemporary high quality levels of democracy (statistical significance level at p < 0.05 in
models 1 to 5 in table 4). This supports the general argument of the book: First, African
dominant party systems are a rather heterogeneous group of electoral regimes compatible
with varying quality levels of democracy (cf. also with the descriptive statistics in table
3 in the previous subsection). And second, stronger and more institutionalized opposition
20The results in the following subsection are robust to the exclusion of Gabon and Mauritania (not
displayed in the book).
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parties in African dominant party systems (even if too weak to take power) are conducive
to a higher quality of democracy in society.21
In detail, when no other variables are present, an increase of an opposition competitive-
ness value of 1 (remember that the scale of the opposition competitiveness index in table 4 is
rescaled from 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 100 to enable comparison with the other determinants
in the model) leads to an increase of almost a third of a Civil Liberties index score (see
model 1 in table 4 and the scatterplot in figure 2). In other words, an average seat share
strengthening of the runner-up opposition party of 5 percent or a decrease of 10 percent
volatility in the opposition party system already leads to an increase of almost a third of
a Civil Liberties index score. Opposition competitiveness alone explains 17 percent of the
variance. The model fit of model 1 would be almost double if we would exclude the case of
Mozambique, which has a relatively weak quality of democracy in 2008, contrarily to what
we could expect from its extraordinarily high opposition competitiveness index (result not
displayed in book; cf. with figure 2 instead). This counter-intuitive concomitance of high
opposition strength and institutionalization and a relatively low quality of democracy can
be observed in other regions of the third wave: E.g., in Latin America, the party systems
of Columbia and Venezuela in the second half of the 20th century were highly institution-
alized and seemingly competitive, yet they were not programmatically responsive to their
electorate and the quality of democracy was rather low (Bornschier, Forthcoming; Luna
and Zechmeister, 2005). Considering Mozambique’s main political parties’ past of civil
war rivalry, we could argue that the more party loyalties are based on the experience of
21First, these results are robust to the exclusion of the cases of Gabon and Mauritania, which both
changed from competitive authoritarianism to electoral autocracies since their last elections in 2006 (not
displayed in book). And second, these results are also highly robust to an alternative measure of the
dependent variable of the quality of democracy: In table 13 in the appendix, I take the mean value
for approval of the Afrobarometer 2008 question q21 (“people should be free to speak their minds no
matter how unpopular their views”) in order to capture the quality of democracy in society by focusing
on democratic attitudes in societies in dominant party systems that are confronted with large natural
majorities for one party. Yet, the number of cases reduces to 10 because of missing countries that are not






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Scatterplot of the quality of democracy on opposition competitiveness in African
dominant party systems
violent conflict in opposition to legacies of non-violent conflict, the less opposition strength
and institutionalization necessarily leads to the fulfillment of its promise of programmatic
responsiveness and high quality of democracy. Figure 2 shows that Nigeria has a relatively
low quality level of democracy despite a competitive opposition in its dominant party sys-
tem, too. Amongst others, this could be due to Nigeria’s strict requirements for parties’
electoral registration (Bogaards, 2010b; Bogaards, Basedau and Christof, 2010).22 This, in
turn, would imply that artificial competitiveness of the opposition is not as conducive to
higher quality levels of democracy as competitiveness of the opposition reached through
non-institutional means.
22See also a more detailed discussion on the potential causes of high opposition competitiveness degrees
in Nigeria on p. 107.
56
The influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains signifi-
cant in the presence of other determinants in models 2 to 5 of table 4. In the presence of the
logarithmized GDP per capita and resource dependency (model 2), the positive influence of
opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains equally strong and signifi-
cant while modernization measured by the logarithmized GDP per capita has the expected
positive but weak significant influence on the quality of democracy in African dominant
party systems (p < 0.1). Resource dependency has the expected negative and significant
influence on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems (p < 0.05). E.g.
if resource dependency increases 10 percent, the Civil Liberties index decreases 0.27 level
points. Most importantly, compared with model 1, my opposition competitiveness index is
robust to the inclusion of these two standard explanations of the level of democracy. The
level of explained variance increases about 24 percent.
As expected – the influence of corruption on the quality of democracy is highly sig-
nificant and negative (p < 0.001, model 3). The inclusion of this standard explanation
results in a model fit of 62 percent explained variance. If corruption increases one Corrup-
tion Perception Index point, the quality of democracy decreases 0.75 Civil Liberties index
points. In the presence of the corruption determinant, the influence of the opposition com-
petitiveness index becomes somewhat weaker, compared with models 1 and 2, but remains
satisfyingly significant.
Whereas the number of third wave elections has no significant influence on the quality
of democracy in African dominant party systems (model 4), the inverted Freedom House
Political Rights index, which is the measure for the freeness and fairness degree of elections,
has the expected highly significant and positive influence on the quality of democracy in
society, which is measured by the inverted Freedom House Civil Liberties index (p < 0.001).
Yet, despite the naturally strong influence when we explain the level of democracy in
society with the level of democracy in elections, and despite the fact, that the freeness and
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fairness degree of elections includes characteristics of the opposition itself, the influence of
opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains significant.
Conclusion
In sum, this section of the book demonstrates that the third wave of democratization in
Africa can be successful, even if the government remains dominated by one major political
party. A competitive opposition party (system) with some minimum amount of strength
and institutionalization – even if too weak to take power – can be conducive to a higher
quality of democracy. This result is robust to the inclusion of standard explanations of the
quality level of democracy.
This means that dominant party systems are compatible with relatively high levels of
democracy and that opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems is not automat-
ically on a homogeneously low level, i.e. a direct function of the existence of a dominant
party system. Naturally, opposition competitiveness is overall on a lower degree in com-
parison with the generally more competitive non-dominant party systems as the rather
low mean of the opposition competitiveness index and the rather low average seat share of
the runner-up party proves. Yet, there is significant opposition competitiveness variation
within the group of African dominant party systems, and this variation in turn proves to
be an important determinant of the quality of democracy in this special group of party
systems, which so far has been misjudged as problematic for democratic consolidation by
definition.
I.e., there exists an alternative path to democracy in Africa that works through domi-
nant party systems with competitive opposition parties instead of the generally championed
path of non-dominant party systems; likewise to democratic consolidation in the dominant
party systems of Mexico at the beginning the 2000s, or Italy and Japan after the Second
World War. And this path does not necessarily work through effective incumbency change
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as the case of Ghana tentatively suggests. After all, Ghana improved its quality of democ-
racy to a substantial degree already before incumbency change in 2000 (Freedom House.
Freedom in The World., 2013). Moreover, incumbency changes in formerly dominant party
systems in Senegal 2000, Kenya 2002 and more recently in Zambia 2011 did not lead to
significant long-term improvements of their quality of democracy (Freedom House. Free-
dom in The World., 2013), while countries like Botswana and South Africa, and to a lesser
degree Mozambique and Seychelles, have higher qualities of democracy in society without
incumbency change.
What could explain the varying degrees of opposition competitiveness in African dom-
inant party systems? This is the topic of the following section of the book.
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3 Explanations for Varying Opposition Competitive-
ness in African Party Systems
I follow a “Rokkanian” perspective of critical junctures and historical legacies of politi-
cal cleavages to explain different degrees of opposition competitiveness in African domi-
nant party systems, i.e. different degrees of opposition strength and institutionalization
(Rokkan, 2000; cf. Bornschier, 2012b). A Rokkanian approach emphasizes the significance
of long-term programmatic linkages between parties and voters. Apart from an approach
that emphasizes short-term programmatic and economic voting (Downs, 1957), which is
not the focus of this study, a Rokkanian approach stands in contrast (1) to an approach
that emphasizes the role of electoral institutions for the configuration of party systems
(Duverger, 1959), and (2) an approach that emphasizes clientelistic and charismatic link-
ages between parties and voters (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).
I argue that opposition parties in dominant party systems of contemporary African third
wave electoral regimes cannot compete effectively with the dominant party if they cannot
draw on historic, ideological and symbolic “capital”, i.e., a ‘brand identity’ from cleavage-
based party system structuring and voter-loyalties formed in minimally routinized electoral
competition shortly before and after independence. A ‘brand identity’ and an image of a
party that ‘stands for something’ increases the independence of an opposition party as an
organizational body from its current strong-men and -women and enhances non-material
cohesiveness among the elite of the party.23 Additionally, it increases the level of trust
among potential opposition voters who would otherwise fear to waste their vote on a ‘flash
in the pan’.
23Cf. with Levitsky and Way’s (2010, 376) “non-material sources of [party] cohesion”. Cf. also with
LeBas (2011).
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If legacies of historic cleavages are present in an African dominant party system of the
third wave, they provide opposition parties with non-material sources of cohesiveness. On
the one hand, non-material sources of cohesiveness enable opposition parties to engage more
viably in clientelistic and non-position taking programmatic valence competition because
they make voters and party elites more willing to suspend demands for immediate disburse-
ments of clientelistic and valence promises. On the other hand, non-material sources of
cohesiveness also allow opposition parties to invest more viably in position-taking program-
matic mobilization strategies. Position-taking programmatic mobilization, in turn, leads
to competition on an equal standing with the dominant party (cf. Shefter, 1994; Van de
Walle, 2007).
If opposition parties lack salient legacies of historic cleavages, however, they have to
exclusively, and also less viably, rely on short-term mobilization strategies of the electorate
– clientelism, charisma and valence issues –, which naturally work better for the incumbent
and dominant party in an uncertain context of non-routinized and new electoral regimes,
and material resources that are mostly concentrated at the state-level (cf. Bleck and van de
Walle, 2012; Van de Walle, 2003). The exclusive salience of short-term mobilization strate-
gies leads (1) to the prevalence of opposition parties that only have scarce material sources
of cohesiveness at hand and are more prone to co-optation by the dominant party, fac-
tionalism and floor-crossing (“nomadisme de politique”). In such a political environment,
opposition parties are mostly formed by ambitious political outsiders who want to gain the
attention of the dominant party, get access to the patronage cake, and eventually jump on
the bandwagon of the dominant party. Furthermore, (2) a prevalence of opposition parties
without legacies of cleavages and an established collective identity leads to less trusting and
less loyal, as well as more easily disillusioned opposition voters who are both less willing
to suspend demands for immediate disbursement of promised clientelistic goods and are
less receptive to position-taking programmatic mobilization. All these factors weaken and
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de-institutionalize opposition parties and decrease the vulnerability degree of the dominant
party.
In the following, I first present my “Rokkanian” approach for explaining the degree of
contemporary opposition competitiveness and dominant party system vulnerability. After
that, I present the main alternative explanation: the salience of clientelistic mobilization
strategies. At the same time, I also discuss the relationship between cleavage-based party
competition and clientelistic mobilization in more detail. Lastly, I outline other determi-
nants and controls.
Legacies of Cleavages and Contemporary Dominant Party Sys-
tems
Salient legacies of cleavages among African elites that structured the embryonic party sys-
tems at the time of the introduction of first national pre-independence elections have the
potential to strengthen and institutionalize the opposition party/parties in contemporary
third wave dominant party systems because they give opposition parties ideological and
symbolic ‘capital’, and an established ‘brand identity’ to attract voters and retain orga-
nizational cohesion in the context of clientelism and valence competition that favors the
dominant party. Yet, legacies of pre-independence cleavages can only spill over into third
wave dominant party systems if democratic breakdowns after independence did not lead
to uninterrupted and long-term autocratic one-party or military regimes between indepen-
dence and post-Cold War transitions in the 1990s. Otherwise, salient pre-independence
cleavages that structured the historic party system have effectively been suppressed and
are lost for contemporary African party systems to build on.
Regarding the influence of electoral institutions on party system configurations, I argue
that electoral institutions are rather endogenous to the historical processes of party sys-
62
tem formation (cf. Rokkan, 2000): Around independence, electoral systems were regularly
changed to suit the interests of the party/parties in power: E.g. proportional systems were
changed to majority systems and parliamentary systems to presidential systems to exclude
additional competitors and centralize power (cf. Van de Walle, 2003, 309; Levitsky and
Way, 2010, 358–360).
The concept of cleavage goes back to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal contribution
on the origin of party systems in Western Europe. Cleavages are conflicts in the social
structure that polarize politics in a system. A cleavage is based on at least one division in
socio-structural foundations like class, religion or ethno(-regional) affiliation that manifests
itself in an element of collective identity and develops an organizational form (Bartolini
and Mair, 1990, 213–220). Hence, a conflict in the social structure needs three elements,
social-structural foundation, collective identity and organizational form, to be considered a
cleavage (cf. Bornschier, 2009). Cleavages develop during critical junctures in history that
lead to developments (‘paths’) and concomitant self-reinforcing positive feedback processes
that cannot easily be abandoned later (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; cf. Pierson, 2004).
I make a path-dependent argument regarding the formation of salient cleavages at the
first critical juncture of decolonization and indigenous nationalization in African colonies.
The critical juncture of decolonization is common to every contemporary African electoral
regime with exception of Ethiopia (which was always independent apart from the short pe-
riod of Italian occupation from 1936 until 1941). It varies regarding the degree of violence
involved in the decolonization process and initiates cleavage formation and concomitant
party system structuring in African electoral regimes from independence onwards. After
that, I identify a second critical juncture, the first post-independence installation of indige-
nous authoritarian military, de jure or de facto one-party regimes, which varies regarding
(1) its occurrence among former African colonies, (2) its timing, (3) the stability of the
authoritarian regime that initiated it, and (4) the degree of suppression of existing cleav-
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ages during the authoritarian regime. In opposition to other accounts in literature (e.g.
Dickovick, 2008, 1120), I do not regard the third wave of democratization in Africa in 1990
itself to be a critical juncture for the structure and responsiveness of contemporary party
systems (cf. Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). I rather consider the third wave in Africa to
be the outcome of an external shock and changing environment, i.e. the end of the Cold
War, that had an impact on every African regime and forced most of them to introduce or
re-introduce electoral regimes (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010). A focus on the period of third
wave transitions neither can explain the large variance of different party system structures
after the beginning of the third wave in 1990, nor the resulting large variance regarding con-
temporary quality levels of democracy or party system responsiveness in African electoral
regimes. Rather, I argue, it is the interaction of the first critical juncture at independence
and the party system structuring incentives that followed from that in interaction with the
second critical juncture that is decisive for the structure of African party systems after the
third wave and contemporary levels of the quality of democracy and responsiveness.
Analogous to cleavage formation in Western Europe, processes of nationalization at the
first critical juncture of African decolonization are processes of centralization and standard-
ization, and most likely provoke an indigenous territorial, center-periphery, conflict during
the transformation of the colonial system into independent nations (cf. Lipset and Rokkan,
1967; Rokkan, 2000, 335–350).24 Accordingly, I argue that center-periphery conflicts are
latent in every African nationalization process. However, their manifestation depends on
the (1) modus of the first critical juncture of de-colonization, and (2) the occurrence,
timing and character of the second critical juncture of installation of indigenous author-
itarianism in order for a potential indigenous center-periphery conflict to manifest itself
24In opposition to Western Europe, where processes of centralization and standardization also triggered
a state-church conflict besides a territorial center-periphery conflict (Rokkan, 2000, 335–350), I consider
African territorial conflicts primarily of a (non-functional) rural-urban nature because African states in-
herited secularism from their colonizers from the outset.
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in a salient cleavage that structures post-independence party competition and develops a
path-dependent effect on contemporary African party system structures.
It is important to note, that I do not argue that the initial socio-structural foundation
of the center-periphery cleavage did not change over time. Rather I argue, that subsequent
party systems over the second critical juncture and during the third wave – depending on
the occurrence, timing and fashion of the second critical juncture – still structure political
conflicts and expectations of the elite and the mass according to the initial center-periphery
antagonism (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 53–63). After analyzing the initial content and socio-
structural foundation of the cleavage, I focus on tracing the legacy of this structuring over
time, and not so much on the content of new conflicts that are incorporated into the ex-
isting structure in order to perpetuate the center-periphery cleavage.
The first critical juncture: formation of a center-periphery cleavage
Regarding the (1) circumstances of decolonization, I consider processes of rather incre-
mental, non-violent decolonization and indigenous nationalization to be the most ideal
conditions for center-periphery conflicts to transform into salient cleavages and structure
historic party system competition, which initiate potential path-dependent developments.
Such non-violent decolonization was mostly the case in British and French African colonies;
in opposition to mostly violent and enforced decolonization processes in Portuguese colonies
and rather violent liberation processes in the settler oligarchies of Namibia and South Africa
(as well as Zimbabwe, which is not part of the case selection of the book).
More precisely, in both French and British colonies, the first critical juncture of indige-
nous nationalization, which was decisive for historical party system formation, manifested
itself in the first national pre-independence elections that have been held in French and
British colonies after the Second World War. These elections were organized by the colonial
powers for the local African population to on the one hand attenuate African nationalists’
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growing demands for independence and self-determination after having fought for a free
Europe in the Second World War, and on the other hand prepare the colonies for future self-
governance in the British Commonwealth or political participation in the French National
Assembly according to the French doctrine of assimilation (Diamond, 1989; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Osei, 2012).
In contrast to Britain and France, Portugal was not willing to grant independence or
self-governance of any kind to its African colonies: No representative institutions were
allowed to emerge.25 Accordingly, the first critical juncture for eventual manifestation
of salient cleavages in Portuguese colonies can be found in the largely violent nationalist
struggle for independence (most notably in Angola and Mozambique) (Osei, 2012, 75).
The same goes for the ‘settler oligarchies’ South Africa and Namibia, where long-term
and mostly armed liberation movements and parties fought against racist and exclusive
societies and electoral regimes. Accordingly, in both Portuguese colonies and settler oli-
garchies, the main line of mostly violent conflict is between the minority of the Portuguese
population and white settlers respectively, and the respective black majority that consti-
tutes or supports the liberation movement while potential indigenous lines of conflict are
rather suppressed in order to increase chances for a successful liberation. However, this
does not preclude the existence of additional indigenous, territorial cleavages inside the lib-
eration or independence movement. Both in the former settler oligarchies of South Africa,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, as well as in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola
potential internal conflicts became salient cleavages during and after liberation, amongst
others due to active sponsorship by the South African apartheid regime for one side of
latent indigenous cleavages in order to destabilize the anti-apartheid movement in South
Africa itself or to destabilize neighboring countries.26
25Further, lesser important, colonial powers in Africa are not of concern in this study.
26Both Zimbabwe and Angola are not part of the case selection of this book.
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Generally, I consider the center-periphery conflict to be the only one with potential
to transform into a salient cleavage at that time, at least in former British and French
African colonies. Amongst others, the second important process for cleavage formation
in Western Europe – the industrial revolution – was and is largely absent on the African
continent (most trade unions in African countries rather represent public employers and
were co-opted by authoritarian one-party regimes that suppressed existing cleavages) (cf.
Erdmann and Basedau, 2007, 10; Randall, 2001). A state-church conflict, in turn, is not
important because new African states inherited secularism from their colonizers.
Hence, I argue that salient cleavages in French and British African colonies develop after
the Second World War, in anticipation of and pushing for pre-independence national elec-
tions and nationalization, and structure society according to a territorial, center-periphery
conflict. They evolve between a (relatively urban) future center that hopes to gain influ-
ence due to independence and a (mostly rural) future periphery that fears to lose influence
compared to its pre-independence position in the division of power between the colonial
forces and the indigenous society. Generally, a comparatively lesser educated African con-
servative and/or traditional elite that secured peripheral penetration and control for the
colony in the countryside (voluntarily or involuntarily) and benefited from colonial patron-
age goods for themselves and their clients should be in opposition to a comparatively more
educated African elite that was not part of the traditional system or estranged from it.
Despite its Western education, this intelligentsia was relatively excluded from the spoils
and positions of the colonial system. This should lead to resentments and more radical
opposition to the colonial system than among the more conservative and traditional elite
that hoped for pacted transitions to independence or even no substantial independence at
all. The radical intelligentsia is most likely backed by the support of jobless and lesser
educated youths in more urban areas that lacked access to the patron-client network in
the countryside. So, while the traditional rural and peripheral elites like chiefs have to win
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less from radical decolonization and immediate indigenous nationalization, standardization
and centralization, the indigenous center of educated Africans, intelligentsia and the urban
elite of commoners and estranged aristocrats can only gain with its previous ”below value”
position by taking over the administrative center from the colonial power. Due to its own
indigenous origin, the new center will have more legitimacy than the colonizers to suppress
traditional peripheral political systems in the future modern nation. Accordingly, mem-
bers of the urban elite and intelligentsia are more likely to adopt progressive rhetorics,
which are directed against the traditional power of chiefs, who in turn will adopt more
conservative rhetoric (in the small-N part of this book, in section 4, I will operationalize
the center-periphery cleavage in African British and French colonies precisely according to
the three elements of a cleavage).
Due to the international context of the Cold War during decolonization and higher
education of African elites in Western and Eastern European universities at that time,
the two sides of the center-periphery cleavage are likely to adopt symbols and rhetorics
of the class-cleavage, which was and is still salient in many parts of the OECD-world,
by identifying themselves with communist/socialist or capitalist ideologies. However, I
consider this alleged cleavage to be only a mimicry of the real class-cleavage in Western
Europe due to the lack of socio-structural foundation of an organized proletariate in non-
industrialized and mainly agrarian African societies. Hence, if a salient cleavage in African
societies resembles a bourgeoisie-proletariate divide, I consider it to enrich the rhetorics
and strengthen the already existing structuring according to the center-periphery cleavage
instead of cross-cut, replace, crowd-out or change its very content. And rather importantly,
its function is also to attract external support from one of the Cold War powers, which is
another factor that strengthens both sides of the center-periphery cleavage.27
27E.g. in an interview with a high-ranking minister of the 2010 LCD government in Lesotho, the minister
had no trouble to associate the heritage of his party with the Sowjet side at the beginning of the Cold
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Hence, the international context of the Cold War and the concomitant left-right divide
enriches and reinforces salient center-periphery cleavages among African elites without
transforming their fundamental character or being a salient cleavage in its own respect: Due
to the combination of opposition to Western colonialism and the feeling of exclusion from
the spoils of Western colonial patronage, the more radical African elite and intelligentsia
should be likely to be receptive to alternative ideologies and new allies in the emerging
Soviet Bloc, which was not involved in colonialism. From their studies abroad the members
of this elite bring back marxist, socialist and communist ideas and concepts and combine
them with radical nationalism and opposition to the traditionally decentralized African
political system of chieftainships and traditional kingdoms. Lacking the socio-structural
foundation of an organized proletariate in mainly agrarian African societies they are likely
to undertake efforts in mobilizing the so called “peasantariate” in the countryside and
the jobless youth in more urban areas for rather radical opposition to the colonial power.
In reaction to this and in line with the context of the Cold War, the Western colonial
powers in turn feel compelled to support more moderate and conservative African elites,
which are part of the traditional system themselves, which cooperated (voluntarily or
involuntarily) with colonial powers, or are at least affiliated with it. Accordingly, more
moderate and traditional elites most likely intensify anti-communist, pro-capitalist and pro-
Western rhetoric. Potential cleavages around independence start to superficially resemble
the bourgeoisie-proletariate cleavage in Western Europe without being based on an actual
industrial revolution and significant class differences, but rather a national revolution that
divides between peripheral and central elites and followers.
The ideology of “Pan-Africanism” is also likely to reinforce the center-periphery cleavage
without fulfilling the criteria of being a cleavage itself, because it lacks a socio-structural
foundation in the different societies itself: Pan-Africanism aims at the unification of all
War, yet still wanted me to explain to him the fundamental difference between ‘left’ and ‘right’ politics in
Western European countries (interview in Lesotho, 2010).
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African people regardless if they are in diaspora or in different parts of the continent.
Naturally, more radical and internationalist African elites were more likely to be inspired
by these ideas than more conservative elites that profited from the colonial system, which
resembled more the Western concept of the nation state. Accordingly, if Pan-Africanism
is present in an African country, it is most likely incorporated by more radical elites that
push for immediate independence and are more sympathetic to marxist ideologies.
Decolonization of most former British and French African colonies happened in a rela-
tively short amount of time of less than a decade. Accordingly, ideologies like communism
and Pan-Africanism diffused widely on the continent, amongst the African elite, which
often visited the same universities in Western Europe, Eastern Europe or South Africa.
Hence, nationalization processes and political cleavage formation in cases that decolonized
earlier – e.g. most notably Ghana in 1957 – influenced nationalization process in cases
that colonized at a later point in time.
The only potential alternative cleavages that are likely to strengthen, supplement, cross-
cut or even replace the main cleavage between central and peripheral African elites are
religious or ethnic affiliations (we already ruled out religious cleavages to some degree
because African states inherited secularism from their colonizers). Yet, I argue that ethnic
affiliations are mostly not invoked for cultural dominance at the state by one ethnic group
over others but rather to secure access to the patronage cake for an ethnic group (cf.
Erdmann, 2007, 11). Likewise to the exploitation of the traditional system of rule by
the colonizers, ethnic boundaries were also politicized, redrawn, emphasized or suppressed
to suit the purposes of the colonial powers and facilitate control of the periphery. The
more dominant the center-side was in the initiation of the process of nationalization and
the development of the embryonic party system, the more peripheral-ethnic elites that
profited from the colonial system of indirect rule had to unite their forces with peripheral-
traditional forces from other privileged ethnic groups and put on hold their more narrow
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ethnopolitical aspirations to effectively meet the competition from the center-side. Hence,
the more salient the territorial cleavage, the more different ethnic and/or religious groups
unite behind one side of the center-periphery cleavage rather than constituting a political
cleavage in their own right. And the more salient the territorial cleavage, the less likely
that ethnic cleavages replace or cross-cut it, but rather reinforce it. Generally, I assume
that it depends on an ethnic group’s previous position of power in the colonial system for
choosing one side or the other of the territorial cleavage. The more an ethnic or religious
group has to fear from radical breaches with the colonial power the more it will support
peripheral and conservative forces. The more it felt marginalized under the colonial system
and lacked access to the spoils of patronage the more it will support radical-center forces.
Favorable conditions for a salient territorial cleavage to prevail over ethnic cleavages
are leaders and party elites on the center or peripheral side that belong to minority ethnic
groups that are too small in order to form a viable, mono-ethnic party (cf. Dickovick, 2008).
Moreover, it also depends on the general ethnic structure of an African country. The more
ethnically homogeneous the country, the less incentives to mobilize ethnopolitical conflicts
in the formation of the embryonic party system.
Accordingly, this book does not intend to neglect the role of ethnopolitical cleavages
or rule out that ethnic and/or religious cleavages cross-cut, suppress or even replace the
initial latent cleavage between center/radical and peripheral/conservative forces. After all,
in the political history of African countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda,
ethnic cleavages certainly play a prominent role.
Despite the potential cleavage strengtheners of the context of Cold War ideologies
and superpower politics, Pan-Africanism and aligned ethnopolitical cleavages, the special
circumstance of nationalization in the context of decolonization and lack of subsequent
industrialization leads to political cleavages at the beginning of party system formation
that are comparatively fewer and weaker than in Western Europe, and comparatively less
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likely to “freeze” over time: First, nationalization processes mainly provoke divisions and
elements of collective identity among the elite of a country. Their saliency decreases over
time and needs to be supplemented by processes like industrialization and/or the state-
church conflict, which more easily mobilize larger segments in society. Yet, party formation
in Africa has so far not been confronted with industrialization and/or a state-church con-
flict and politics therefore mainly remained a business amongst elites without considerable
involvement of a narrow middle class and a large “peasantariate”. Second, as previously
noted, in case of the violent decolonization processes in Portuguese colonies and settler
oligarchies, in order to unify their forces against colonialism, national independence and
liberation parties and movements had strong incentives to suppress dissent and divid-
ing cleavage formation inside the movement and emphasize the “transcending” and more
immanent “supra”-center-periphery cleavage between the colonial center and the periph-
eral African society (cf. Randall, 2001, 246f.). Consequently, after reaching independence,
nationalist liberation movements and parties are tempted to monopolize power and na-
tionalist rhetorics and suppress opposition. Even in British and French African colonies,
which experienced largely peaceful decolonization through pre-independence elections, win-
ning parties are tempted to avoid the crystallization of salient territorial cleavages, and
concomitant dissent and vote dispersion among the nationalist movement. Consequently,
these (more or less forced) unification processes are likely to lead to the second critical junc-
ture of the abolishment of potentially cleavage-strengthening post-independence electoral
regimes and the installation of authoritarian one-party regimes or counter-revolutionary
military regimes. And it depends largely on the timing of the second critical juncture and
the subsequent durability of the authoritarian regime to allow third wave party systems to
rely on party system-structuring legacies of territorial cleavages:
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Second critical juncture: establishment or suppression of center-periphery
cleavage
While the first critical juncture of pre-independence elections causes similar developments
in former British and French African colonies for party competition and structuring, I argue
that the (1) occurrence, the (2) timing and the (3) fashion of the second critical juncture
of the abolishment of the post-independence electoral regimes determine the structuring of
future party systems and set previously similar cases apart. The sooner the second critical
juncture of the abolishment of post-independence electoral regimes follows the first one of
the introduction of pre-independence elections, the less time for the routinization of elec-
toral politics and the establishment of stable political identities and party linkages in the
electorate.28 If such a breakdown of the electoral regime did not occur yet, the better the
conditions for the establishment of structured party competition around a center-periphery
cleavage. If it did occur, the longer the experience of minimally competitive elections be-
tween the first critical juncture and the second critical juncture of the breakdown, the
better for the establishment of structured party competition. The strength and stability
of the first post-independence authoritarian regime, in turn, determines both the degree
of suppression of an existing center-periphery cleavage in itself and the likeliness of pre-
third wave breakdown of the authoritarian regime, which would lead to pre-third wave
renaissance of a minimally competitive electoral regime. Accordingly, the less strong and
stable the first post-independence authoritarian regime, the more likely another round of
pre-third wave routinization around established cleavages and subsequent spill-over into
the third wave.
In other words, chances that political identities and ideological (party) traditions are
lost for third wave party systems to rely on are biggest if the abolishment of post-indepen-
dence electoral regimes leads to the stable installation of an authoritarian one-party regime
28Cf. with Kitschelt et al. (2010, 177–208) who argue that historic routinization of electoral politics in
Latin America influences future party system structuring.
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or the abolishment of any political party by military regimes. In both cases, opposing
parties and their radical and/or conservative ideological traditions are suppressed for a
long time. In the case of stable authoritarian one-party regimes, the associated side of
the cleavage loses its significance as well due to the lack of electoral competition with its
suppressed antagonist.
Consequently, my argument is a path-dependent one (cf. Pierson, 2004): First, I argue,
that the content of the cleavage is based on the first critical juncture of national revo-
lution in former African colonies. Second, successful spill-over of this cleavage into third
wave party systems, i.e. the historical cleavage has still some amount of saliency in the
structuring of third wave party systems, depends on the timing and fashion of the second
critical juncture of the abolishment of the first post-independence electoral regime. The
more time passes after the first national elections until this second critical juncture (or the
second critical juncture remains absent), the better for successful spill-over of cleavages
into present third wave party systems.
Figure 3 visualizes an ideal-typical (British- or French-)African case regarding the de-
velopment of party competition, structured around political cleavages over authoritarian
interruptions. Decisive for salient survival of political structuring around the legacy of a
territorial political cleavage in the third wave are the duration and saliency of party com-
petition around this political cleavage during pre-third wave electoral regimes, visualized
by the two continuos arrows before the beginning of the third wave. Negatively speaking,
the longer the authoritarian phase(s), marked by transparent and broken arrows, and the
more strongly suppressed the territorial political cleavage during that time, the less likely
salient survival in the third wave.
In sum, the less electoral politics after independence could routinize and the longer the
era of uninterrupted authoritarian one-party or military rule, the less able are opposition
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parties in post-cold war third wave electoral regimes to base their programmatic iden-
tity and mobilization on “frozen” political structures and identities from the embryonic
party system around the time of independence (this does not necessitate that the initial
socio-structural foundation and the effective content of the cleavage is still salient). The
less they are able to profit from symbolic ‘capital’ and a historic ‘brand identity’, in turn,
the more they have to exclusively and also less viably resort to short-term programmatic
mobilization and to clientelistic mobilization, which, because of its incumbency and access
to government resources, is the natural strategy of the dominant party and rather weak-
ens and de-institutionalizes opposition parties in dominant party systems (see following
section).
Hypothesis 1.1: The more cleavage-based party competition established itself in pre-third
wave national parliamentary elections, the stronger and more institutionalized the
opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.
Alternative Hypotheses:
Alternatively, one could hypothesize that it is not so much the establishment of cleav-
ages around independence, but rather the modernization and “sophistication level” of the
citizenry at the moment of first national elections at the time of independence that is
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responsible for the establishment of party competition around salient cleavages. I.e., con-
temporary opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems would be rather
a long-term effect of the modernization level around independence than established cleav-
ages around independence.
And finally, alternatively to the routinization of pre-third wave electoral politics, we
could look into the influence of the routinization of third wave electoral competition itself
(cf. Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Lindberg, 2006; Mainwaring and
Zoco, 2007). We could hypothesize that the learning experience of the temporarily nearer
third wave elections are more important than the more distant combination of routinization
of pre-third wave elections and significant cleavage formation around independence. I will
test these alternative hypotheses in the large-N section of the book.
Alternative Hypothesis 1.2: The higher the modernization level around the time of in-
dependence, the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in
contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.
Alternative Hypothesis 1.3: The more post-third wave national parliamentary elec-
tions have been held in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems,
the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary
African third wave dominant party systems.
Clientelistic Mobilization and Opposition Competitiveness
Parties can mobilize their voters by three strategies, which are seldom exclusive in a coun-
try: So far, this section mostly dealt with (1) (historic) programmatic mobilization strate-
gies that work through the promise and provision of public and universalistic goods from
whose consumption opponent voters or non-voters can not be excluded, and which have
long-term effects on the viability of contemporary mobilization strategies and party sys-
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tems. (2) Traditional mobilization works through the voters having a traditional and/or
emotional loyalty towards the politicians and the parties they vote for. And finally, (3)
clientelistic mobilization strategies are prevalent if parties mainly provide voters private
goods or club goods in exchange for their vote (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkin-
son, 2007).
A prevalence of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters generally works to the
advantage of the dominant party and leads to the weakness and de-institutionalization
of the opposition parties in the context of a dominant party system. The more clien-
telistic mobilization strategies prevail in electoral systems where the required resources
for clientelistic mobilization are concentrated at the state level, the more the usual in-
cumbency advantage is inflated (cf. Van de Walle, 2003).29 The dominant party can use
such a clientelistic monopoly to co-opt opposition parties and their politicians and turn
them into further clients (cf. Van de Walle, 2003). The less access opposition parties and
their leaders have to the necessary resources for clientelistic party competition the more
prone they will be to these co-optation efforts. Co-optation offers deter opposition parties
and politicians from strategically coordinating their campaigns with other opposition par-
ties, from building successful coalitions, and from establishing programmatic identities to
which party members and voters can relate and form loyalties. The result are weak and
non-institutionalized opposition parties. Under these circumstances of low vulnerability in
electoral competition, the dominant party has no incentive to additionally invest in long-
term programmatic mobilization strategies and responsiveness as long as it has enough
resources to “feed” its clientelistic electorate.
29In a more recent contribution, Van de Walle (2007) coins prominently the term “prebendalism” for
the predominant African version of clientelism. He discerns between the more organized “Latin American”
form of clientelism that is targeted at grass-roots voters and the less organized “African” form of clientelism
that combines clientelistic mobilization strategies with traditional mobilization strategies and patterns of
deference and targets rather elite-voters/vote-brokers instead of grass-roots voters (cf. Scott, 1969). In
this study, I assume that the boundaries between “African” prebendalism and “classic”/“Latin American”
clientelism are not fixed and can be measured with the same proxy indicators.
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Opposition parties are more likely to survive in the context of rampant clientelism or
even profitably sidestep from potentially harmful clientelistic competition to programmatic
mobilization strategies (cf. Shefter, 1994) if they have access to long-term traditions of
established party-voter-loyalties and linkages, and socialize potential new opposition voters
into these structures.
Opposition parties that have to build a brand identity and party-voter linkages from
scratch, in turn, are unlikely to be successful against the clientelistic (and non-position-
taking programmatic) offerings of the dominant party: (1) In opposition to the domi-
nant governing party, they lack material resources and have to mostly rely on clientelistic
promises in election campaigns instead of concrete material offerings. (2) Another po-
tential disadvantage for opposition parties without legacies of cleavages is the prevalence
of programmatic party competition around valence issues in African electoral regimes of
the third wave. Valence issues are about public policies that are favored by everyone
and non-conflictive (e.g. “development”, “fight against corruption”, “fight against crime”,
etc.). Valence issues are a rational choice for party competition in the context of scarce
information about potential electorates and weakly established electoral and democratic
rules in young electoral regimes (cf. Bleck and van de Walle, 2012). And they work bet-
ter as a complementary strategy in the context of clientelistic competition, because their
non-conflictive nature relaxes party-loyalty constraints and allows potentially rewarding
co-optation, shifting of alliances and floor-crossing more easily. Because valence issues are
mainly about the competence of a party in achieving goods of valence, they lead to an
inherent advantage for the dominant and incumbent party: E.g., the dominant party as
the governing party in a weakly developed country can prove its capacity to provide de-
velopment and other goods of valence by investing in highly visible infrastructure projects
in the foresight of electoral campaigns (cf. Young, 2004). Hence, if opposition parties en-
gage in non-position-taking programmatic valence competition with the dominant party,
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due to lack of incumbency, they cannot prove their competence in providing public and
universalistic goods of valence. (3) Lastly, voters in a context of rampant clientelism are
unlikely to vote for the alternative of a position-taking programmatic opposition if it lacks
historic credentials. I.e., in the unlikely case that a new position-taking programmatic op-
position would win the elections, voters would know that they could not be excluded from
the promised public goods, regardless if they have voted for the programmatic opposition
or not. Yet, they would not want to risk their access to clientelistic goods in the more
likely case that the dominant party is reelected (cf. Van de Walle, 2007, 67). Accordingly,
stronger and long-term loyalties are needed to counter such “opportunistic” but rational
voter-behavior in the context of a rather poor electorate. Otherwise, voters favor the short-
term bird in the hand than the two in the distant bush that they would get anyway in
the unlikely case of a distant future with a governing party that has been voted in office
on the basis of the programmatic promise of public goods. In contrast, opposition voters
and party elites that are socialized into structures of historic cleavages are more likely to
have a feeling of belonging to the opposition party as an organization, have longer time
horizons, and are more likely to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clien-
telistic and valence promises. Moreover, they are also more receptive to position-taking
programmatic mobilization. Hence, it becomes more likely that (1) an opposition party
survives recurring frustration of clientelistic expectations and (2) is able to more viably
sidestep to programmatic mobilization strategies. Thus, it becomes more likely that such
an opposition party will make it through another round in the ‘wilderness’ of opposition
after electoral defeat.
In sum, the less opposition parties can rely on established structures of political cleav-
ages, the more they have to exclusively and also less viably compete with the dominant
party on the terrain of clientelistic and non-position taking programmatic valence mobi-
lization. This advantages the dominant party because it can prove its competence in both
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areas whereas the opposition can only rely on promises. The prevalence of clientelistic pol-
itics makes opposition parties prone to defections and co-optation by the dominant party.
Furthermore, it makes potential opposition voters more likely to abstain from voting or
even opportunistically jump on the bandwagon of the dominant party.
Finally, even if legacies of historical cleavages are present in contemporary African party
systems, I consider it nonetheless unlikely that they manage to crowd out clientelistic
mobilization strategies completely.30 I rather suspect that the two explanations for the
competitiveness degree of the opposition parties are empirically independent of each other
in the context of African third wave regimes. Hence, in the large-N section of the book,
I test both explanations together in one model. Nonetheless, I will test for potential
collinearity.
Hypothesis 2: The more salient clientelistic mobilization strategies in African third wave
dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party
system in African third wave dominant party systems.
Incentives for Clientelistic Mobilization Strategies:
Whereas the legacy of a cleavage-based party system around independence can be a viable
counterforce to the detrimental effects of the dominant party’s clientelistic monopoly and
push the dominant party system to be programmatically more responsive overall, there are
factors on the other hand, which directly influence the feasibility of clientelistic mobilization
strategies in a dominant party system in the first place: (1) The fairness degree in party
competition (skewness of the playing field), (2) the access to large state resources, and (3)
the salience of traditional and ethnic loyalties in voting:
30Cf. with Singer and Kitschelt’s (2011) “Do Everything” (DoE) parties, which combine clientelistic
and programmatic mobilization.
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(1) The more a dominant party relies on a skewed playing field in electoral competition,
the cheaper and more feasible clientelistic mobilization strategies. The dominant party can
concentrate its clientelistic efforts on the relatively few people, who secure the skewness
of the playing field (e.g. the electoral commission, the courts, civil servants, the media,
private donators) than on the masses of the electorate.31 Nonetheless, in opposition to
electoral autocracies or pure autocracies, the dominant party cannot totally ignore the
electorate because elections are basically free and their outcomes partially insecure.
(2) Accordingly, clientelistic strategies in democracies and competitive authoritarian
regimes require relatively large state resources to enable the offering of private goods or
club goods to large parts of the electorate. This will be most feasible, if the dominant
party has access to large state resources. In Africa, this is usually the case, if a country is
rich in natural resources like oil, diamonds and/or other ore.32
(3) The more traditional patterns of deference and ethno-regional loyalties are salient
the more feasible are clientelistic mobilization strategies in democracies and competitive
authoritarian regimes (cf. Scott, 1969). If a clientelistic party relies on a critical number
of strategic individuals like chiefs of the traditional system or ethnopolitical, regional and
religious leaders, it can lower the costs of clientelistic mobilization. These vote brokers
provide a bloc of votes to the clientelistic party due to their traditional and/or charismatic
capital to a fraction of the electorate. In that case, the clientelistic party can reduce the
number of people significantly, whom it needs to win for an absolute majority. It only
needs to promise the vote brokers private goods, while they provide the votes of their
followers thanks to their traditional linkages. This option will be most feasible if there
is still a large fraction of the electorate significantly linked to traditional structures of
power in an African country (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt and
31Cf. with Bueno de Mesquita et alii’s (2003) more formalized political economy approach of The Logic
of Political Survival. Cf. with Levitsky and Way (2010) regarding the significance of a “skewed playing
field” in electoral competition.
32See the large body of literature on the so called “resource curse” (cf. Ross, 2001).
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Galaich, 2003; O’Brien, 1999; Smith, 1986; Scott, 1969; Van de Walle, 2003). I.e., I assume
that high numbers of identifiable and geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups
make clientelistic mobilization strategies more feasible for the dominant party and are
therefore detrimental to opposition party system strength and institutionalization. First,
because they allow clientelistic mobilization strategies for the dominant party at lower
costs. Second, higher numbers of ethnopolitical groups lead directly to weaker and less
institutionalized opposition parties. They give ethnopolitical “entrepreneurs” and outsiders
to the dominant party an incentive to form their own party and to show off to the dominant
party their strategic significance in electoral competition. This makes it more likely for
them to “earn” co-optation by the dominant party for their political support in parliament
and/or run-off second rounds in presidential elections. Consequently, it is unlikely that
ethnopolitically mobilized opposition parties form coalitions and alliances with each other.
Accordingly, they are generally weaker and less institutionalized than opposition parties
that are based on long-term legacies of programmatic political cleavages and have non-
material sources of cohesiveness.
In sum, I assume that higher numbers of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical
and regional groups create incentives for viable clientelistic mobilization strategies by the
dominant party, which in turn weakens opposition parties (high effective numbers of eth-
nopolitical groups that are not geographically concentrated should lead to the opposite
effect as it does not make sense for a candidate to mobilize selectively among ethnically
mixed constituencies). Alternatively, as outlined in the last section, it is possible that
ethnopolitical cleavages are congruent with legacies of significant cleavages (see partial
evidence for that in Bleck and van de Walle, 2012). In this case, the detrimental ef-
fects of clientelism on opposition party system strength and institutionalization should
be neutralized by the favorable and strengthening circumstances for viable programmatic
mobilization by opposition parties.
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The weaker incentives (1) to (3), the more likely that clientelistic mobilization is diffi-
cult to sustain for the dominant party and the more likely that programmatic mobilization
strategies become more attractive to “externally mobilized” opposition parties that lack
access to state resources because it allows party competition on an equal standing (cf.
Shefter, 1994). And the more these programmatic mobilization strategies are rooted in
legacies of historical cleavages instead of valence competition the more committed and less
prone to defections opposition politicians become. This makes opposition parties more
stronger and more institutionalized, which in turn renders the dominant party program-
matically more responsive as well.
Mediating Hypothesis’ 3.1 to 3.3: The stronger incentives (1) to (3), the more salient
clientelistic mobilization strategies in African third wave dominant party systems.
Hypothesis 3.1 The more skewed the playing field (minimally free but unfair elections)
in African third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized
the opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.
Hypothesis 3.2 The more natural resources rents in African third wave dominant party
systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party system in African
third wave dominant party systems.
Hypothesis 3.3 The more geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups in African
third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposi-
tion party system in African third wave dominant party systems.
Other Determinants of Opposition Competitiveness
I hypothesize that the incentives for mobilizing voters clientelistically are higher in countries
with high poverty levels, because voters can be bought at relatively low costs (cf. Kitschelt
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and Wilkinson, 2007). Hence, the opposition party system should be weaker and less
institutionalized in poorer African dominant party systems.
As already mentioned, I consider electoral institutions to be rather endogenous to the
processes of party system formation after independence. Nonetheless, it is important to
control for their exogenous influence on contemporary opposition party system strength and
institutionalization: In the context of majoritarian systems, the negative effect of stronger
incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies and salient clientelism on opposition com-
petitiveness should be aggravated. The emphasis on candidate visibility to the detriment
of party visibility in majoritarian electoral systems strengthens political entrepreneurs and
potentially influential outsiders to the dominant party to use potential opposition parties to
show off their co-optation potential to the dominant party. In the context of proportional
or mixed systems, the negative effect should be weakened or insignificant.
Founding first elections of third wave electoral regimes should lead to (a) stronger
and more institutionalized opposition party/parties than second and third elections. First
third wave elections in former autocratic one-party or military regimes are in the limelight
of national and international observers, which weakens the former autocrats’ incumbency
advantage. And naturally, a winning newcomer party can not yet profit from an inflated
incumbency advantage. Winner and looser images about the parties are not yet established
among the electorate, which makes them less likely to vote strategically according to the
logics of clientelism. Naturally, the splits and the defections inside the opposition parties
in the new electoral regime occur only after the first third wave election.
High degrees of development aid dependency in countries with dominant party systems
can be detrimental to opposition party system strength and institutionalization. Usually,
development aid is tied to conditions like good governance and minimal free elections,
but not to the provision of a level playing field in party competition, i.e. the provision
of equal access to the state media, party finance and/or party organizational capacities.
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On the contrary, the usual promotion of good governance enhances the governing party’s
organizational capacity while opposition parties have difficulties to organize themselves
and to penetrate the periphery of their countries, which is necessary to win significant vote
shares in most African elections. At the same time, uneducated and poor voters in the
periphery regard the satisfaction of basic needs like food, shelter and access to medicinal
facilities – often provided by development aid instead of the government – as something
that is directly provided by the governing party, because there is no difference between the
state and the governing party in their perception. To ensure the ongoing satisfaction of
the basic needs they assume they have to vote for the governing party; to the disadvantage
of the opposition.33
Furthermore, high degrees of development aid signify potential donor leverage on po-
litical parties’ policy platforms. Too specific policy-platforms and positions are difficult to
credibly maintain because they could stand in contrast to budget constraints and condi-
tionalities that have been imposed by donors (cf. Bleck and van de Walle, 2012; Moss, Pet-
tersson and van de Walle, 2008). This would favor clientelistic and/or valence party compe-
tition, which rather strengthens the dominant party and weakens and de-institutionalizes
the opposition party system.
I check if former liberation movements and parties that led partially armed and success-
ful struggles against settler oligarchies or Portuguese colonization, and did not experience
civil war with rival liberation movements or internal faction after liberation, participate in
third wave elections. Because of their important historical role and claim to represent the
whole nation against oppression, I expect voters to vote loyally for them regardless of their
programmatic positions and performance. Accordingly, opposition parties, which have no
33Interviews with political experts and opposition politicians in Botswana and Lesotho (2010), and an
unpublished paper by Schüepp (2009) inspired me to include the factor of aid dependency in the analysis.
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“historical capital” to rely on, should have a strong disadvantage to compete effectively
and are weak and non-institutionalized.34
Last but not least, I control for electoral boycotts by opposition parties in dominant
party systems because this factor naturally goes hand in hand with lower opposition com-
petitiveness degrees.
Figure 4 summarizes the complete model of the determinants of opposition competi-
tiveness in third wave African dominant party systems.
Explaining Opposition Competitiveness Degrees
In order to test the postulated positive influence of a salient legacy of cleavage-based
party competition around independence on the degree of contemporary opposition com-
34Most impressive example for that is Nambia’s former liberation movement and current dominant party
South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) (Melber, 2011), which is surrounded by a weak and
non-institutionalized opposition.
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petitiveness in African dominant party systems, I first define the operationalization of the
independent variables (the dependent variable of opposition competitiveness has already
been defined in the previous section of the book). Afterwards, I present the descriptive
statistics and explain the choice of method. The models will be based on the sample of 18
African dominant party systems defined above (see table 1 on p. 43 and discussion in the
previous section of the book). Apart from explaining opposition competitiveness averages
over third wave elections, I will also investigate some dynamic models that explain punc-
tual third wave opposition competitiveness, i.e. models where an observation is based on
a single third wave election. Lastly, I present and discuss the results.
Operationalization and Data
In the small-N section of the book, I will be able to identify salient legacies of cleavages
in detail in a comparative historical analysis using process tracing (see next section of the
book). For the large-N analysis, I identify salient legacies of conflict through a proxy,
which is based on two measures that do not reflect the content of concrete cleavages per
se but rather reflect the probability degree of contemporary presence of legacies of pro-
grammatically structured pre-third wave party competition: (1) The age of the runner-up
opposition party in relation to the number of years since independence resulting in values
between 0 and 1 (in instances where a contemporary opposition party was founded before
independence the value can be higher than one), and (2) the number of minimally com-
petitive elections before the beginning of the third wave in 1990. The maximum value of
minimally competitive pre-third wave elections in the sample will be used to divide the
values of the measure and bring them on a scale from 0 to 1. Then, the two measures are
combined in an additive index because I consider each of the two measures as sufficient
proxies to capture contemporary presence of salient legacies of political cleavages of the
pre-third wave area:
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If the most important opposition party in a contemporary dominant party system is
relatively old in relation to the number of years since independence, i.e. the closer to / or
above a ratio value of one, this indicates that it could survive since the formation of the
embryonic party system around independence. Hence, (1) such an opposition party man-
aged to resist self-destructive splits and defections in the context of rampant clientelism,
and (2), the prevailing breakdowns of democratic electoral regimes after independence did
not extinct this pre-third wave political party successfully. Survival despite these rather
adversary circumstances, in turn, indicates (1), that a source of non-material cohesiveness
like significant political cleavages must be present and (2), non-democratic periods did not
manage to extinct these non-material sources of cohesiveness: According to the logic of
path-dependency, cleavages in African politics developed during the critical juncture of
first national elections for the local population in French and British colonies after the Sec-
ond World War and during independence struggles in Portuguese colonies and liberation
struggles in the Southern African settler oligarchies. Hence, if old opposition parties are
present in contemporary dominant party systems, I assume that they draw on long-term
programmatic and ideological loyalties formed in routinized electoral competition shortly
before and after independence, or violent struggles for independence and liberation.
Another mechanism accounting for spill-over of old cleavages into contemporary dom-
inant party systems, is a relatively high number of minimally competitive pre-third wave
parliamentary elections in the history of a contemporary third wave African dominant party
system. A higher number of pre-third wave elections indicates (1) that democratic break-
downs after independence happened relatively late or not at all and allowed routinization
of electoral politics and the establishment of more stable cleavage-based political identities;
and/or (2), democratic breakdowns have not been pervasive and allowed for pre-third wave
renaissances of minimally competitive electoral regimes, which enhances the potential for
survival and re-vitalization of independence cleavages and political identities before the
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beginning of the third wave. Lastly, because it is likely that historical legacies of cleav-
age hide behind superficially “new” third wave opposition parties, which we could miss in
large-N samples, the inclusion of the second measure helps to compensate for such potential
mistakes.35
Accordingly, I formulate an “operationalized” version of hypothesis 1.1 of p. 75 for the
large-N analysis:
Operationalized Large-N Hypothesis 1.1 (cf. with p. 75): The older the strongest
contemporary opposition party in African third wave dominant party systems and/or
the more pre-third wave national parliamentary elections have been held in the history
of contemporary African third wave dominant party systems, the more competitive
(i.e. stronger and more institutionalized) the contemporary opposition party system
in African third wave dominant party systems.
The founding year of third wave runner-up opposition parties has to be retrieved
through a variety of sources (Azevedo, Nnadozie and João, 2003; Rosenberg, Weisfelder
and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008; Rupley, Bangali and Di-
amitani, 2013; Szajkowski, 2005; Tonchi, Lindeke and Grotpeter, 2012; UFP, 2013; COD,
2013; CUF, 2013) (cf. also with Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001). Der Fischer Weltal-
manach (2009), in turn, determines the year of independence. For Ethiopia, which was
35E.g. the 1996 Ghana election’s main opposition party, NPP, which was officially founded as a political
party in 1992, actually has roots that can be traced back to the Danquah-Busia tradition: i.e. the Popular
Front Party (PFP), which participated in the 1979 elections, the Progress Party (PP) under Kofi Abrefa
Busia, which participated in the 1969 elections, and both the United Party (UP), which participated in
the 1960 presidential election, as well as the UGCC, which participated in the pre-independence 1951
election, which were both under the leadership of Joseph Danquah. What looks like a new party founded
in 1992, is actually an old political tradition that goes back to the foundation of the UGCC in 1947
(Ayee, 2008; Jeffries, 1980; Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Morrison, 2004; Nunley, 2009; Osei, 2012). Because
we lack similar detailed knowledge of the party history in some of the remaining African countries in the
large-N sample, I can imagine that other putatively “new” opposition parties in African dominant party
systems have actually older roots. This would be most likely in the case of relatively large numbers of
pre-third wave elections without concomitant old aged opposition parties. Accordingly, in such cases, the
second measure of the number of pre-third wave elections should compensate for this potential deficit to
some degree.
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always independent, the year 1941, the end of five years of Italian occupation, will be
taken. Namibia (ex-South-West Africa) became independent from South Africa in 1990.
It experienced regular but racially exclusive national elections during the period of (in-
ternationally disputed) South African administration between 1919 and 1990. The main
liberation movement and contemporary third wave dominant party, South West Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO), has already been founded in 1960. The 1994 runner-up
opposition party, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), was founded in 1977. Accordingly,
computing the ratio of the runner-up opposition age in relation to Namibia’s independence
year of 1990 would led to a heavily overestimated proxy value for the existence of his-
torical legacies of cleavage-based party competition in relation to the rest of the sample.
E.g. the value for Namibia’s 1994 election would be more than four times larger than one
((1994 − 1977)/(1994 − 1990) = 4.25), while the average value for the rest of the sample
is 0.48 and the standard deviation 0.5. Accordingly, to compute the proxy value for the
case of Namibia, I take the fictive independence year of 1960. This is equal to the sample’s
mean independence year and results in a rather average proxy value for Namibia’s 1994
elections ((1994− 1977)/(1994− 1960) = 0.5).
Nunley’s (2009) African Elections Database provides the data for the number of pre-
third wave parliamentary elections. All pre- and post-independence national lower house
parliamentary elections before the beginning of the third wave in 1990 are counted, pro-
vided that at least two parties managed to capture seats in parliament, i.e., elections were
minimally competitive.36 Because national pre-third wave elections in the settler oligarchies
of South-West Africa (contemporary Namibia) and South Africa were racially exclusive to
the disadvantage of the local non-European black and colored population, I count zero
pre-third wave elections in both cases.
36Botswana’s 1989 election is counted as a third wave election.
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Maddison (2009) provides historical GDP per capita data to measure the modernization
level of an African country at the time of first minimally competitive national elections at
independence. The value of the year before the actual election will be taken. In cases where
no minimally elections around independence have been held the value of the respective year
before independence will be taken. The GDP per capita is in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars. This is a hypothetical currency with the same purchasing power of an
US-Dollar at a given point in time (cf. QoG, 2013).
A count variable of the number of consecutive third wave elections between 1990 and
2008 that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a foreign military intervention
measures the number of post-third wave elections. The data is based on Nunley (2009),
while interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual Freedom House
country reports (Freedom House, 2009; Freedom House, 1991-2002).
Whereas definitions and conceptualizations of clientelism are abundant (cf. Bratton
and van de Walle, 1997; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkin-
son, 2007; Lemarchand, 1972; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972), measures are notoriously few.
We cannot ask politicians in surveys about their own clientelistic mobilization strategies
because they most likely would conceal it (cf. Kitschelt, 2000, 869) (exemptions excluded,
of course; cf. with the author’s experience in asking that question to parliamentarians in
Lesotho in the next section of the book). Therefore, I use Transparency International’s
(2009) inverted Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to proxy the saliency of clientelistic
mobilization strategies in African third wave dominant party systems.37 The inverted in-
dex goes from 0 to 10 and high values signify high corruption levels. Corruption is usually
highly correlated with clientelism: Amongst others, salient practices of clientelism entail
that politicians use their discretionary power to offer money and favorable administrative
treatment (access to housing, medical treatment, state contracts, etc.) in exchange for vote
37See http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview for details about the method of this
meta-index, which is based on several surveys and assessments from various sources.
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blocs offered by political brokers. In a formally universalistic polity, such particularistic
and targeted behavior with the goal of reelection and support leads usually to corrupt
behavior, i.e. use of public office for private gain (cf. Kitschelt, 2000, 870f.; Singer, 2009).
Because it is hard to validly proxy clientelistic mobilization strategies, I also defined
factors in section 3 above, which directly influence the feasibility of clientelistic mobilization
strategies in African dominant party systems:
The skewness degree of the playing field in third wave electoral party competition
(minimally free, but varyingly fair) will be measured through Freedom House’s (2009)
Political Rights index for the respective year of the lower house election.38 The index
ranges on a theoretical scale from 1 to 7, but will actually range between 1 to 5 because
of the rules of this book’s case selection, which aims at excluding electoral autocracies
to the benefit of democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarian regimes (see
section 2). In doing so, high values will proxy high skewness degrees in the playing field of
party competition.39 The inclusion of Freedom House’s Political Rights index should be a
difficult test for the main hypothesis of the influence of the presence of legacies of cleavages
because the Political Rights index has an element of in-built endogeneity to the dependent
variable of opposition competitiveness: It includes informations about the significance of
the opposition in an electoral regime (Freedom House, 2011).
The degree of resource dependency will be measured by adding up the export value
(constant 2000 US-Dollar) of mineral-based fuels and the export value of non-fuel ores and
metals exports calculated as a share of the GDP (constant 2000 US-Dollar) (cf. Ross, 2001).
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) provides the data (World Bank, 2009). Missing
observations are completed through the consultation of Der Fischer Weltalmanach (2009).
38E.g. for Botswana’s lower house election in 1989 I take Freedom House’s Political Rights assessment
for Botswana that has been published in 1990 (reports and indices are always based on the precedent
year).
39Further information on Freedom House’s Political Rights index will not be repeated here and can be
consulted on p. 50.
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The measurement of (1) the number and (2) geographic concentration of ethnopolitical
groups relies on Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich’s (2003) data:
(1) To avoid problems of endogeneity, (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003) define
those groups as ethnopolitical groups that “have demonstrated their actual political rel-
evance or high potential political relevance based on past relevance, apart from or prior
to particization”, i.e. before effectively forming a political party. The following forms of
politicization are necessary and sufficient indicators to identify an ethnopolitical group: (a)
organized group mobilization not related to party formation; (b) articulation of grievances
by leaders claiming to speak for a group rather than a party; (c) participation in col-
lective action or conflict with other groups or the state and being subjected to state vi-
olence; (d) domination of an officially designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a
disproportionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy or the military; and (f)
controlling disproportionate socioeconomic resources.40 The Ethnopolitical Group Frag-
mentation index is based on the share of the politicized population that belongs to each
ethnopolitical group or subgroup. Mozaffar et al. use a modified Herfindahl concen-
tration formula, likewise to Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of Political





ing data is obtained from Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) and Posner (2004, 856).
(2) While Mozaffar et al. conceptualize, operationalize and collect the effective num-
ber of ethnopolitical groups themselves, the corresponding measure for the geographical
concentration of ethnopolitical groups in a country is based on the Minorities at Risk
(Phase III) data set (Gurr, 1993). The index measures geographical concentration of a
group on a scale from 0 to 3 whereas a value of 0 means “widely dispersed”, 1 indicates
40See Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003, 382–384) for a more detailed discussion of the definition and
measurement of ethnopolitical groups and Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) for a comprehensive data set of
all 48 sub-Saharan African countries.
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“primarily urban or minority in one region”, 2 “majority in one region, dispersed in oth-
ers”, and 3 “concentrated in one region”. To get the aggregated concentration score for
a country, the concentration value for a each specific group is multiplied by its respective
population’s share in the respective country and summed up (GeographicConcentration =
∑n
i=1(GroupShareofPoliticizedPopulationi ∗GeographicConcentrationi))
Note, that both measures do not vary over time. Because I hypothesize that higher
effective numbers of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups create incentives for
ethnic brokerage, I center the two measures and create a multiplicative index.
The average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over two elections/observations
of an election cycle captures an African dominant party system’s poverty level, i.e, the last
incentive for clientelistic mobilization. Note, that in the context of a resource-rich conti-
nent, I construct a measure for GDP per capita (constant 2000 US-Dollar) that is already
adjusted for high natural resource dependency by taking the residuals of a simple linear re-
gression of the GDP per capita on resource dependency. This is necessary, because natural
resource wealth not only enhances the capacity of the dominant party to buy votes, but it
also facilitates vote buying on the supply side: Only marginal proportions of the citizens
are involved in the production and consumption of a country’s revenues from natural re-
sources and remain poor. In such a case, non-adjusted GDP per capita data is “distorted”
so that resource-rich country appear to produce a rich and sophisticated citizenry while
most likely the opposite is true. The World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) (2009)
provide the data. Missing observations in the WDI are completed by consultation of Der
Fischer Weltalmanach (2009).
Finally, the analysis includes the dichotomous measure for the electoral system, where
a value of one indicates a majoritarian system and zero indicates a proportional or mixed
electoral system. The data is based on Lindberg (2007; 2006) and Nunley (2009). Note,
that the electoral systems in this dataset do not vary over time. The clientelism proxy,
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CPI, or the incentives for clientelism will be centered and a multiplicative index of each
will be created in combination with the electoral system dummy.
Regarding the other determinants, elections are coded as “first” elections when they
are the first founding elections of the third wave or when they are first elections after
interruption of the electoral cycle due to a military coup or foreign military intervention
(this is the case for Gambia’s and Lesotho’s respective 2002 election). The data is based on
Nunley (2009), while interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual
Freedom House country reports (Freedom House, 2009; Freedom House, 1991-2002).
Aid dependency is measured as average Official Development Assistance (ODA) net
disbursements between two elections of an electoral cycle as a share of a country’s average
GDP (constant 2000 US-Dollar) between two elections of an electoral cycle. Aid data relies
on the Development Database on Aid from DAC Members (OECD, 2010). The GDP data
is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009).
The presence of a former liberation movement is captured with a dummy variable where
the value of “1” indicates the presence of such a movement in parliamentary elections of
third wave dominant party systems. Various sources determine the respective status of
a country (Azevedo, Nnadozie and João, 2003; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton,
2004; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008; Rupley, Bangali and Diamitani, 2013; Sza-
jkowski, 2005; Tonchi, Lindeke and Grotpeter, 2012).
Finally, the number of parties boycotting a parliamentary election captures electoral
boycotts by opposition parties in African dominant party systems. Data is provided by
Lindberg (2006). See Lindberg (2006, 45–51) for a discussion of the data collection and
primary sources of information.
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Descriptive Statistics and Methods
As discussed in the first section of the book, it makes sense to rather analyze opposition
competitiveness averages over third wave elections than punctual competitiveness degrees
for single third wave elections; especially, because this book is basically interested in the
effects of long term explanations like legacies of cleavages or modernization levels at the
time of decolonization.
Nonetheless, after having analyzed explanatory models of average competitiveness de-
grees over third wave elections, I also analyze several dynamic explanatory models of
punctual opposition competitiveness in single third wave elections. I assume that the dis-
cussed factors, which are relevant between different African dominant party systems, are
also relevant within a dominant party system over time; from one election to the next.
Accordingly, the descriptive statistics below are divided in two tables. Table 5 includes
the full set of variables and shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of country
averages over third wave elections. Table 6 shows the descriptives for the sample of single
elections. To avoid redundancy, table 6 does not include variables, which are not dynamic
at all or lack significant variation over time (i.e., resource dependency and aid dependency).
Both tables 5 and 6 are based on the same case selection as in the previous section of
the book (cf. with table 1 on p. 43). However, the case of The Gambia is excluded here as
well as in all the models that follow. The Gambia is a special case that does not (yet) fit
into this book’s theoretical framework of historical legacies of cleavages in the explanation
of contemporary opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems:
For more than three decades it looked like The Gamiba – likewise to Botswana and
Mauritius – would be spared the fate of almost every newly independent African state
where electoral regimes experienced breakdown and military dictatorships, and/or de jure
one-party regimes were installed by the end of the 1960s / beginning of the 1970s (Nunley,
2009). However, the military coup in 1994 led to the non-democratic installation of army
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Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh as president and deposition of the in 1992 regularly re-elected
dominant party, People’s Progressive Party (PPP). In the subsequent and deeply flawed
1996 presidential and 1997 parliamentary elections the PPP was officially banned. Not very
surprisingly, Yahya Jammeh and his newly founded Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation
and Construction (APRC) won both elections and “democratized” their previous non-
democratic grip to power. The freeness degree of the 2002 and 2007 elections ameliorated
slightly so that these elections are part of the book’s large-N case selection, but nonetheless
led to the confirmation and consolidation of Jammeh’s rule (Hughes and Perfect, 2008).
The recent 2011 elections however were deeply flawed again, likewise to 1996 and 1997
(Freedom House. Freedom in The World., 2013). Accordingly, as long as this “behind
schedule” autocratic phase in The Gambia’s history is not over, the effect of a strong
record of seven pre-third wave elections between 1960 and 1990 should not come into play.
Consequently, I exclude the 2002 and 2007 elections of The Gambia from the subsequent
analyses.
The descriptives of the average opposition competitiveness index over third wave elec-
tions in table 5 is basically a repetition of the descriptive statistic in the second section of
the book (cf. with table 2 on 44). The exclusion of The Gambia accounts for the slightly
higher mean of 2.95 on a scale from 0 to 10 (the original index ranges from 0 to 100; it is
divided by 10 to ease comparability with other determinants).
The first constituting indicator for the legacy of cleavages index, the ratio of the age of
the runner-up opposition party as a share of the years since independence varies around
a mean of 0.45, between a minimum of 0.01 in Ethiopia and 1.03 in Botswana (note,
that values can exceed 1 when parties have been founded before independence). Seven of
17 countries did not experience any minimally competitive elections before the beginning
of the third wave (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritania and Mozambique, as well
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of country sample (averages over third wave elections in
African dominant party systems)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable:
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) 2.95 1.89 0 8.47 17
Independent variable and its measures:
Legacy of Cleavages Index 0.81 0.58 0.01 2.03 17
Age runner-up / ys. since independence 0.45 0.34 0.01 1.03 17
No. of elections before 1990 1.82 1.81 0 5 17
Alternative explanations:
GDP per capita at Independence ($ 1000 Geary-Khamis) 1.35 1 0.39 3.72 17
Number of third wave elections 3 0.94 1 4 17
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10) 6.57 1.1 3.93 8.27 17
Incentives for clientelism:
Political Rights Index (1–7) 3.64 1.24 1.33 5.25 17
Resource dependency 0.11 0.18 0 0.67 17
Effective number of ethnopolitical groups 4.41 3.1 1 9.91 17
Geographic concentration of ethnopolitical groups (0–3) 1.43 0.99 0 2.63 17
GDP per capita (adj. for resource dependency) −0.19 1.83 −1.68 5.36 17
Majoritarian electoral system (dummy) 0.53 0.51 0 1 17
Other determinants:
Aid / GDP 0.11 0.09 0 0.36 17
Liberation movement (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0 1 17
No. of parties boycotting election 0.37 0.61 0 1.5 17
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as Namibia and South Africa due to the coding rules stated further above). Botswana
and Ghana experienced the sample’s maximum of 5 pre-1990 elections. The median is at
two pre-1990 elections (mean of 1.82). Accordingly, Botswana has the highest legacy of
cleavages index value, 2.03, while Ethiopia has the lowest with 0.01.
The GDP per capita at the critical juncture of first elections at the time of indepen-
dence varies around a mean of 1350 international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (median at
Zambia’s 902 dollars). Ethiopia used to be the poorest country with 390 dollars, and rather
noteworthy, Botswana the second poorest country with 430 dollars. Gabon used to be the
richest country with 3718 dollars (in 2008, Ethiopia is still one of the poorest and Gabon
one of the richest countries in the dataset; Botswana however, is third richest after Sey-
chelles and Gabon; cf. with p. 51 in the second section of the book). African third wave
dominant party systems in the case selection experienced on average three uninterrupted
third wave parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2008. The inverted Corruption Per-
ception Index varies around 6.63 with Botswana being the averagely least corrupt country
between 1990 and 2008 (index value of 3.93) and Nigeria the most corrupt one (index value
of 8.27).
With a Political Rights index of averagely 1.33 between 1990 and 2008, South Africa
has the least skewed playing field in party competition and Djibouti the most skewed one
(5.25). The mean skewness degree in part competition is at 3.64. Mean resource depen-
dency is at 11 percent. Gabon has the highest dependency with averagely 67 percent
dependency over third wave elections. Lesotho has the lowest declared dependency in the
WDI with 0 percent. The average third wave dominant party system is situated in a con-
text of almost 4.5 ethnopolitical groups and a geographic concentration degree of almost
1.5 on a scale from 0 (widely dispersed) to 3 (concentrated in one region). With almost
10 ethnopolitical groups, Namibia is the ethnically most fractionalized country whereas
ethnopolitical groups in Nigeria are geographically most concentrated, i.e. least dispersed
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(value of 2.62). Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Seychelles have only one effective ethnopo-
litical group. Regarding the GDP per capita that is accounted for resource dependency,
Seychelles is the richest country in the case selection over third wave elections (value of
5.36). Because Nigeria’s GDP per capita is to a large degree built on its oil wealth, it
becomes the poorest country in the case selection if we account for resource dependency
(value of –1.68). Nine countries in the case selection have majoritarian electoral systems
and eight have proportional or mixed electoral system (only Lesotho and Seychelles have
a mixed electoral system).
With 36 percent, Mozambique has the highest aid dependency as a share of its GDP
between 1990 and 2008. South Africa is generally not aid dependent at all. The mean is
around 11 percent aid dependency. Only in Namibia and South Africa, liberation move-
ments participate in elections that did not experience civil war after liberation; SWAPO
and the African National Congress (ANC), respectively. Five out of 17 dominant party
systems experience electoral boycotts by opposition parties in third wave parliamentary
election (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Zambia, Gabon and Ghana). This results in an overall mean
of “0.37 opposition parties” that boycott third wave elections.
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables of the dynamic mod-
els. The sample is based on 51 elections in the 17 African third wave dominant party
systems. Of course, the descriptives are more or less comparable to the ones in table 5.
The high maximum for the ratio value of the age of the runner-up opposition party in re-
lation to the years since independence points out to several elections in African dominant
party systems where opposition parties came second after the dominant party that were
founded before independence (in descending order: Seychelles 1993 and 2007, Burkina Faso
2002 and 2007, Ghana 1996, South Africa 1994, Lesotho 2002, Zambia 1991, and every
election in Botswana). Obviously, the data for electoral boycotts is more revealing when we
look at the sample of single elections instead of country averages over elections: Djibouti
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is the only country that experienced in more than one parliamentary election boycotts
by opposition parties (three parties boycotted the 1992 elections, two the 1997 elections
and one the 2008 elections). And Zambia experienced in 1996 an electoral boycott by the
sample’s maximum of six opposition parties.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of elections sample (country years of lower house elections
in African third wave dominant party systems)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable:
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) 2.84 2.27 0 9.26 51
Independent variable and its measures:
Legacy of Cleavages Index 0.83 0.69 0 2.26 51
Age runner-up / ys. since independence 0.47 0.5 0 1.71 51
No. of elections before 1990 1.8 1.77 0 5 51
Alternative explanations:
Election’s number since 1990 2.22 1.05 1 4 51
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10) 6.47 1.16 3.9 8.6 51
Incentives for clientelism:
Political Rights Index (1–7) 3.65 1.37 1 6 51
GDP per capita (adj. for resource dependency) 0.04 1.99 −1.85 6.05 51
Other determinants:
First election 0.27 0.45 0 1 51
No. of parties boycotting election 0.41 1.17 0 6 51
In the following cross-sectional OLS multiple regression analysis of the sample of country
averages over third wave elections in dominant party systems, the approach is to first
conduct a simple linear regression between the main independent variable, the legacy of
cleavages index, and the dependent variable, opposition competitiveness (m1 in table 7 of
the following subsection). After that, four OLS multiple regression models are conducted
by step-wise introduction of the alternative explanations and other determinants (m2a-
m5a) (cf. with table 5 on p. 98 or the model figure on p. 86): first, the proxy for
clientelistic mobilization strategies, the Corruption Perception Index in interaction with the
electoral system dummy, second, GDP per capita at independence and the number of third
wave elections, third, the other determinants, aid dependency, the liberation movement
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dummy and the number of parties boycotting the election.41 Lastly, the analysis presents
a complete model that includes both the legacy of cleavages index, as well as the alternative
explanations and the other determinants that reached significance in the previous steps.
Additionally, the effect of the incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies – ethnic
brokerage, political rights, resource dependency and GDP per capita – instead of the
proxy for clientelistic mobilization strategies is tested. Table 7 reports these results if they
reach statistical significance (m2b, m5b).
Conceptually, there is no in-built problem of endogeneity in the main hypothesis because
contemporary opposition competitiveness degrees cannot influence the legacy of cleavages,
which are based on historical events in the relatively distant past of the times of decol-
onization. However, one component of the proxy for salient legacies of cleavages (the
independent variable), the age of the runner-up opposition party, is worth scrutinization:
Extreme values of the volatility degree of the opposition party system, one component of
the opposition competitiveness index (the dependent variable), could be an indicator for
the presence of a newly founded, maximally young, runner-up opposition party. If the
value of volatility approaches 100 percent volatility, and if this value is not based on large
losses of the dominant party that led to proportional gains of established opposition par-
ties, the high volatility derives from one or several newcomer opposition parties that made
relatively large gains on the cost of more established opposition parties. Newcomer parties
are recently founded and cannot be old by definition. Despite the potential endogeneity
this could cause, only in four election observations out of 51, the competitiveness index
is actually based on an opposition volatility that approaches 100 percent volatility: in
Ethiopia’s fourth election and Zambia’s second to fourth elections. To make sure that the
41The supposed influence of the clientelism incentives, GDP per capita, the Political Rights index and the
measure for ethnic brokerage, on the Corruption Perception index itself is significant and in the expected
direction with an explained variance of 78 percent (results not shown in book).
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results are not driven by these observations, I will report the results of robustness tests
where I exclude these two countries or the election observations in question, respectively.
The dynamic analysis follows the same approach of step-wise introduction of alterna-
tive explanations and controls. All models are with random effects, include the lagged
dependent variable and use cluster-robust standard errors to take care of serial-correlation,
equicorrelated errors and panel-heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson, 2008; Kittel, 1999).
The potentially confounding fact that variables like the GDP per capita usually increase
over time is accounted for by the inclusion of the number of consecutive third wave elec-
tions in a country, which increases over time by definition. The results of several additional
robustness-tests will be reported as well.
Results
Table 7 reports the results for the determinants of average opposition competitiveness
degrees over third wave parliamentary elections in African dominant party system. And
indeed, all models (m1-m5b) point to the same result: An opposition party (system)
that can draw on legacies of historical cleavages is more competitive in contemporary
third wave African dominant party systems than an opposition party that lacks legacies
of historical cleavages. Accordingly, legacies of cleavages can be an effective counterforce
against the opposition-weakening effect of the clientelistic monopoly in African dominant
party systems. Legacies of cleavages provide opposition parties with sources of non-material
cohesiveness that increase party elites and voters’ loyalties and make the party more fit for
party-competition in a difficult context.42
42The sample of table 7 and figure 5 excludes the case of Mozambique due to its outlaying status:
Mozambique’s dominant party system features by far the most competitive opposition party of the sample
despite a rather average index value of legacies of cleavages, which is caused by the absence of minimally
competitive pre-third wave elections in Mozambique’s history (see scatterplot of opposition competitiveness
on the legacy of cleavages index in figure 37 on p. 304 in the Appendix; cf. also with figure 1 on p.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the simple linear regression of opposition competitiveness on the legacy of cleavages
index, an increase of the index value of one43 leads to an increase of opposition compet-
itiveness of 14.6 points on the opposition competitiveness scale from 0–100 (1.46 on the
scale from 0 to 10 as it is applied in table 7) (level of significance at p < 0.01). This is equal
to an increase of 7.3 percent seat share of the runner-up opposition party or a decrease
of 14.6 percent opposition party system volatility. Legacies of cleavages alone explain 42
percent of the variance of opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems.
The scatterplot in figure 5 shows the good linear fit between the two variables.
In models 2a and 3, the positive effect of the legacy of cleavages index remains robust
to the inclusion of the main rival determinant, the saliency of clientelistic mobilization –
proxied by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in interaction with the electoral system
– and the other alternative explanations, the modernization level at independence and the
number of third wave elections. In both models 2a and 3, the positive effect of legacies
of cleavages on opposition competitiveness is even stronger than in model 1. Moreover,
as expected, the results of model 2a imply that salient legacies of cleavages can exist
side by side with salient clientelistic mobilization strategies, despite the slightly negative
relation between the two variables (Pearson’s r of -0.46). Hence, it seems that legacies of
cleavages not only make programmatic mobilization strategies more effective in the context
with the contemporary dominant party, they reach above-average non-material cohesiveness, voter loyalty
and contemporary competitiveness despite a lack of pre-third wave routinization of non-violent party
competition. Due to the lack of further cases that experienced fierce and long-term civil war and where
rival civil war groups subsequently turned into political parties after the beginning of the third wave, this
remains an untested, preliminary hypothesis. Nonetheless, Angola’s history of civil war, and its election
results of 1992 and 2012 seem to support this hypothesis (see Nunley, 2009). Table 14 on p. 306 in the
appendix includes the case of Mozambique and applies the same models as in table 7. The results for the
main independent variable, legacy of cleavages, are rather robust to the inclusion of Mozambique. The
overall model fit decreases, however, and other independent variables become insignificant.
43An increase of a legacy of cleavages index of one is equal to a an increase from a newcomer runner-up
opposition party to a runner-up opposition party that relies on roots going back to independence and a
constant record of zero minimally competitive pre-third wave elections, or an increase from a newcomer
runner-up opposition party to a runner-up that was formed approximately half way between independence
and the present and a concomitant increase from zero to two pre-third wave elections.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of opposition competitiveness on legacy of cleavages index in African
dominant party systems
of dominant party systems and rampant clientelism, they also reduce the self-destructive
effect of clientelistic mobilization strategies by a resource-poor opposition because they
make opposition elites and voters more loyal and more willing to suspend demands for
immediate disbursements of clientelistic promises. Opposition parties can become “Do
Everything” parties that successfully combine programmatic and clientelistic mobilization
(cf. Singer and Kitschelt, 2011). In a context of rampant clientelism, this is an important
step towards more democratic responsiveness.
The interactive effect of the clientelism proxy, corruption in interaction with the elec-
toral system, is statistically significant in model 2a.44 However, the interactive effect does
not behave as expected. If we assume a majoritarian electoral system for the electoral
44Yet, the multiplicative proxy of clientelistic mobilization is only significant due to the concomitant
presence of the legacy of cleavages index as a test of a separate model without the legacy of cleavages
index shows (not displayed in the book).
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system dummy, an increase of the corruption level leads to a slightly significant and mod-
erate increase of opposition competitiveness instead of the expected heightened decrease
(y = b0 + belect.sys + bcpi ∗ xcpi + binteraction ∗ xcpi).
45 This unexpected positive relationship
stems from the relatively highly competitive opposition party systems in Nigeria and to
a lesser degree Kenya, which both have majoritarian electoral systems and high degrees
of corruption.46 Among the group of dominant party systems with proportional or mixed
electoral systems there is a significant negative relationship between the clientelism proxy
and opposition competitiveness (p < 0.1).
The modernization level at independence has no significant effect on higher opposi-
tion competitiveness degrees (model 3). This supports the general argument of the book:
Rather legacies of independence cleavages set paths of party system developments until
and beyond the beginning of the third wave apart than the historic context of the level of
modernization, from which embryonic party systems started their journey through time.
The other alternative explanation in model 3, the number of third wave elections, against
predictions, decreases the opposition competitiveness degree slightly, but significantly. Ac-
cordingly, the hypothesized opposition competitiveness boosting effect of founding first
third wave elections counters and overshadows the expected positive effect of the rou-
tinization of third wave party competition so far.
Model 4 includes the controls together with the number of third wave elections. The
legacy of cleavages index remains robust to the inclusion of the controls despite the strong
contribution they make to the level of explained variance (81 percent vis-à-vis 42 percent
45Coefficient: 1.46− 0.81 = 0.65; Coefficient SE:
√
var(CPI ∗maj) + var(CPI) + 2 ∗ cov = 0.31
46On the one hand, Nigeria’s opposition is rather competitive due to a legacy of four pre-third wave
elections, which is in accordance with the main argument of this book. On the other hand, the relatively
high opposition competitiveness degree in Nigeria’s dominant party system may also be explained by the
presence of electoral engineering to deter the formation of ethnic parties. Nigeria has one of the most strict
requirements for political parties’ electoral registration in Africa. Nigerian parties are forced to be present
with party offices in the majority of states, and for becoming president, a candidate not only needs to win
the majority of votes but also a quarter of the vote in the majority of states (Bogaards, 2010b; Bogaards,
Basedau and Christof, 2010). This prevents the inflationary creation of new opposition parties in Nigeria.
107
in model 1). Yet, the legacy of cleavages index’ positive effect looses in strength in compar-
ison with models 1 to 3. More detailed, while the liberation movement dummy does not
reach statistical significance, both aid dependency and electoral boycotts have the expected
significant negative effect on opposition competitiveness. An increase of aid dependency of
10 percent leads to a decrease of the opposition competitiveness index of 7.7 points (in the
0-100 version, 0.77 points in the 0-10 version as it is applied in the table). This is equivalent
to a decrease of the seat share of the runner-up party of almost 4 percent or an increase of
opposition volatility of 7.7 percent. This is bad news for the aid community. In dominant
party systems, aid decreases the competitiveness of the opposition, because it increases
the capacity of the governing dominant party due to investments in governance capacity
and externally induced development of the country that is (falsely) associated with the
governing party. Regarding electoral boycotts, in turn, if averagely one party boycotts the
elections during the third wave, opposition competitiveness decreases 6 points on the scale
from 0 to 100.
Model 5a includes the legacy of cleavages index together with the proxy for the signif-
icance of clientelistic mobilization strategies, corruption in interaction with the electoral
system, as well as the alternative explanations and controls that reached statistical signifi-
cance in the previous steps. The legacy of cleavages index is highly statistically significant
and has the second highest positive effect on opposition competitiveness of the five models
(p < 0.001). Apart from the electoral boycotts variable, which has a stronger negative
effect than in model 4, the effect of clientelism in interaction with the electoral system,
as well as the negative effects of the number of third wave elections and aid dependency
are weaker in comparison with models 2a to 4. Amongst others, the negative effect of
clientelistic mobilization in proportional or mixed electoral system looses statistical signifi-
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cance, while the positive effect of clientelistic mobilization in majoritarian electoral systems
becomes weaker in comparison with model 2a, but remains statistically significant.47
The results are robust to the exclusion of the potentially tautologically coded cases of
Ethiopia and Zambia (regarding the potentially related measurement of opposition com-
petitiveness on the left hand side of the equation and the legacy of cleavages index on
the right hand side of the equation; see above, section 3). The results are also robust to
the exclusion of cases that are on the edge of the case selection regarding their freeness
degree in party competition (Djibouti, Mauritania and Gabon; both robustness tests not
displayed in the book).
The positive effect of the legacy of cleavages index is also robust to a battery of models
that test the influence of the incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies (cf. with
figure 4 on p. 86). Table 7 only displays additional results where effects of the incentive
variables for clientelistic mobilization reached statistical significance. I.e., because neither
the interactive effect of the skewness degree of the playing field in party competition (Po-
litical Rights index) and the electoral system dummy, nor the multiple interactive effect
of the number of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups in interaction with the
electoral system, nor resource dependency reached statistical significance, models 2b and
5b in table 7 only include the interactive effect of GDP per capita (adjusted for resource
dependency) and the electoral system dummy. In detail, according to model 5b, where
the interactive effect of GDP per capita is slightly significant, the richer a country, the
less competitive the opposition party system in majoritarian electoral systems, which runs
counter to Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) expectation that richer voters are less easily
mobilized by clientelistic means.48 However, this result has to be interpreted with caution
as it is driven by the case of Nigeria, which has a relatively high opposition competitiveness
47Coefficient: 0.88− 0.39 = 0.49; Coefficient SE:
√
var(CPI ∗maj) + var(CPI) + 2 ∗ cov = 0.17
48Coefficient: −0.58 + 0.17 = −0.41; Coefficient SE:
√
var(CPI ∗maj) + var(CPI) + 2 ∗ cov = 0.19
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degree despite a majoritarian electoral system and a relatively low level of modernization
(see discussion above).
Last but not least, the legacy of cleavages index is robust to all the incentives for clien-
telistic mobilization strategies without interaction with the electoral system (not displayed
in the book; neither the interactive effect of ethnic brokerage nor the other incentives
without the interaction with the electoral system reach statistical significance).
In sum, it is safe to say that the legacy of cleavages index is the much more convincing
explanation for opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems than
the standard explanation of clientelism. And, we can conclude that, to some degree, salient
legacies of cleavages can exist side by side with salient clientelistic mobilization strategies.
In addition, I also tested the portability of the general argument for the set of non-
dominant African party systems of the third wave. The results are not as convincing as for
the set of dominant party systems because of countries like Malawi and Niger, which have
competitive and institutionalized non-dominant party systems despite relatively young par-
ties and a record of only one pre-third wave election. Nonetheless, generally, we could also
speak of a positive relationship between legacies of cleavages that are present in contem-
porary party competition, and more competitive party systems in non-dominant African
party systems (results not displayed in book).
Table 8 reports the results of the dynamic analyses. The step-wise introduction of
alternative explanations and controls follows the same rationale as in table 7. The results
support the general argument of the book: The legacy of cleavages index is not only
a powerful instrument to explain different degrees of opposition competitiveness between
third wave dominant party systems, but also within third wave dominant party systems.
E.g., imagine a dominant party system where a relatively young runner-up opposition party
looses its runner-up position to an opposition party that has already been founded between
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the pre-independence phase and the pre-third wave phase. The latter will be comparatively
stronger than the former was before. Vice versa, in a dominant party system where an
old runner-up opposition party looses its runner-up position, a new and younger runner-up
opposition party will not manage to become as strong and threatening as the old opposition
party used to be.
More detailed, in model 1 of table 8, an increase of the legacy of cleavages index of
one unit49 leads to an increase of opposition competitiveness of 18.9 points on the original
competitiveness scale from 0 to 100. This is equal to an increase of 9.5 percent seat share
of the runner-up opposition party or a decrease of 18.9 percent volatility of the opposition
party system. Furthermore, model 1 features an acceptable “within” explanatory power
of 20 percent explained variance. This result is – amongst others – robust to the step-
wise inclusion of the proxy for clientelistic mobilization in interaction with the electoral
system (model 2a), the GDP per capita at independence (model 3), aid dependency and
the number of parties boycotting the election (model 4), as well as the complete model
that includes the significant variables of steps 2a-4 (model 5b).
In table 8, the contemporary modernization level in interaction with the electoral sys-
tem, which is an incentive for clientelistic mobilization strategies, proves to be the more
powerful explanation for opposition competitiveness degrees within African dominant party
systems than the proxy variable for clientelism, the Corruption Perception Index in interac-
tion with the electoral system (models 2b and 5b in contrast to models 2a and 5a). Similar
to table 7, GDP per capita (adjusted for resource dependency) has a negative effect on
opposition competitiveness degrees within African dominant party systems in the context
of a majoritarian electoral system. In proportional or mixed systems, the effect of GDP
49An increase of one unite of the legacy of cleavages index is equal to an increase from a value of the
age of the runner-up party in relation to years since independence from 0.0 to 1.0 and a constant record





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































per capita is positive, in turn. The effect is robust to the variable that indicates the third
wave sequence number of an election in a dominant party system.
Finally, the dynamic results for the legacy of cleavages index in table 8 are also robust
to the exclusion of the potentially tautological cases of the Ethiopian 2005 election and
all Zambian elections; as well as to the exclusion of cases that are on the edge of the case
selection regarding their freeness degree in elections.50
Conclusion
On the basis of the large-N research design, the third section of the book delivered evidence
that the context of clientelism in African dominant party systems does not automatically
lead to weak and volatile opposition parties. If opposition parties of the third wave have
access to a heritage of historic cleavages that has been formed around the time of inde-
pendence or liberation from settler oligarchies, they are stronger and less volatile, and
become more threatening to the dominant party. Old opposition parties with pre-third
wave experience of electoral competition can rely on established images and symbolic cap-
ital, i.e., a ‘brand identity’ that has been formed during independence – times of hope
and trust in the changing power of politics. This non-material source of cohesiveness in-
creases both opposition party elites and voters’ loyalty. It makes old opposition parties
more immune against co-optation efforts by the dominant party and dangers of internal
factionalism; in contrast to newcomer opposition parties, which have to earn the trust
of relatively critical and sometimes disgruntled potential opposition voters from scratch.
Therefore, old opposition parties can more viably follow a position-taking programmatic
mobilization strategy in electoral competition with the dominant party. And, at the same
50Political Rights values of 5; every election in Djibouti and Mauritania, the 1992, 1997 and 2007
elections in Burkina Faso, the 2000 and 2005 elections in Ethiopia, the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections in
Gabon, the 1992 election in Ghana, the 1995 election in Tanzania, and the 1996 and 2001 elections in
Zambia.
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time, non-material sources of cohesiveness also lead to more success in clientelistic compe-
tition because opposition party elites and voters are more willing to suspend demands for
immediate disbursements of clientelistic promises.
Standard explanations like the significance of clientelistic mobilization strategies and
the modernization level contribute their share to the explanation of opposition competi-
tiveness degrees in African dominant party systems. Yet, their influence is less robust than
the influence of salient legacies of cleavages. Hence, the pre-third wave history of African
party systems matters for contemporary dominant party systems and their potential for
higher quality levels of democracy and democratic consolidation.
As expected, salient legacies of cleavages can exist side by side with salient clientelistic
mobilization strategies to some degree. The two variables are only slightly negatively
related. This finding contrasts with common wisdom and accounts in the literature that
postulate a crowding-out effect of salient programmatic and non-material mobilization on
clientelistic mobilization (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000). Rather, I argue that opposition parties with
non-material sources of cohesiveness are also more successful in clientelistic competition in
contrast to their opposition counterparts that lack historic capital. Voters seem to have
higher trust in clientelistic promises of historically established opposition parties and are
more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursement. Hence, even in a context
of rampant clientelism and heightened incumbency advantage, salient legacies of cleavages
and historic capital manage to strengthen opposition parties, which eventually leads to
increasing quality levels of democracy.
Some caveats remain that cannot be corrected for in quantitative large-N designs: First,
the measure for legacy of cleavages is rather an approximation to the party system reality
around the times of independence and the historical formation of political cleavages as
well as its path-dependent spill-over into contemporary third wave dominant party sys-
tems. Second, the path-dependent chain of causality from the cleavage formation in the
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embryonic party system at the time of independence over democratic breakdown and sub-
sequent renaissance of the electoral regime to spill-over into third wave dominant party
systems is difficult to trace in large-N designs. Hence, it is important to re-test the large-N
results in a more qualitative small-N analysis. Accordingly, the next section of the book
will examine four crucial cases regarding (1) their embryonic party system and cleavage
formation history around the time of independence and their spill-over into present party
system configurations (section 4), and (2) demonstrate the resulting contemporary demo-
cratic responsiveness level (section 5), which is an important element of the quality level
of democracy.
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4 Historical Roots of Opposition Competitiveness in
Four African Cases
It is the intention of this and the following section to refine shortcomings of the previous
two parts that are owed to the nature of quantitative large-N designs. I do this by retesting
the robustness of the book’s two main arguments – (1) salient legacies of cleavages lead
to more competitive opposition parties in third wave dominant party systems, and (2)
more competitive opposition parties in turn are conducive to third wave dominant party
systems that have a comparatively higher level of democratic responsiveness and quality
of democracy – in (1) a qualitative and variable-centered comparative-historical analysis,
and (2) by measuring the contemporary democratic responsiveness level by the distinctive-
ness of programmatic offers and the extent of party representatives’ and partisan voters’
programmatic issue congruence.
The small-N analyses follow the logic of Lieberman’s (2005) nested analysis approach
in mixed-method designs of comparative research: Because I consider the results of the
previous large-N analyses to be rather robust, I chose a case selection strategy for the qual-
itative small-N analyses that corresponds to the case selection strategy of a “model-testing
small-N analysis” (Lieberman, 2005, 442). Such a case strategy aims at re-testing the
robustness of the large-N results in a small-N setting. This allows retesting the arguments
with more fine-grained qualitative measures for the central concepts and to open the “black
box” of the causal mechanism between the X and Y of the arguments.
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Small-N Case Selection (for sections 4 and 5) and Ceteris Paribus
Assumptions
In order to conduct the model-testing small-N analyses of this and the following section, it
makes sense to select cases that the large-N analysis predicts relatively accurately, and that
exhibit a considerable degree of variation on the independent and the dependent variable
(Lieberman, 2005, 444). Additionally, to enable analytical isolation of the main arguments,
I strive to hold contextual factors constant (“ceteris paribus assumptions”) that could po-
tentially disturb the analysis (Lijphart, 1975): Hence, in the first place, I am looking for
cases in my large-N case selection that do not vary to strongly on the regime variable
regarding the skewness degree of the playing field in third wave party competition. I also
want to exclude former settler colonies or Portuguese colonies because historical cleavages
in these cases evolved rather in the context of violent conflict than non-violent conflict. The
electoral system variable should be held constant to some degree as well. And the saliency
of ethno-politics should not vary too much among the cases. Last but not least, the level of
modernization around independence and the level of contemporary corruption, a sign for
the saliency of contemporary clientelism (Singer, 2009), should be rather constant within
the small-N case selection.
Case Selection:
To begin with, I select two cases that featured dominant party systems in 2010,51 and
are comparable regarding their skewness degree of the playing field in party competition
(measured by Freedom House’ Political Rights index). Additionally, the two cases should
display considerable variation regarding the competitiveness degree of their opposition
party system, which is the independent variable in the second section of the book, and the
51The respective elite survey for the subsequent section, where I measure democratic responsiveness, has
been conducted by the author in 2010 and 2012.
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dependent variable in the third section of the book. And they should display variation both
on the independent variable of the third section of the book, the legacy of cleavages index,
and the dependent variable of the second section of the book, the quality of democracy.
Figure 6 on p. 119 demonstrates that Botswana and Lesotho fit best into these case
selection criteria: Both countries belong to the group of dominant party systems in 2010
(formerly dominant party systems in 2010 with capital letters in figure 6). And both be-
long to the group of democracies as polyarchies or democracies that are on the borderline
between democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarianism with relatively less
skewed playing fields in party competition (average Political Rights index values over third
wave elections of 3.0 or below; countries with grey dots in figure 6). And Botswana and
Lesotho display the necessary variation on the independent and the dependent variable.
The variation on the independent variable of the third section of the book, the legacy of
cleavages index, is substantial. The variation of opposition competitiveness is interesting
because the difference is bigger than we think: While Lesotho’s 2002 and 2007 elections
in the dataset belong to the stronger half of the large-N sample in the previous sections
of the book regarding the seat share of the runner-up opposition party, the country per-
forms considerably weaker regarding the degree of opposition institutionalization, where
the country’s observations belong to the weaker half of the sample.
In more qualitative terms, Botswana’s dominant party, Botswana Democratic Party
(BDP), is confronted with a stable, yet varyingly strong opposition (between 9 and 33
percent seat share over third wave elections), embodied in the Botswana National Front
(BNF). The BNF achieved the runner-up position in Botswana’s national parliament in ev-
ery single election since independence in 1966. Lesotho’s opposition, in turn, is rather non-
institutionalized. After the former authoritarian Basotho National Party (BNP) seemed to
establish itself as the runner-up opposition party behind the dominant Lesotho Congress for
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Figure 6: Small-N Case Selection based on opposition competitiveness and legacy of cleav-
ages index
Democracy (LCD) in the 2002 elections, it sank into insignificance in the 2007 elections by
dropping from a seat share of 17.8 percent to 2.5 percent in 2007 with a concomitant drop
in vote shares. On the other hand, the newcomer opposition party, All Basotho Convention
(ABC), which has just been founded less than a six months before the 2007 elections gained
14.17 percent from scratch and became the new runner-up opposition party. Additionally,
the opposition party Lesotho Worker’s Party (LWP) rose from less than 1 percent seat
share in 2002 to 8 percent seat share in 2007 while the National Independent Party rose
from 4 percent in 2002 to 17 percent in 2007 and changed from opposition in 2002 to be-
coming a co-opted junior partner of the dominant LCD in 2007 (interviews with political
experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010).
The high rank of the legacy of cleavages index for Botswana derives (1) from the
fact that the runner-up opposition party BNF was already founded in 1965, and (2) that
Botswana experienced 5 pre-third wave elections; both facts point to the high probability
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that legacies of independence cleavages are still present in the contemporary party system.
In Lesotho by contrast, only in the 2002 elections the runner-up opposition party was
relatively old, whereas this was not at all the case in 2007 (the 2002 runner-up, BNP, was
founded in 1959 whereas the 2007 runner-up, ABC, was founded in 2006). Additionally,
Lesotho experienced two pre-third wave elections less than Botswana.
The two cases also suit the criteria for the case selection of a model-testing small-
N analysis regarding their quality of democracy, the dependent variable in the second
section of the book. The first scatter plot in figure 7 shows that Botswana has an inverted
Civil Liberties index of 6 in 2008 (the last observation year in the large-N sample), while
Lesotho only reaches a value of 5. The difference is more impressive in the second scatter
plot, where I measure the quality of democracy in society with 2008 Afrobarometer data
using individual citizen’s perceptions of the quality of democracy in society, a survey-based
equivalent to Freedom House’s expert based Civil Liberties index: The measurement is
based on the mean values of African countries of two Afrobarometer questions; “In this
country, how free are you: To say what you think?” (q15a), and “In this country, how
free are you: To join any political organization you want?” (q15b), which both range from
“not at all free” (value of 1) to “completely free” (value of 4), and are combined in a factor
that is based on the principal-component factor method.52
It is crucial to match and compare the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho
with two cases of the group of formerly dominant party systems in 2010 in terms of the
variance of their opposition competitiveness degree during their dominant party system
phase, the legacy of cleavages, and the quality of democracy. I regard this special sub-
52Note, that two outliers are not included in the second scatter plot of figure 7: Tanzania has a higher
quality of democracy in society according to its citizens’ evaluation than expected on the basis of its rel-
atively low average opposition competitiveness index. Nigeria in turn has a comparatively extremely low
quality of democracy in society according to its citizens’ evaluation despite a high opposition competitive-
ness index. Both countries belong to the group of countries with averagely stronger skewed playing fields
in party competition.
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Figure 7: Small-N Case Selection based on indices of the quality of democracy and opposi-
tion competitiveness
group of non-dominant party systems as analytically most valuable benchmark against
which any positive assessment of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and
democratic responsiveness has to be tested: First, non-dominant party systems are so far
generally regarded as favorable for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness,
in contrast to dominant party systems, and therefore set a high benchmark. Second,
the fact that cases of the special sub-category of non-dominant party systems used to
be dominant party systems themselves makes them most comparable to contemporary
dominant party systems and helps to evaluate if change from a dominant party system to a
non-dominant party system is automatically associated with contemporary higher levels in
the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness in comparison with contemporary
dominant party systems.
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In figure 6 on p. 119, ex-dominant party systems in 2010 are marked with capital letters.
Clearly, Ghana matches Botswana most adequately, as it had a relatively competitive
opposition party system during its dominant party system phase between 1992 and 2000,
and a legacy of cleavages index that comes closest to the value of Botswana due to an
old runner-up opposition party in 1996, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), and five
pre-third wave elections. And, as Botswana and Lesotho, Ghana belongs to the group of
African democracies as polyarchies or borderline cases between democracy as polyarchy
and competitive authoritarianism (grey dots in figure 6), which additionally enhances its
analytical value.
In 1992, the main opposition party, NPP, its roots go back to the 1947 founded party
United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), boycotted the founding elections. When the NPP
participated in the subsequent 1996 elections, it instantly achieved a runner-up position
of 30 percent seat share in the national parliament. In 2000, the NPP even won the
elections and the third wave dominant party system of Ghana ended. The former dominant
party, National Democratic Congress (NDC), however, retained its former strength despite
strong man Jerry Rawlings’ retirement and the 2000 defeat by its successor John Atta
Mills, and regained incumbency in the 2008 elections. Hence, the institutionalization and
competitiveness of the opposition in the dominant party system, which became apparent
in the 1996 elections, spilled over into the non-dominant party system of the 2000s, and
made Ghana one of the few truly institutionalized and competitive two-party systems in
Africa. In sum, both the quantitative and qualitative extent of opposition competitiveness
in Ghana’s party system are highly interesting and analytically most valuable.
Senegal and Kenya are the only countries in the large-N sample besides Ghana that
changed their status from a dominant party system to a non-dominant party system be-
tween the beginning of the third wave and 2010, and could potentially match Lesotho and
serve as an antipode to the Ghanaian case in terms of the competitiveness of the opposition
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party system, the legacy of cleavages and quality of democracy.53 Yet, the two countries are
clear cases of competitive authoritarianism, in contrast to Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana.54
Furthermore, ethnic mobilization strategies and the general saliency of ethnicity in politics
are much more pronounced in Kenya than in Botswana and Ghana where ethnic politics
have been more strongly suppressed, and ethnic cleavages been cross-cut or multilayered
to some degree by other, non-ethnic salient cleavages.55 And Lesotho is one of the ethni-
cally most homogeneous nations in Africa. In sum, we could not analytically isolate the
relationship between legacies of cleavages and opposition competitiveness in Kenya from
the potentially confounding factors of salient ethnopolitical fragmentation and a relatively
53Zambia changed from a dominant party system to a non-dominant party system in 2011 as well, and
Lesotho in 2012. Yet, these events happened too recently and there has not passed enough time in order
to research and validly cover them in this book.
Also note, that we cannot compare the democratic responsiveness degree of Ghana, Kenya or Senegal
during the non-dominant party system phase of the 2000s with their democratic responsiveness degree
during the dominant party system phase of the 1990s due to lack of responsiveness data for the 1990s. I
would expect rather the competitiveness degree of the opposition to be the decisive factor for explaining
the contemporary degree of responsiveness than actual change of incumbency. Accordingly, Ghana should
have already been more responsive during its dominant party system phase than dominant party systems
with lesser competitive opposition parties. In the case of Zambia and Lesotho in turn, I would expect that
their party systems cannot transform from a dominant party system to an institutionalized non-dominant
party system with a higher quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness as in the case of Ghana,
but rather resemble non-institutionalized non-dominant party systems with rather lower responsiveness
degrees due to their past of a lesser competitive opposition party system during their dominant party
system phase (cf. van Eerd, forthcoming).
54Provided that we neglect Senegal’s and Kenya’s status as clear cases of competitive authoritarianism,
they could potentially match the case of Lesotho, because their party systems followed much more chaotic
paths after incumbency change in 2000, respectively 2002, as it could be assumed by their relatively high
opposition competitiveness degree during their phase of dominant party system in the 1990s. Yet, apart
of the fact that it belongs to the group of competitive authoritarian regimes, Kenya is also not an ideal
case for a model-testing small-N analysis because its opposition competitiveness index is not well predicted
by the model as we can see in figure 6. Its opposition competitiveness index is too high in comparison
to what we could expect by its rather low legacy of cleavages index, which is based on a record of only
two pre-third wave elections and a runner-up opposition party in 1992 that has just been founded. If we
neglect its potentially confounding status as competitive authoritarian regime with a relatively stronger
skewed playing field than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, Senegal could be an analytically more suitable
candidate than Kenya as it is predicted more accurately than Kenya in figure 6. However, its opposition
competitiveness degree is still slightly higher than expected by its legacy of cleavages index value, especially
in comparison with Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana. In this regard, it would be a more suitable candidate
to match Botswana instead of matching Lesotho.
55For the significance of ethnopolitical fragmentation in Kenya see Elischer (2008), LeBas (2011, 231–
236) and Wahman (forthcoming); for cross-cutting cleavages in Botswana see Charlton (1993); and for
Ghana see Bebler (1973), Dickovick (2008), Whitfield (2009) and Osei (2012))
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stronger skewed playing field in party competition. The Senegalese party system of the
2000s, in turn, resembled more a new dominant party system, this time with an extremely
weak and non-institutionalized opposition, than a non-dominant and non-institutionalized
party system, which could match the case of Lesotho.56
Due to that fact that I have run out of formerly dominant cases that could complete
the small-N case selection of Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, I open the field for potential
cases that do not fit my large-N case selection constituting time criteria – at least three
consecutive electoral victories with an absolute majority and the presidency in a row, or
such an electoral victory in the founding third wave elections for the previously authori-
tarian party – but that are considered instances of one-party dominance in the literature
and achieved absolute majorities and the presidency in at least two consecutive elections
after the beginning of the third wave. The national Malian elections in 1992 and 1997
clearly conform to these criteria and make Mali an ideal (almost-)formerly dominant party
system case to serve as the antipode to the formerly dominant party system of Ghana
and complete the small-N case selection. As shown in figure 6, the Malian party system
completes the case selection more adequately than Senegal and Kenya as it varies strongly
both on the x- and y-axis in comparison with Ghana due to (1) a non-competitive opposi-
tion party system in the 1990s and (2) a concomitant low legacy of cleavages index due to
newly founded runner-up opposition parties and a low record of only one pre-third wave
election. Apart from the fact that the Malian case is predicted rather accurately in figure
6, the case is also better suited to complete the small-N cases selection in opposition to
Kenya and Senegal because the Malian electoral regime between the beginning of the third
wave and 2010 also belongs to the group of democracies as polyarchies or borderline cases
56More detailed, the former Senegalese dominant Parti Socialiste (PS) was confronted with a relatively
competitive opposition, embodied in the 1974 founded Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS). However, in
opposition to Ghana’s former dominant party NDC, the PS did not manage to retain its strength after
its loss of dominance in 2000 and imploded dramatically during the 2000s on the one hand due to its own
failures, and on the other hand due to electoral reforms and a skewed playing field to the advantage of
Abdoulaye Wade’s new PDS government (cf. Osei, 2012; Wahman, forthcoming; Levitsky and Way, 2010).
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between democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarianism with an average Po-
litical Rights index over third wave elections of 2.25, i.e. a relatively low skewness degree of
the playing field in party competition.57 The following paragraph exemplifies the dominant
party system character of the Malian party system during the 1990s and the concomitant
non-institutionalization and weakness of the opposition, which led to a non-dominant, but
generally non-institutionalized, party system in the 2000s.
First, both in 1992 and 1997, the former democracy movement and newly founded
party, Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (ADEMA), won a two third majority in par-
liament and the presidency. According to more qualitative criteria, this period in Mali’s
third wave electoral regime is considered to be one of dominance by the ADEMA and its
president, Alpha Oumar Konaré (Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; van Vliet, 2013; Dooren-
spleet and Nijzink, 2013). Second, the opposition in both 1992 and 1997 was formed by
an extremely weak and non-institutionalized opposition with an average opposition party
system competitiveness index of 13.2 on a scale of 0 to 100 (cf. with figure 6). Yet in
2002, ADEMA lost its dominant position before even contesting the elections, due to in-
ternal factions over who should replace Konaré, who was banned by the constitution from
running for a third term (Boilley, 2002, 174f.; cf. Moestrup, 2006): The ADEMA prime
minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (“IBK”) resigned and formed a new political grouping,
Alternative 2002, that evolved into a new party, the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM),
which formed an umbrella for a significant number of disgruntled former ADEMA mem-
bers. Apart from IBK and the ADEMA candidate, Soumäıla Cissé, who tried to inherit the
presidency from Konaré, the former lieutenant colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (“ATT”),
who was very popular due to his performance as head of the transitory government from
57The categorization of the Malian electoral system as democracy as polyarchy or borderline case between
democracy as polyarchy and competitive authoritarianism is true until the recent military coup on March
22, 2012. Quite “lucky” in the case of this book, the respective elite survey for the measurement of
democratic responsiveness has just been finished in the beginning of March 2012, and is therefore still a
valid assessment of democratic responsiveness in Mali’s third wave electoral regime as respondents have not
been influenced in their answers by the new, and non-democratic environment of a quasi-military regime.
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1991 to 1992, ran as an independent candidate, and won the necessary run-off presidential
election. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, the ADEMA also lost its absolute
majority in parliament due to huge gains by its splinter RPM. Due to the split inside
the ADEMA, subsequent “birth” of the RPM in the advent of the 2002 elections and
changes between smaller opposition parties, the opposition volatility and weakness of the
1990s spilled over into opposition parties’ and formerly dominant party system’s overall
volatility in the 2000s. This general non-institutionalized nature of the party system be-
came even worse due to the independent president ATT’s governing style to forge support
in parliament through changing coalitions, of which some important parties strategically
changed back to opposition status in the advent of the 2007 general elections. On top
of that, another split inside the ADEMA amongst supporters of the former presidential
candidate Soumäıla Cissé led to the formation of the party Union pour la république et
la démocratie (URD). Whereas ADEMA and URD decided to back independent president
ATT’s bid for reelection in the 2007 elections, IBK and his party RPM made another at-
tempt to gain power. Yet ATT was re-elected. This proved to be disastrous for the RPM
in the following parliamentary elections. The party lost 35 of its 46 seats while ADEMA
consolidated its position as strongest party without absolute majority and no presidency
and the newly founded URD gained 34 seat from scratch. Following the 2007 elections,
ATT further intensified his strategy of coalition government among the several parties in
parliament. He formed a largely oversized coalition by adding the initially opposing par-
ties, RPM and Parti pour la renaissance nationale (PARENA), to his already oversized
coalition of 12 parties, Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP). By doing this,
he increased his support base in parliament to 143 of 147 seats in parliament. Only one
party, Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l’indépendance (SADI), remained in the
opposition (interviews with political experts in Mali, 2012; Imperato and Imperato, 2008;
Nunley, 2009).
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Figure 8: Genealogical tree of the Malian parties between 1991 and 2006 (CMDID, 2007)
The genealogical tree of the Malian parties between 1991 and 2006 in figure 8, which
was made by a local artist on behalf of the non-governmental organization, Centre Malien
pour le dialouge inter-partis et la Democratie (CMDID), should give a good impression of
the extremely volatile and increasingly fragmented party system landscape in the Malian
third wave electoral history (CMDID, 2007).
Both Ghana and Mali are also analytically valuable cases in order to re-test the main
arguments of this book in a comparative small-N analysis because they match Botswana
and Lesotho not only in terms of the legacy of cleavages argument (section 3 of the book),
but also in terms of the influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy
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(party II of the book). As shown in the left-hand side scatter plot in figure 7 on p. 121, in
2008, both Botswana and Ghana have a higher quality of democracy in society according
to Freedom House’s inverted Civil Liberties index than Lesotho and Mali. And the match
is confirmed in the right-hand side scatter plot in figure 7 where the quality of democracy is
measured with 2008 Afrobarometer data on individual citizen’s perceptions of the quality
of democracy in society (see above, based on citizen’s evaluation of freedom of expression
and organizational freedom in a country). In the following, I discuss the ceteris paribus
assumptions and potentially confounding variables for the four selected cases.
Ceteris Paribus Assumptions and Potentially Confounding Variables:
Regarding the minimization of potentially confounding variables, Botswana and Lesotho
are ideal cases because these two southern African and culturally cousin countries share
many contextual variables (cf. Lijphart, 1975; Lieberman, 2005): Both countries have been
British protectorates, which benefited the colonizers as well as the colonized in fending off
the Boers. Both gained independence in 1966 and established parliamentarian democra-
cies. Botswana became a parliamentary republic, Lesotho a parliamentary constitutional
monarchy. The two countries are culturally related as both belong to the Sotho-Tswana
Bantu language sub-group. The Basotho are the only ethnic group in Lesotho while the
Tswana (eight ‘major’ tribes) form an 80 percent ethnic dominance in Botswana and the
remaining 20 percent are constituted by the ethnically distinct ‘minority’ tribes. Both
countries have a traditional chief system, which parallels and complements the modern
government structures. The paramount chiefs of both countries have seats in the coun-
tries’ respective mainly advisory second chamber (Düsing, 2002; Good, 2008; Maundeni,
2001; Coplan, 1997; Olaleye, 2003).58
58Constitution-wise, both Ghana and Mali have an unicameral parliamentary system in opposition to
Botswana and Lesotho. Yet, this constitutional variation should not be over-emphasized as the role of the
second chambers in both Botswana and Lesotho are rather of advisory character. The formal and informal
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Likewise to Botswana and Lesotho, both in Ghana and Mali, the traditional chief system
used to play an important role during in the indirect-rule system of both the British as
well as the French colonial administration (Apter, 1963; Rathbone, 2000; Foltz, 1965). In
this respect, Schachter Morgenthau (1964) points out to the fact that in the case of Mali,
which was much less urbanized and peripheral than the French beacons of West-African
colonialism, Senegal and Ivory Coast, the colonial power was never able to implement
its official policy of direct rule and “assimilation” that intended to put meritocratically
selected Africans in charge of the local political system instead of the traditional “chefferie”.
Accordingly, the Malian traditional political system was preserved to some degree during
the colonial phase (Foltz, 1965, 11–13); as in the case of Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, and
most other British colonies in Africa. Due to this similarity and the comparable timing of
colonialization and de-colonization as well as the granting of political rights to the African
population after the Second World War in French and British African colonies in opposition
to Portuguese colonies or Southern African settler oligarchies, I find it interesting to mix
former French and British African colonies in a comparative small-N analysis (Foltz, 1965,
22; Awoonor, 1990, 133f.). It is an additional advantage of such a “mixed” small-N case
selection that it speaks to both the French-speaking and English-speaking parts of Africa
and echoes the large-N selection in that respect as well.59
Generally, however, it is safe to say that in contemporary Malian politics, chiefs are
to some degree of lesser importance than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana. Nonethe-
less, people in Mali still know who is of noble descent and who not. Likewise, they still
highly respect the “chefferie” even in Mali’s most urban and modern place, the capital
power of chiefs in local rather than national politics is much more important (Düsing, 2002; Coplan,
1997; Olaleye, 2003; interviews with political experts, traditional chiefs, and politicians in Botswana and
Lesotho, 2010).
59Note, that British colonialism had no significant influence on both the contemporary quality of democ-
racy in the second section of the book, as well as the opposition competitiveness index in the third section
of the book.
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Bamako (interviews with political experts, traditional chiefs, and politicians in Botswana
and Lesotho, 2010, and Ghana and Mali, 2012).
As in Botswana and Ghana, ethnopolitical cleavages are of generally lesser salience than
in other African electoral regimes (Lesotho is ethnically homogeneous, anyway). On the one
hand, a considerable plurality of different ethnic groups certainly exists in Mali, on the other
hand, they are geographically too scattered to allow efficient ethnopolitical mobilization in
plurality single-member constituencies (Gurr, 1993; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003;
Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999). And, as in the case of Botswana and Ghana, ethnopolitical
cleavages have been overlayered and/or cross-cut by other, non-ethnic, political cleavages
(Bebler, 1973; Dickovick, 2008).60
As in Botswana, Ghanaians and Malians select their parliament through single-member
constituencies. Ghana, like Botswana, uses the first-past-the-post (FPTP), Mali uses plu-
rality. Lesotho deviates in this respect somewhat as it changed from single-member con-
stituency FPTP-system to a mixed system by adopting the mixed member proportional
system (MMP) in 2002. While this strengthened the representation of the opposition in
comparison to the 1993 and 1998 elections, the majoritarian element is still dominant.
Constitutionally, the four countries differ because Lesotho and Botswana have parliamen-
tary systems, Mali a semi-presidential system and Ghana a purely presidential system.
However, these differences are de facto of minor importance. Although Botswana’s presi-
dent is elected by the national assembly, he has as much executive power as any directly
elected president in African electoral regimes. In some respects, his executive powers even
excel the ones of most other, directly elected African presidents (Good, 2008; Good and
Taylor, 2008). In Mali’s semi-presidential system in turn, the prime minister is directly
60Of course, recent events in Mali, and the periodical re-ignition of violent conflict between the lighter-
skinned Northern Tuareg minority groups and the mostly Southern and rather black-skinned majority
groups since independence seems to contradict this notion. However, neither are the Tuareg an ethnically
and politically homogeneous group that would speak with one voice nor do they have a critical mass in
the Malian population share to be electorally highly relevant.
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appointed by the president (Moestrup, 2006; Nunley, 2009). And the logic of presidential-
ism is pervasive in Mali, too (interviews with political experts in Mali, 2012). Lesotho’s
parliamentary constitutional monarchy comes nearest to a classical parliamentary system
(the monarch has only ceremonial duties). This is a potentially confounding fact that has
to be kept in mind when we interpret the results of the small-N analyses.
Regarding socioeconomic development, Botswana is one of the few upper-middle income
economies in Africa while Lesotho belongs to the lower-middle income countries (World
Bank, 2012). Yet, more importantly, both countries started on a very weak modernization
level around independence: In 1964, Botswana had a GDP per capita of 430 international
1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, and Lesotho one of 435 Dollars (second poorest and third
poorest countries of the large-N selection at that time) (cf. with figure 10 on p. 142).
Ghana, like Lesotho, belongs to the lower-middle income economies whereas Mali is cat-
egorized as low-income economy (World Bank, 2012). Because Botswana in turn belongs
to the group of upper-middle income countries (see further above), the variance between
Botswana and Mali in this respect could disturb the validity of the small-N results some-
what. Nonetheless, the contemporary modernization level already proved to be the weaker
explanatory large-N factor in both the second and third section of the book. Regarding
the historic modernization level around independence, Mali started on a comparable low
level, with a GDP per capita of 504 international 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, slightly
more than the 430 and 435 of Botswana and Lesotho. Yet Ghana belonged to one of the
more advanced colonies, with a GPD per capita of 1122 Dollars. Hence, this is another
potentially confounding factor that we have to keep in mind when we interpret the results
of the ensuing small-N analyses. In general, however, the large-N analyses in the previous
sections of the book already have proven, that the modernization level around indepen-
dence has no path-dependent influence on contemporary party systems in African third
wave electoral regimes (cf. also with figure 10 on p. 142).
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Last but not least, Mali is most similar to Lesotho and Ghana regarding the level of
corruption according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
which points out to a comparable saliency level of clientelistic mobilization strategies (cf.
Singer, 2009). Here, Botswana deviates with a rather low level of corruption.
Summary of the Small-N Case Selection:
Figure 9 summarizes the small-N case selection of this book. I select four cases that vary
on two party system dimensions, the competitiveness degree of the opposition party sys-
tem since the beginning of the third wave (x-axis in figure 9), and the fact wheter they
are contemporary dominant party systems or contemporary non-dominant party systems,
which used to be dominant party systems between 1990 and incumbency change in 2000
(Ghana) and 2002 (Mali) (y-axis).
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The four cases vary on the independent variable in the third section of the book, the
legacy of cleavages index, which leads to the expectation that in the historical small-N
analysis, we should be able to trace path-dependent spill-over from (1) cleavage-based
party competition in the first minimally competitive national elections around the time of
independence over (2) first breakdowns of the electoral regime after independence to (3) pre-
third wave renaissance of the electoral regime finally (4) into current third wave electoral
regimes and party systems. Last but not least, the four cases vary on the dependent variable
in the second section of the book, the quality of democracy, which leads to the expectation
that they will vary accordingly regarding their party system responsiveness degree, i.e.
the distinctiveness of programmatic offers and the congruence between partisan voter’s
preferences and their political representative’ policy preferences, which will be analyzed in
the subsequent section of the book (cf. with section 1).
The four cases are most similar regarding their skewness degree of the playing field in
third wave electoral party competition, as their third wave elections are overall basically
free but not perfectly fair, yet belong to the most fair ones of the large-N selection. They
are also rather similar regarding a rather low saliency degree of ethnopolitical mobilization
in third wave elections. Botswana, Ghana and Mali all feature parliamentary electoral
systems based on vote through single-member constituencies, while the largest part of
Lesotho’s parliament is also voted for through single-member constituencies. And, apart
from Botswana, which has a rather low level, they are similar regarding their corruption
level, which points out to a comparable saliency level of clientelistic mobilization strategies.
In the following, I discuss the operationalization, data and methods for the comparative
historical analysis regarding the influence of salient legacies of cleavages on opposition
competitiveness in third wave dominant party systems. The first subsection of section 5,
in turn, will start with the operationalization, data and methods for measuring the degree
of party system responsiveness in the four cases.
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Operationalization, Data and Methods for Comparative Historical
Analysis
The empirical subsection of section 4 is about retesting section 3’s results regarding the
argument that salient legacies of cleavages lead to more competitive opposition parties in
third wave dominant party systems, i.e.:
Hypothesis 1.1 (cf. section 3): The more cleavage-based party competition established
itself in pre-third wave national parliamentary elections, the stronger and more insti-
tutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant
party systems.
Accordingly, the general theoretical argument and the definition of the main concepts
(e.g. political cleavages, critical junctures) are the same as in section 3 and can be consulted
there. Nonetheless, I briefly repeat the main theoretical argument below, which I have
visualized in figure 3 on p. 75.
Generally, I argued in section 3 that the first critical juncture of de-colonization and
indigenous nationalization processes most likely provoked embryonic political party com-
petition around a center-periphery cleavage in advent of first pre-independence elections.
Furthermore, I argued that ethnical cleavages and alleged bourgeoisie-proletariate cleav-
ages are rather incorporated in the dominant center-periphery cleavage than representing
real cleavages in their own right. After that, the timing and fashion of the eventual second
critical juncture of the first post-independence breakdown of the minimally competitive
electoral regime determines the chances for the degree of establishment of the center-
periphery cleavage and its subsequent spill-over into third wave party competition. I used
figure 3 on p. 75 to visualize an ideal-typical African case regarding the development of
party competition, structured around a center-periphery cleavages over authoritarian inter-
ruptions into final spill-over into contemporary third wave party competition. Decisive for
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salient survival of political structuring around a legacy of a center-periphery cleavage in the
third wave are the duration and saliency of party competition around a center-periphery
cleavage during pre-third wave electoral regimes, visualized by the two continuos arrows
in figure 3 before the beginning of the third wave. Negatively speaking, the longer the
authoritarian phase(s), marked by transparent and broken arrows, and the more strongly
suppressed political cleavages during that time, the less likely survival and spill-over into
the third wave. If third wave opposition parties cannot rely on established legacies of cleav-
ages that structure political competition, they have no ideological and symbolic “capital”
to rely on in competition with the dominant party and have to exclusively and also less
viably refer to mobilization strategies that advantage the dominant party because of its
incumbency, i.e. clientelistic mobilization strategies and valence competition.
While the first critical juncture of de-colonization is identical regarding its non-violent
nature through first pre-independence elections to every former British and French African
colony, the second critical juncture of the breakdown of the first post-independence electoral
regime varies regarding (1) whether it occurred at all until present, and (2) if yes, regarding
its timing, as well as (3) whether it was initiated by a stable authoritarian force or an
instable authoritarian force. If it did not occur yet (1), the better for present political
structuring around a legacy of a center-periphery cleavage. If it did (1), the later after
independence (2), the better. And if it was initiated by an unstable authoritarian force
(3), the lower the degree of suppression of political cleavages and the higher the likeliness
for subsequent pre-third wave renaissance of electoral regimes where minimally political
competition is structured around the same territorial political cleavage.
Operationalization
In the following, I operationalize the main concept degree of establishment of center-
periphery (territorial) cleavage for the comparative historical small-N analysis, which is
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based on (1) the identification of a salient center-periphery cleavage in pre-independence
party competition in the advent of first pre-independence elections and (2) the degree of
subsequent establishment of this cleavage. In opposition to the large-N part where I had to
proxy the existence of salient legacies of cleavages in third wave party competition by the
age of the strongest opposition party and the number of pre-third wave elections, I will be
able to (1) directly measure the existence of a salient territorial cleavage at the first critical
juncture of first pre-independence elections and indigenous nationalization and (2) to trace
its development and eventual establishment over subsequent pre- and post-independence
elections and the second critical juncture of first breakdown of the electoral regime until
eventual salient-spill over into third wave party competition. The center-periphery cleav-
age’s development after first pre-independence elections, and during the pre-third wave
area (see figure 3), will indicate the cleavage’s degree of establishment and depends on
the occurrence, timing and fashion of the second critical juncture of the first first post-
independence installation of an authoritarian regime. Last but not least, (3) third wave
party system structuring around the legacy of the same center-periphery cleavage will
complete the chain of causality from cleavage-based party competition at independence to
strength and institutionalization of the opposition in third wave dominant party systems
because it is temporally most proximal to the dependent variable.
More precisely, (1) I consider a territorial center-periphery political cleavage to be
salient in the advent of pre-independence elections if I am able to identify two political
groups/parties (organizational form of the cleavage) after the Second World War and in
advent of first pre-independence elections that are based on two different sets of elites,
which have different socio-structural affiliations: One set of elites is rather urban, higher
educated according to Western Europe, Eastern Europe or South African standards (i.e.
part of the indigenous intelligentsia), relatively estranged from the traditional indigenous
political system, and of lesser importance for the colonial system of indirect rule, the other
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set of elites is rather rural, lesser educated, part of the traditional indigenous political
system and of importance for the colonial system of indirect rule. Possibly, but not nec-
essarily, one set of elites has a different ethno-regional association than the other set of
elites, i.e. ethno-regional affiliations are non-randomly distributed among the two sets of
elites. Hence, whether ethnicity is salient depends on the saliency of the center-periphery
conflict. Initially, the rather urban intelligentsia should have the following of an urban and
unemployed youth, which is excluded from the colonial patronage network. The rather
rural traditional elite in turn should have the backing of rather rural followers that indi-
rectly profit from the spoils and patronage of indirect rule. The two sets of elites in turn
should be aware of their own preferences and values as a group and the ones of their an-
tagonists (element of collective identity) (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 57f.): I.e. while the urban
intelligentsia prefers radical and immediate decolonization and considers the traditional
indigenous system as a stumbling block on the way to indigenous nationalization and cen-
tralization, the rural elite prefers incremental and pacted transition to an independent
nation and wants to preserve the traditional system of rule and its conservative values. As
argued in section 3, the values of the elites that represent the center should be associated
and enriched with preferences for communist/socialist and pan-africanist ideas and ideolo-
gies while the peripheral elites most likely associates themselves with capitalism and lack
of explicit sympathies or even open rejection of pan-africanist ideas.
In sum, I consider a center-periphery cleavage to be salient if it is present in post-Second
World War political groups and pre-election political parties and its issues are explicitly
invoked by influential leaders of theses political groups and parties after the Second World
War and in the advent of first national elections.
To measure (2) the degree of subsequent establishment of territorial cleavage-based
party competition, I conduct a historical analysis to assess whether the central issues of the
political cleavage are invoked again in subsequent pre-independence and post-independence
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elections, prior to the second critical juncture, i.e. the first post-independence electoral
breakdown, and manifest themselves in the same political parties as before or not. If
parties change their name, I check whether they invoke the same issues and explicitly re-
fer to the programmatic and symbolic legacy of their forerunner party or not. If this is
not the case, I consider the establishment of territorial cleavage-based party competition
to be failed. If this is the case, I consider territorial cleavage-based party competition
to be medium established. In order to consider it “more than medium” established, the
territorial cleavage should “survive” the second critical juncture of the installation of the
first post-independence authoritarian regime. Whereas the chances of pre-authoritarian
establishment depend on the time given for electoral routinization, i.e. the number of
elections before the second critical juncture, the chances for survival of the authoritarian
phase depend on the stability of the authoritarian phase, i.e. the longer the authoritarian
phase the more likely effective suppression of the center-periphery cleavage, and the less
likely the renaissance of an electoral regime prior to the third wave. We detect the second
critical juncture itself by the installation of de jure or de facto authoritarian one-party
regimes by the winning party of the previous minimally competitive election. Subsequent
elections under the rule of this party – if at all – are façade elections with no party or can-
didate from alternative parties to vote for. Alternatively, the abolishment comes through
“counter-revolutionary” military regimes that fear the dominance and eventual authori-
tarianism by the previously electorally successful side of the cleavage. Hence, I analyze if
parties of the pre-authoritarian period are again present in eventual post-authoritarian but
pre-third wave elections and invoke the same issues and/or refer to their pre-authoritarian
territorial cleavage-related programmatic and symbolic heritage. If the parties have new
names, I analyze if they invoke the same issues and/or explicitly refer to the legacy of
their forerunner party in the pre-authoritarian phase. It is important to note that I do not
expect that the socio-structural foundation of the cleavage is necessarily still identical to
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the immediate pre- and post-independence phase. I am mainly interested if political com-
petition is still structured according to the historic center-periphery cleavage, and whether
actors expectations are still structured according to that (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 53–63). If
yes, I consider the pre-third wave establishment degree as “more than medium”. If the
second critical juncture did not occur, I consider this generally to be a sign of “more than
medium” establishment, given a salient center-periphery cleavage at independence that
can be successfully traced in subsequent post-independence elections over pre-third wave
elections during the 1970s and 1980s.
Finally (3), in order to trace path-dependent spill-over into third wave electoral regimes,
I analyze if the historic parties re-appear in the elections of the third wave and/or newer
parties explicitly refer to the heritage of one of the historic independence parties and lead-
ers in speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles. Again, I do not expect that third
wave parties still explicitly formulate concrete policies and pamphlets associated with the
historic territorial center-periphery cleavage, or even base themselves on the unmodified
socio-structural foundation since then. Rather, I want to analyze if such third wave parties
are still explicitly associated with one side of the historic cleavage, regardless if self-ascribed
or externally ascribed, by other parties and citizens. And I expect new conflicts to be incor-
porated into the existing structure rather than to trigger the formation of new cleavages.
If all this applies, the party system is still structured according to the historic center-
periphery cleavage, and opposition parties have a chance to uphold internal cohesion and
concomitant strength and institutionalization, despite a context of a dominant party sys-




I use comparative history to track the sketched-out process of political structuring around a
territorial cleavage and its establishment (see above and section 3). In line with George and
Bennett’s (2005) strategy of “process tracing”, I focus the ensuing empirical part on the sys-
tematic analysis of the previously discussed most important “process stations” in the time-
line from first pre-independence elections to third wave elections (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2006,
276f.). As visualized in figure 3, important process stations are first, the foundation of po-
litical groupings and political parties in the post-Second World War phase, in advent of
first pre-independence national elections for the African population. At this first station
(“birth”), I mainly need to assess the saliency of a center-periphery cleavage in party
competition, based on the three elements of a cleavage. At stations two (“establishment”),
three (“suppression”) and four (“re-establishment”), I measure the degree of establishment
of the center-periphery cleavage at three process stations: (2, “establishment”) after in-
dependence in advent of the subsequent post-independence national election(s) before the
second critical juncture, i.e. the saliency of the same center-periphery cleavage in party
competition; (3, “suppression”), I research the timing of the second critical juncture, on
which the duration of (2, “establishment”) depends, and the degree of stability of the
authoritarian regime and the concomitant degree of suppression of the center-periphery
cleavage during that time, on which (4, “re-establishment”) depends; The fourth process
station (4, “re-establishment”) is the eventual pre-third wave renaissance of the electoral
regime where I assess whether the political parties and their leaders are still structured
around the same center-periphery cleavage and explicitly refer to this heritage. In case of
the absence of the second critical juncture, process points (3) and (4) are represented by
pre-third wave elections during the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. an extension of process station
(2, “establishment”), in fact. Finally (5, “legacy”), I assess the degree of structuring in
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third wave party competition around a legacy of the same center-periphery cleavage as at
independence.61
Data Sources
A considerable variety of country-specific accounts over the time period between 1945
and 2010 exists for all four cases, which allows me to base my comparative historical
analysis on secondary sources without risking distortion of results. Hence, in the following
analysis, I will interpret the secondary sources according to my comparative framework
and according to my identified process stations. Generally, the quantity of the literature
on political developments in the four cases is somewhat skewed in favor of Ghana, and to
a lesser degree Botswana, in opposition to Lesotho and Mali. Nonetheless, I consider the
amount of material for Lesotho and Mali to be enough for the purposes of this study.
Pre-Analysis: Historic Modernization Levels Do Not Drive Subsequent Party
System Development
Figure 10 shows that the level of modernization before the first pre-independence elections
does not drive the subsequent party system development in the four cases.
61In case of former Portuguese colonies or settler oligarchies, I assume that an equivalent process tracing
strategy with process stations before the outburst of violent liberation or decolonization processes, during
the process, and after liberation or independence, and finally during the third wave could be practicable.
Yet, cleavage formation in the context of violent conflict and absence of pre-third wave elections should
harm either (1) the existence of subsequent structuring around a heritage of cleavages at all, or, (2) if such
a structuring is still present and strengthens the opposition, hamper its positive effects for the quality of
democracy or party system responsiveness; (1) because one side of the cleavage could successfully claim
to represent the whole nation against the colonizer or settler side of the supra-cleavage between the local
population and the Portuguese colonial power or the settlers; (2) because the cohesiveness of both sides
of the cleavage is mainly based on the heritage of the violent conflict and both sides do not have to be
programmatically responsive to get voted for. At least, the results of the large-N analysis in this book
seem to support this assumption for the cases of Namibia and Mozambique, and to a lesser degree, South
Africa.
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Figure 10: GDP per capita of Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho and Mali between 1950 and 1990
At the beginning of the third wave in 1990, the richest country of the four, Botswana,62
also relies on a more than medium established legacy of cleavages (which will be shown
in the subsequent analysis). However, the cross-sectional comparison in 1990 is deceiving.
Botswana was actually the least modernized of the four countries in the crucial years before
the first pre-independence elections in 1965. And it remained in this position during the
subsequent first establishment phase of the territorial cleavage between 1965 and 1969.
Only thereafter, Botswana’s modernization level started to increase. Ghana, in turn, could
build on the most established territorial cleavage of the four cases at the beginning of
the third wave in 1990, although its modernization level was lower than both Botswana
and Lesotho. Certainly, Ghana was the most modernized country before its first pre-
independence elections in 1951. However, its modernization level dropped after 1974 below
the levels of both Botswana and later Lesotho. Nonetheless, this did not initiate any de-
62According to GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, provided by Maddison (2009).
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establishment of the territorial cleavage. Finally, Mali’s modernization level was slightly
higher than the one of Lesotho and Botswana in advent of the first pre-independence
elections. Yet, the country was the first one to experience the abolishment of its first
electoral regime, and turned out to be the one with the least established legacy of territorial
cleavage at the beginning of the third wave in 1990.
Analysis
In the following, I will analyze every potential process station for all four cases, one station
after another, with a brief summarizing comparison and a final conclusion at the end of
this section of the book. Table 9 provides an overview of the critical junctures and the
start and end dates of the process stations for each case:63
After the end of the Second World War in 1945, at process station “birth”, due to
the common first critical juncture of non-violent decolonization and nationalization (in
opposition to Portuguese colonies and settler oligarchies) all four cases initially follow a
similar path. Ghana – as the first colony on the continent that became independent –
experienced its first critical juncture of decolonization manifested in first pre-independence
elections before Mali, and later Botswana and Lesotho. Hence, process station “birth” can
be analyzed for each of the four cases in similar fashion. In Ghana, the years until the first
pre-independence election in 1951 are decisive, in Mali the years until 1957, in Lesotho
until 1960, and in Botswana until 1965.
The analysis of process station “establishment” is rather straightforward, too. How-
ever, in Botswana, the electoral regime never experienced a breakdown so far. Hence,
the second critical juncture is absent in Botswana and the case derivates from the gen-
eral route followed by the other countries. Because of this, the empirical analysis process
63Dates in table 9 are retrieved from Nunley (2009).
143
Table 9: Empirical timeline of critical junctures and start/end dates of process stations in
Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali
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station “establishment” will encompass a more extended time-span in Botswana and a
larger number of post-independence elections than in Lesotho, Ghana and Mali. Accord-
ingly, process station “suppression” is absent in Botswana and station “re-establishment”
rather a repetition of process station “establishment” at later points in time. Therefore, it
makes sense to analyze process station “re-establishment” together with “establishment”
in Botswana. In sum, the years 1966 until 1984 are decisive in Botswana for an extended
process station “establishment”, which also includes station “re-establishment” (elections
in 1969, 1974, 1979 and 1984).64 In opposition to Botswana and Mali, both Lesotho and
Ghana experienced more than just one pre-independence election. I consider party compe-
tition in pre-independence elections after the first pre-independence election already as first
establishing points of the center-periphery cleavage and analyze them together with the
first post-independence election. This means that for the process station “establishment”
in Lesotho the years 1961 until 1970 are of interest (second pre-independence election in
1965 and first post-independence election in 1970) while in Ghana these are the years
between 1952 and 1964 (second and third pre-independence elections in 1954 and 1956,
and first post-independence election in 1960). In Mali, the time-span for process station
“establishment” is rather short. It only comprises the years from 1958 until the arrest
of the “on-off”-opposition leader, Fily Dabo Sissoko, in 1962. On top of that, the sec-
ond pre-independence elections in 1959 were already non-competitive due to the interim
co-optation of Fily Dabo Sissoko and his party, Parti Progressiste Soudanais (PPS), into
president Modibo Keita’s party, Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
(US-RDA) (Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 272). To enhance readability for each country
case, I analyze process stations “birth” and “establishment”, in chronological manner and
in one separate subsection for each of the four countries.
64I consider Botswana’s 1989 election already to be part of the third wave, i.e. part of the analysis of
process station “legacy”.
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While the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the post-independence electoral
regimes is absent in Botswana it manifests itself in Ghana in 1964 with the installation
of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) as the sole legal party (Owusu-
Ansah, 2005, liii). With the arrest of Fily Dabo Sissoko in Mali in 1962, Modibo Keita
and his US-RDA left no doubt about their intentions to install a one-party state, too
(Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 300). Accordingly, in the 1964 elections, US-RDA was
already the sole legal party (Nunley, 2009). In Lesotho in turn, the results of the first post-
independence elections in 1970 led to the annulation of the elections results and declaration
of a state of emergency by the loosing incumbent, Leabua Jonathan, and his party BNP,
and the subsequent installation of the de facto one-party regime (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and
Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxix). As both Lesotho and Mali did not experience a renaissance
of the electoral regime until the advent of the third wave in 1990, their time span for
the process station “suppression” is relatively long and process station “re-establishment”
absent in both cases. In Lesotho, process station “suppression” comprises the years between
1970 and 1990. In Mali, the years between 1962 and 1990 are relevant.
Ghana, is somewhat peculiar as it experienced, after the first abolishment of the elec-
toral regime in 1964, and subsequent renaissance of the electoral regime in 1969, another
breakdown in 1972, second renaissance in 1979, and third and last breakdown in 1981 be-
fore the advent of the third wave in 1990 (Nunley, 2009; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). Accordingly,
phases that belong to process station “suppression” and phases that belong to station “re-
establishment” alternate over time. Hence, it makes sense to analyze the developments
between the second critical juncture in 1964 and the third wave 1990 together and in a
chronological manner (figure 11 illustrates the time-span of the different phases in the four
countries).
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Figure 11: Length of process stations in Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali
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Already this overview, table 9 and figure 11 should have given an impression about
the chances of the four cases to develop cleavage-based party competition that has path-
dependent effects on contemporary party competition structured around a legacy of a
center-periphery cleavage. Clearly, Botswana’s historic cleavage should have good chances
for survival due to the lack of a second critical juncture of electoral breakdown. And
clearly, Mali’s historic cleavage should have rather few chances for survival due to the
very early installation of an authoritarian regime without pre-third wave renaissance of
the electoral regime. Ghana’s back and forth between electoral regime phases and author-
itarian phases during its pre-third wave history accounts for a more complex development
of party competition around a legacy of pre-independence cleavages. Nonetheless, the rel-
atively large number of pre-independence elections and the subsequent periodic pre-third
wave flare-up of electoral competition should provide potential for survival of party system
structuring around a pre-independence cleavage. Also Lesotho experienced a significant
phase of pre-independence party competition. Yet in opposition to Ghana, it did not ex-
perience a pre-third wave renaissance of electoral competition. So the chances for salient
survival will depend on the vibrancy of the pre-independence cleavage itself and the degree
of suppression during the authoritarian phase.
The subsections below will follow the rationale outlined above. I analyze process sta-
tions “birth” and “establishment” together and for every case one after another (with
Botswana receiving relatively larger space because of its extended “establishment” sta-
tion). After that, process station “suppression” is analyzed in Lesotho and Mali whereas
stations “suppression” and “re-establishment” in Ghana receive their own subsection. Last
but not least, I analyze station “legacy” for all four cases in one subsection. Finally, I con-
clude this section of the book.
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Pre- and Post-Independence Party Competition Based on Center-Periphery
Cleavage before the Second Critical Juncture
Botswana
As in Lesotho, British engagement in Botswana was initially reduced to a minimum in
comparison with “regular” British African colonies as the Gold Coast (Ghana after inde-
pendence). The establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate by the British in 1885
was mostly strategically motivated in order to prevent Boer or German rule over Tswana
polities (Picard, 1987, 29).65 The British administration intended to keep the costs of the
protectorate as low as possible. The initial idea was to install a system of “parallel rule”,
i.e. the British administration protected Tswana societies from outside forces while the
traditional political relationship between the chiefs and their subjects would remain un-
touched. However, soon the British administration started to interfere in the affairs of the
chiefs, until finally, by 1934, the generally more interfering concept of “indirect rule” was
also adopted in Bechuanaland, and the protectorate started to resemble the average British
African colony. Yet, British engagement remained comparatively modest in comparison
with other British African colonies like the Gold Coast (Picard, 1987, 28–50). The idea of
indirect rule was for British administrators to govern the indigenous population through
their own traditional institutions. In practice, it both emphasized the role of the chief while
at the same time undermined his autonomy from British interference by subordinating him
directly to the British hierarchy of colonial administration.
As in other African colonies, the experience of Batswana soldiers on the side of the
Allied Forces in World War Two, catalyzed aspirations for independence and indigenous
nationalization (Picard, 1987, 124f.). Nonetheless, indigenous nationalist political move-
ments formed comparatively late in Botswana. First, due to the relatively low engagement
65Tswana is a general term for persons who speak “Setswana” as their first language and usually belong
to the major Tswana tribes. A person of Tswana origin is called “Motswana”, more than one person are
called “Batswana” (cf. Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 345).
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of the British Empire in Botswana in general, which led to a very narrow basis of indige-
nous educated elites, from which any indigenous nationalization impulse could originate
(Picard, 1987, 85–91). And second, because most of the elites that initiated the forma-
tion of the most important nationalist political movements before independence have been
educated in proximate South Africa and also worked there. Accordingly, they were preoc-
cupied with engagements for the South African anti-apartheid movements African National
Congress (ANC) and its splinter Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). After the banning of the
ANC and PAC, and the diminishing prospects for change in South Africa, Batswana elites
returned home and shifted their focus to nationalization in their own country (Picard, 1987,
123f.).
The first successfully organized political party in pre-independent Botswana, the Bechua-
naland People’s Party (BPP) (Botswana People’s Party after independence), was formed
in 1960 in response to the establishment of an indigenous, non-partisan legislative coun-
cil in preparation for future independence, whose membership consisted mainly of chiefs
(Kowet, 1978, 150f.; Picard, 1987, 135–137). The founding leaders of the BPP, K. T.
Motsetse, Philip Matante and Motsamai Mpho, shared a common experience of higher
education and work in South Africa, and political activism in South African anti-apartheid
movements. And none of them was a chief (Kowet, 1978, 154, 166; Polhemus, 1983, 400;
Picard, 1987, 123). Accordingly, they did not play a role in the administrative system of the
protectorate; neither as traditional leaders in the system of indirect rule nor in the newly
established advisory council or legislative council. The party was anti-traditional as it de-
manded that people should obtain political office only based on merits. And it was progres-
sive. It demanded immediate independence and africanization of the civil service (Halpern,
1965, 287; Polhemus, 1983, 399f.; cf. Mogalakwe, 1997, 37). The BPP drew its support
from the small urban proletariate in Botswana’s major towns, along the rail line between
Gaborone, the newly established center and future capital, and Francistown (Kowet, 1978,
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154; Picard, 1987, 137; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 266). It also tried to find its
future voters among the Batswana migrant workers in South African mines. However, most
of these migrants settled in the more traditional villages upon return to their home country,
and became skeptical of the BPP’s anti-traditionalist campaign (Gulbrandsen, 2012, 95).
The BPP was sympathetic to Pan-Africanist ideas and was soon associated with socialist
and communist ideas (Kowet, 1978, 156; Picard, 1987, 137–140; Gulbrandsen, 2012, 97).
The alliance between the three leaders of the BPP was an uneasy one. The split between
the South African anti-apartheid movements ANC and PAC was reproduced in the BPP
because of the different sympathies of the three leaders to the two splinters. There was a
pro-ANC faction led by secretary general Mpho and an anti-communist and Pan-Africanist
pro-PAC faction led by vice-president Matante (Mogalakwe, 1997, 37). From these quarrel
three BPPs resulted, one led by Motsetse, one by Matante, and one by Mpho. Before the
founding pre-independence elections in 1965, Mpho renamed his splinter into Bechuanaland
Independence Party (BIP). All three parties contested the 1965 elections (Polhemus, 1983,
400f.). Nonetheless, they basically represented all the same, rather urban, progressive and
anti-traditional, side of a the center-periphery cleavage. Yet, both the BPP’s factionalism
and the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Batswana still lived in traditionally
ruled villages led to the BPP’s failure to penetrate the rural periphery, which was and
is still necessary to make substantial gains in elections in Botswana (Kowet, 1978, 154;
Picard, 1987, 139; interviews with Politicians in Botswana, 2010).
The formation of the BPP both alarmed the colonial administration and members of the
newly formed legislative council, which had no partisan affiliation so far. In 1962, Seretse
Khama, an executive member of the legislative council and heir to the regency of the
important Bangwato tribe, formed the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) (Botswana
Democratic Party after independence) mainly in reaction to the threat posed by the BPP.
Khama’s person represented a more moderate Batswana elite, which let itself be co-opted
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by the colonial administration to some degree, had an aristocratic or royal heritage and
a strive for moderate modernization and nationalization. Some of them were substantial
cattle owners, had considerable wealth, and were well educated. Although to some degree
also critical of the traditional system of rule and the colonial administration, the members
of this elite were not involved in South-African anti-apartheid struggles and were ready
to collaborate with the colonial administration during the last decade of its existence
(Polhemus, 1983, 401; Picard, 1987, 136; Mogalakwe, 1997, 36–38; Gulbrandsen, 2012, 96).
Before the founding of the party itself, the BDP’s future leadership was already part of the
indigenous “[d]e [f]acto [g]overnment” manifested in the legislative council and trained by
the British colonial administration for smooth transition to independence (Picard, 1987,
138). Accordingly, the BDP’s rhetoric was much less confrontative than the BPP’s. In
opposition to the BPP, the party did not demand immediate independence and did not
threaten the authority of the chiefs. Rather it intended to attenuate the chiefs’ traditional
authority in a less confrontative way by constitutionalizing their role in the new republic
(Kowet, 1978, 156). The BDP also did not approve of the BPP’s confrontative rhetoric
against apartheid South Africa and the small white settler community in Botswana. It did
not approve rather out of strategic reasons – in line with the British colonial administration
– than with regards to its content. Khama and the BDP did not consider it wise to
provoke neighboring South Africa on the eve of Botswana’s independence. Affiliated with
an emerging class of entrepreneurs and substantial cattle owners, the BDP also had no
sympathies for the alleged socialism or communism of the BPP (Gulbrandsen, 2012, 96).
In sum, the moderate rhetoric and the unique combination of a BDP leadership, which
feature both a traditional heritage and Western education, manifested in the charismatic
person of Seretse Khama, who was also not affiliated with the South African anti-apartheid
movements, made the BDP an acceptable party to support both for the numerous tradi-
tional leaders, the population-wise dominating rural population, the emerging Batswana
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Figure 12: Embryonic Party System Structuring in Botswana 1965
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bourgeoisie, the British colonial administration, and the small minority of white settlers
(cf. Kowet, 1978, 156). And the party also received financial and organizational support
from European and Asian communities in Botswana who feared the more radical BPP
(Picard, 1987, 138f.; Mogalakwe, 1997, 38) Clearly, this were decisive factors for the com-
fortable electoral victory of the BDP in the first pre-independence election (cf. Picard, 1987,
138–140).
Consequently, the BDP represents the “periphery” side of the center-periphery cleav-
age, although the term “periphery” sounds somewhat debatable in the case of the largely
non-urbanized Botswana around independence. With Botswana colonial administration
headquarters outside the country in Mafikeng, and Gaborone installed only in 1961 as
the future capital city, the center was almost non-existent and manifested itself in labor-
migration and anti-apartheid engagement in South Africa or in peripheral Francistown.
Migrant Batswana in South Africa’s mines, who constituted the potential electorate for
the BPP, were not able to cast their vote from outside the borders while the traditional
and rural fraction of the Batswana population amounted for the lion’s share of the relevant
electorate and was more likely to sympathize with the less anti-traditional BDP and its
leader of royal descent (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 12).
153
After the elections in 1965 but before independence in 1966, Kenneth Koma founded the
Botswana National Front (BNF), which proved to become the most durable and strongest
opposition party in Botswana. Like Seretse Khama, Kenneth Koma was a member of the
influential Bangwato tribe, and allegedly had some sort of royal background (Polhemus,
1983, 401f.; Makgala, 2005, 304). However, he was neither a chief nor was he a member
of the legislative council despite his higher education, which makes him more comparable
in terms of his socio-structural basis to Motsetse, Matante and Mpho of the BPP. Koma
spent most of the decisive years for the formation of political parties in advent of the
1965 elections abroad in South Africa, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union,
where he received a doctorate in political science (Polhemus, 1983, 401f.; Picard, 1987, 152;
Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 181). Upon return in 1965, he intended to unite the
factions of the BPP by the formation of the BNF. While Koma managed to incorporate
the Motsetse wing of the BPP into the BNF, the Matante wing of the BPP and Mpho’s
BIP remained independent political parties (Stevens, 1975, 26f.; Polhemus, 1983, 402;
Picard, 1987, 152, 156; Charlton, 1993, 346; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 236f.).
According to his socio-structural standing of an outsider to both the system of indirect
rule and the legislative council, Koma initially was against chieftainship in general, like the
BPP and the BIP have been themselves in advent of the 1965 elections (Makgala, 2005,
306). He criticized heavily the BDP’s association with the chiefs, which he regarded as a
continuation of the system of indirect rule and “neo-colonialist” regime (Polhemus, 1983,
406). Regarding ideology, Koma shared the fate of the BPP leaders in being associated
with communism while he himself associated his BNF with “scientific socialism” (Polhemus,
1983, 406; Picard, 1987, 140; Makgala, 2005, 307f.).
Both the BPP’s failure to penetrate the rural periphery, which is necessary for electoral
victory in Botswana, and the fact that the BDP won the elections due to its general
association with chiefs who secured political mobilization and success in the periphery,
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and the BDP having many chief members in its own ranks, soon convinced Koma that it
would be strategically wise to associate itself with chiefs as well and have them as members
and potential candidates. Therefore, already the BNF’s Pamphlet No. 1 states that “[w]e
must not be afraid of temporary alliances even with those groups which it is our ultimate
patriotic duty to annihilate” (cit. in Polhemus, 1983, 406). It was not difficult for the BNF
to find disgruntled chiefs to forge its uneasy alliance of intellectual lefts and urban dwellers
on the one hand, and traditional chiefs on the other hand, who would gain traditional
voters from more rural constituencies who were loyal to their chiefs and therefore also to
the BNF (Stevens, 1975, 27; Polhemus, 1983, 406f.; Picard, 1987, 147). One of the reasons
for increasing disgruntlement of chiefs was the introduction of the Tribal Land Act before
the first post-independence elections in 1969, which reduced the chiefs’ official status to
payed civil servants and led to increasing tensions with the BDP government and significant
fissures in the bond between chiefs and the BDP. Most prominently, Bathoen II, influential
chief of the Bangwaketse, one of the other big Batswana tribe beside Khama’s Bangwato,
and first chairman in the House of Chiefs, realized the impotency of chiefs under the
constitution of newly independent Botswana, resigned and turned to the BNF (Wiseman,
1977, 73; Kowet, 1978, 204f.; Polhemus, 1983, 406f.; Picard, 1987, 152, 157–159; Charlton,
1993, 335, 338; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 42f.). In order to gain the rural vote
from the BDP, the BNF even nominated Bathoen II as its presidential candidate instead
of Koma, and Bathoen II challenged BDP Vice-President Quett Masire in his own district
(in Botswana, the president, which is endowed with large executive powers, is indirectly
elected through the parliament and an ex-officio member of the parliament itself) (Picard,
1987, 158).
The contradictory, even “schizoid”, alliance of commoners, who had the same socio-
structural foundation and ideological disposition as its forerunner, the Motsetse wing of the
BPP, and disgruntled chiefs of the traditional system who disapproved of the BDP leader’s
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increasing centralizing tendencies after their victory in the 1965 elections, proved to have
double-edged effects in the first post-independence elections in 1969. On the one hand,
the BNF and Bathoen II indeed won three seats in Bathoen’s Bangwaketse areas along
many local District Council seats, on the other hand, urban voters found it difficult to vote
for a party that portrayed a chief as its presidential candidate. Accordingly, Gaborone
and Lobatse remained in the hand of the BDP despite of a growing class of civil servants
in Gaborone who voted for the BNF. And Francistown remained in the hand of the BPP.
Koma himself was not elected for the National Assembly and also lost the party presidency
to Bathoen II.
In comparison with the 1965 elections, the BDP lost some of its popular support, but
nonetheless retained a considerable absolute majority in the National Assembly with 24
seats vis-à-vis three seats for each the BNF and the BPP and one for the BIP (Polhemus,
1983, 407f.; Picard, 1987, 158, 161; Charlton, 1993, 335; Wiseman, 1998, 256; Nunley,
2009). Yet, turnout was considerably lower compared with 1965 because a remarkable
number of disillusioned chiefs ordered their following to abstain from voting (Kowet, 1978,
205–207).
Thus, while the original leadership and following of the BNF belonged to the center-side
of the territorial cleavage alongside the remainder of the BPP, the Matante faction, and the
other splinter of the BPP, the BIP, the new, more traditional allies of the BNF belonged
to the peripheral side and opted for reversal of the centralizing tendencies of the BDP
government. The platform of the BNF tried to reflect the peripheral side by demanding a
federal system with an upper house of tribes that would have the final word in legislation
(Picard, 1987, 158).
Hence, while the territorial cleavage certainly remained salient in Botswana after the
1965 elections due to the survival of the first political parties BDP, BIP and BPP, and
the BNF, which was founded shortly after the 1965 elections and took over the heritage
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of Motsetse’s BPP faction, the correspondence between the socio-structural foundation of
its leaders and the respective programmatic platform became blurred. On the side of the
BDP this was caused by its capturing of power of a constitutionally increasingly centralized
state, whose centralization the previously peripheral forces even further intensified. This
disgruntled influential chiefs who were increasingly excluded from the center of power like
Bathoen II or more subordinate chiefs who remained in the periphery and were degraded
to mere civil workers. Koma and the BNF in turn realized, due to the negative examples
of its forerunners BPP and BIP, the difficulty to capture power in a rather traditional
and rural Botswana without the support of chiefs who act as a bridgehead to the rural
population. Hence, with the increasing modernizing and centralizing tendencies of the more
traditional BDP after the 1965 elections and an uneasy alliance inside the new progressive
opposition party, BNF, between traditionalist forces, who wanted to conserve traditional
powers, and progressive non-traditional forces, who sympathized with socialist ideas, the
difference of the territorial cleavage became blurred both regarding the element of collective
identity and regarding the socio-structural foundation, which became an uneasy alliance
on the side of the BNF (cf. Wiseman, 1998, 256). Nonetheless, the organizational form
of the cleavage and hence the structure of the Botswana party system perpetuated and
established itself to some degree in the 1969 elections. And the BPP-split that was led
by Matante and became the “sole” BPP after incorporation of Motsete’s wing into BNF
remained most coherently in its socio-structural foundation and rhetorical platform and
retained its urban stronghold in Francistown (Polhemus, 1983, 405; Picard, 1987, 158).
The BIP however, which was already weak in the 1965, had even less popular support in
the 1969 and turned into a one-man show of his ANC-sympathizing president Mpho and
had a low-key rhetorical platform (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 13)
(Polhemus, 1983, 403f.; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla; 2008, 238f.).
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Figure 13: Party System Structuring in Botswana 1969 and 1974
BPP (Matante-faction)
Center








Despite retaining power, regarding the number of seats, the vote share, and the general
turnout, the 1969 elections came as a shock to the BDP in comparison with its landslide
victory of 1965. It reminded the party leaders of the BDP that peripheral and rural support
is not guaranteed by the fact that the party leadership could refer to its own socio-structural
affiliation of a traditional-peripheral heritage. The recent urban and centralizing tendencies
in the platform and policies of the governing BDP, which were somehow inevitable due to
the construction of the new capital Gaborone and the installation of a civil service, led to an
impression of neglect on the side of its rural basis in the periphery. And the centralization of
power in the hands of the BDP political elites in turn led to the concomitant disgruntlement
of chiefs who did not belong to the inner circles of the BDP or had subordinate positions
in the periphery but still had substantial influence on the rural following of the BDP.
This was aggravated by an increasingly negative attitude of the BDP-government towards
traditional leaders. Therefore, in prospect for the 1974 elections, the BDP readjusted
its urban-rural-, i.e. center-periphery-, balance again in favor of the more rural areas.
Due to the BDP’s position of incumbency, it did this by the implementation of actual
rural development policies rather than rhetorics (Charlton, 1993, 355f.). BDP ministers
started to regularly travel the vast country in order to stop the defection of its rural basis.
Additionally, to lure away the growing class of civil servants in Gaborone, which tended
to vote for the commoner-representing part of the BNF in the 1969 elections, the BDP
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increased their salaries (Picard, 1987, 161f.). Although the BDP preferred deeds rather
than words in order to balance its peripheral background and basis with its increasingly
centrist governing style, it nonetheless emphasized its will to build a broad coalition of
urban and rural forces in formulating explicitly its ideology of “unity” and “harmony”
of all Batswana citizens “irrespective of race, tribe or occupation” in advent of the 1974
elections. In rejecting Marxist ideology, Seretse Khama denied “that certain groups are
faced with an inevitable and irreconcilable conflict of interest.” Rather he beliefs that these
conflicts “can be avoided if we [. . . ] apply in practice our belief in Kagisano [i.e. unity
and harmony].” (Khama cit. in Polhemus, 1983, 402f.)
The fact that the peripheral-traditional forces inside the centrist BNF were responsible
for the electoral gains in the 1969 elections instead of the centrist-commoner founders of
the party led to subsequent power struggles inside the party. Koma lost the presidency
to Bathoen II and several progressive members left the party. Yet, Koma kept the vice-
presidency and remained the rhetorically most outspoken BNF-leader and ensured that
the party was not overtaken entirely by the traditional allies. In the party organ of the
BNF, Koma ensured that the party remained true to its initial program and that the
new traditional members would have to adapt to the progressive character of the party
(Polhemus, 1983, 407f.). Koma’s resilience to give in to the traditionalist drift in his party
was supported by the fact that the BDP readjusted its electoral strategy after 1969 in favor
of its previously defecting traditional and rural base, which in turn increased the BNF’s
urban and more progressive vote (Charlton, 1993, 355f.).
Generally, the re-balancing strategy of the BDP proved to be rather successful in the
1974 elections. The electoral support of the BDP was almost back to the level of the first
pre-independence elections and both the BNF and the BPP lost one seat. Nonetheless,
voter turnout in general decreased again and pointed to the fact that the problem of
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Figure 14: Party System Structuring in Botswana 1979 and 1984
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voter apathy and dissatisfied traditional chieftaincy in peripheral areas was not completely
reversed (Picard, 1987, 162–164).
The 1979 elections were a repetition of the 1974 elections, both regarding its outcome
as well as the electoral strategy of the BDP with the difference of a higher voter turnout
as the government invested heavily in re-registration of voter and increased efforts in rural
development again. Co-optation of further potentially BNF-inclined civil servants were
continued as well. Meanwhile, the BNF could maintain its position as the most important
opposition party and the BNF presidency went back to Koma and the progressive forces of
the BNF in 1977. Hence, the center-side of the BNF was strengthened again. The fortunes
of the BPP in turn started to vanish while the BIP lost its sole seat in the National
Assembly (Picard, 1987, 164; Makgala, 2005, 306).
Khama’s death in 1980 hurt the vote share of the BDP in the 1984 elections to some
degree, but the party could hold its seat share and comfortable absolute majority in the Na-
tional Assembly. The 1984 elections also resulted in the consolidation of the BNF’s position
as Botswana’s most important opposition party and its standing as a viable alternative for
urban voters. Due to the vanishing of the BPP and the BIP, the BNF reached the highest
vote and seat share since its foundation and Koma, for the first time, became a member of
parliament by winning a Gaborone constituency (cf. with party system structuring map
in figure 14) (Picard, 1987, 168–172).
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Increasing centralization by the BDP whose core consisted of member of tribes that be-
longed to the 80 percent Batswana majority led to the impression on the side of the biggest
minority group, the Bakalanga, of cultural suppression (Du Toit, 1995, 128f.). Both the
BPP and later the BNF tried to invest in this potential ethnopolitical-cleavage as it coin-
cided with urban Francistown constituencies, who sympathized with the more progressive
opposition parties, anyway. However, the BDP made sure that ethnic grievances of mi-
nority groups were attenuated by the same development projects and material benefits it
employed to win back its own rural basis. Accordingly, the Bakalanga never displayed a sig-
nificant opposition vote outside the immediate Francistown area and politics in Botswana
remained ethnically cross-cutting (Selolwane, 2002, 78f.).
In sum, although an urban and commoner-based intelligentsia was underdeveloped in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate itself, several Batswana commoners, who received their higher
education in South Africa, initiated the birth of the Botswana party system with the
foundation of the BPP upon return to their country of origin. This forced the peripheral-
traditional and more conservative forces in Bechuanaland to form their own party and
the territorial cleavage came into being. The non-enfranchisement of Batswana miners
in South Africa, lack of urbanization and general low modernization level in Botswana
at the time of first pre-independence elections ensured an overwhelming electoral victory
of the peripheral-side of the territorial cleavage embodied in the future dominant BDP.
In the following, the BNF, an heir to one faction of the BPP, realized the importance
to ally itself with peripheral and traditional forces and forged an uneasy coalition of its
urban basis of commoners and a faction of traditional leaders who were disgruntled by
the increasing centralizing tendencies of the BDP. Both the centralizing tendencies on the
side of the BDP and the peripheral alliance strategy on the side of the BNF blurred the
collective identity element among the party elite, and to some degree, the socio-structural
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foundation element on both sides of the territorial cleavage. Nonetheless, both the BDP
and the BNF managed to hold together their organizational integrity and structured the
Botswana party system during the entire pre-third wave phase and beyond. And after
the first post-independence elections, they readjusted their platform and policies to some
degree again to bring it back in correspondence with their initial collective identity and
socio-structural foundation. Summa summarum, it is safe to consider the establishment of
the territorial cleavage and its concomitant structuring of the Botswana party system as
“more than medium” (according to the criteria formulated in section 4).
Lesotho
Likewise to Botswana, Britain had no inherent interest in the colonization of Basutoland
(Lesotho after independence). The establishment of the Basutoland Protectorate in 1884,
after annexation as a British Territory in 1868 and intermediary administration by the
Cape Colony, was rather strategically motivated. Chief Moshoeshoe, the founder of the
Basotho nation, his territory and people were under constant threat from the migrating
Boers and the newly established and adjacent Orange Free State.66 Moshoeshoe asked for
British protection and the British in turn saw their interests in danger if the Boers would
incorporate the Basotho territory and subsequently could push down to the sea and the
territory of the cape colony (Spence, 1968, 10f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton,
2004, 283–285; Eldredge, 2007, 25).
As in Botswana, the British administration wanted to keep the costs of the new pro-
tectorate as low as possible. Accordingly, ‘dual’ rule was implemented in Basutoland, i.e.
protection from outside threats by the British, and internal rule by the Basotho chiefs
(Spence, 1968, 14f.). Likewise to other African colonies, Basotho chiefs were empowered
by British rule insofar as their autocratic powers transformed from being flexible custom-
66The people of Lesotho, pronounced Lesutu, are called Basotho, Basutu. The singular is Mosotho,
Mosutu, and the language is Sesotho, Sesutu (cf. Rosenber, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 12f.).
162
ary law to codified law. At the same time, the chiefs were now responsible to the colonial
administration instead of to their own people, which decreased their traditional legitimacy.
I. e. traditional rulers were not “chiefs by the people” anymore but “chief[s] by jurisdiction
over an area” (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 35).
In the 1930s, the British intended to “modernize” the system of rule in Basutoland,
and reduced the number of chiefs drastically. While the modernization of the traditional
system decreased the number of subordinate chiefs, it emphasized the role of senior chiefs
and the paramount chief itself. This shift of power from subordinate chiefs to senior chiefs,
which was initiated by the colonial administration in 1938, led to a new alliance of the
previously disunited commoners and subordinate chiefs.
By the 1930s, a small but growing number of entrepreneurial, relatively wealthy, edu-
cated and mostly protestant Basotho commoners became politically more active, because
they felt actively neglected and sabotaged by the British. Josiel Lefela, a teacher, was the
most prominent of them (Epprecht, 1995, 36, 42f.; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 37f.). He
formed the Commoner’s League, which was both anti-colonial, critical of the current role
of the chiefs and had links to South Africa’s Communist Party. He had the backing of
an increasing number of migrant Basotho workers in South African mines. Lefela initially
intended to establish a Council of Commons alongside the existing National Council, which
was preserved for chiefs and their nominees. However, the majority of the National Council
was against it (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 38; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton,
2004, 147f.).
Due to the concurrence of actual degradation of subordinate chiefs and perceived degra-
dation of commoners after the reform of 1938, these two unlike groups were suddenly united
against the British administration (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 39). As we will see further
below, the antagonism of the uneasy alliance of subordinate chiefs and commoners on the
one hand and senior chiefs on the other hand basically represents two sides of a center-
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periphery cleavage with the special circumstance of a sub-cleavage inside the prospective
center between the paramount chief and the senior chiefs on the one side and the common-
ers on the other side. These special circumstances gave birth to three political parties in
advent of first pre-independence election in 1960 as we will see further below.
Coates (1966, 113) points to the effect the experience of Basotho soldiers in the Second
World War had on their level of political awareness and increased the general demand
in Basutoland for more indigenous legislative powers. At the same time, the changing
circumstances after the Second World War and the definitive certainty that incorpora-
tion of Basutoland in apartheid South Africa was not an option anymore prepared the
ground for the British administration to support steps in direction of more self-governance
(Spence, 1968, 29). In 1955, the National Council, which was so far only advisory, asked for
legislative powers. The British government agreed to discuss the demand and in 1960 the
new constitution came into being: The National Council transformed into a Legislative
Council with legislative powers over internal matters. Most importantly, the new con-
stitution introduced the electoral principle and demanded that half of the 80 Legislative
Council members are elected by local District Councils acting as electoral colleges. The
District Councils in turn are elected by universal adult male franchise. The remainder
remained reserved for senior chiefs and nominees of the paramount chief (Coates, 1966,
113; Spence, 1968, 32f.). On the one hand the new constitution fulfilled an important
demand of the commoners by the introduction of the electoral principle and the possibility
for commoners to be eligible. On the other hand, the senior chiefs and the paramount
chief retained their decisive position by holding half of the seats based on non-democratic
basis. Accordingly, the fundamental friction between senior chiefs on the one hand, and
commoners and subordinate chiefs on the other hand, remained salient (cf. Spence, 1968,
33).
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Amidst the changing environment after the Second World War and demands for reform
of the National Council, Ntsu Mokhehle founded the first nationalist party, the Basutoland
African Congress (BAC), renamed Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1958 in prepara-
tion for the first pre-independence elections (Spence, 1968, 32; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and
Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxviii). Mokhehle was a pupil of Lefela, the founder of the Com-
moner’s League, and shared Lefela’s and the commoners’ outspoken anti-colonial rhetoric.
Mokhehle received his university education at Fort Hare College in South Africa together
with future anti-apartheid leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. He became polit-
ically active in the ANC, and ideologically, followed the pan-Africanist ideas of Ghana’s
Kwame Nkrumah (Epprecht, 1995, 43; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004,
23f., 151, 265). Although Mokhehle himself was a son of a subordinate headman, he did
not obtain a place in the traditional system of rule. After having received his Master of
Science in Fort Hare, he became a teacher in Basutoland, the only job open for academic
Basuto under British administration (Khaketla, 1972, 34–36). Accordingly, Ntsu Mokhehle
despite his quite excellent education did not play any role in the administrative system of
the British protectorate. As its forerunner, the Commoner’s League, the BAC/BCP drew
its support from the commoners, i.e. Basotho civil servants, protestant teachers, traders,
entrepreneurs and laborers who also felt neglected by the British administrative system
(Epprecht, 1995, 43).
Despite the commoners non-incorporation into the British system of indirect rule and
administration, the BAC/BCP’s rhetorical stance vis-à-vis the incorporated system of
chieftaincy was initially relatively soft. It rather reflected the complexly layered system
of traditional and indirect rule in Basutoland, where subordinate chiefs proliferated exces-
sively and a paramount chief existed, in opposition to the Bechuanaland protectorate where
no paramount chief existed and chieftainship played a less significant role in the formation
of the nation (Halpern, 1965, 261). Accordingly, in opposition to the BPP in Botswana,
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the BAC/BCP initially did not question the idea of formal incorporation of traditional
rulers in an upper house, and underlined the fundamental importance of the traditional
element for Basutoland. Clearly, the BAC/BCP’s general soft stance on the topic was
rather strategically motivated, as later developments and testimonies after the first pre-
independence elections show (Spence, 1968, 30f.; Khaketla, 1972, 49f., 56). Mokhehle and
the BAC/BCP were wise to go soft on the topic, because it could have repelled the follow-
ing of the future electorate, which still held chieftainship in high esteem due to its historic
role in the formation of the Basotho nation (cf. Spence, 1968, 31; Coplan, 1997). After
all, the chieftainship’s strategic interaction with the British enabled the construction of
the Basuto identity vis-à-vis the all-encompassing threat of incorporation into apartheid
South Africa (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997).
Although the BAC/BCP initially went soft on the chief subject, it was clear that it did
envision a rather ceremonial role for the paramount chief, and no substantial role for sub-
ordinate chiefs (Eldredge, 2007, 216). In reaction to this and fear of the alleged communist
influences in the BAC/BCP, Chief Samuel Seepheephe Matete formed the Marema-Tlou
Party (MTP) in 1957 and Chief Leabua Jonathan established the Basutoland National
Party (BNP) in 1958 (Spence, 1968, 36–38; Eldredge, 2007, 216). Matete acted as a chief
and had an influential role in the National Council. He was the main advisor of the Regent
Paramount Chieftainess Mantsebo. In 1956 however, Matete challenged her rule by prepar-
ing the succession to her throne and concomitant modernization of the paramountcy by
intending to install her Oxford-educated stepson Bereng Seeiso as the new regent in a cen-
tralized and monarchical future independent Lesotho (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-
Fulton, 2004, 216, 233f.). Hence, Matete mainly formed the MTP to strengthen the royal
center to the disadvantage of peripheral subordinate chiefs and radical commoners who
also intended to form the future center in the new nation. Accordingly, the MTP had the
support of the senior chiefs, who hoped to profit from an emphasis on the paramountcy,
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which could tip the balance of power in their favor and against subordinate chiefs and
commoners (Spence, 1968, 37; Weisfelder, 1977, 175). Likewise to Matete, also Leabua
Jonathan, the founder of the BNP, was a chief and an advisor of the Regent Paramount
Chieftainess Mantsebo. He was a member of the National Council, and in opposition to
Matete, he became a Roman Catholic like the acting Regent Mantsebo and supported a
prolongation of her regency in opposition to Matete’s plans to install her stepson Bereng
Seeiso (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 126f., 235). As a lesser chief with
weak links to the senior chiefs, Jonathan approved of Regent Mantsebo’s traditional inter-
pretation of the paramountcy. Her regency was based on more cooperative relationships
to subordinate chiefs and was against the new alliance of Matete and her stepson Seeiso
Bereng who intended to modernize and centralize the paramountcy by putting more em-
phasis on it and the senior chiefs (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 216).
The influential Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho in turn feared the alleged communism
of Ntsu Moekhehle and his BAC/BCP who tried to incorporate lesser chiefs and common-
ers. The Church supported Jonathan to found a more conservative party, which would ally
itself with the lesser chiefs like himself and who were skeptical of the progressive rhetoric of
the BAC/BCP and Mokhehle, anyway. (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004,
126; Khaketla, 1972, 18).
In sum, the proliferation of lesser chiefs and the significance of the paramount chief in
Basutoland led to a more complex center-periphery cleavage in Lesotho than in Botswana.
Both commoners and royalists hoped to become the new center through modernization,
centralization and nationalization. Subordinate chiefs who had a position of considerable
influence during the early decades of British administration and secured the penetration
of the periphery came under pressure because of the modernization attempts of both the
British administration itself and royalist like Matete who wanted to strengthen centraliza-
tion by putting emphasis on the paramountcy and senior chiefs and decrease the number
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of lesser chiefs. Because the British administration initially was more favorable towards
modernization and centralization through the paramountcy and senior chiefs instead of
commoners, subordinate chiefs had no other option than to turn towards the BAC/BCP
due to the common enemy of centralization through royalism. This alliance was paradoxi-
cal as interests on the center-periphery cleavage between commoners and lesser chiefs were
contradictory and mainly motivated because of the lack of political organization on the
side of the subordinate chiefs. Hence, although the formation of the BNP came late, it
stepped in the middle ground between the Matete’s MTP and Mokhehle’s BAC/BCP and
easily captured the support of subordinate chiefs (cf. Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 40). The
center-periphery cleavage between commoners and royalists manifested in the BCP and the
MTP on the one hand and subordinate chiefs manifested in the BNP on the other hand
was reinforced by a religious divide regarding the fact that most commoners belonged to
protestant churches in Basutoland while most subordinate chiefs belonged to the Roman
Catholic Church (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 15) (Epprecht, 1995,
42f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 352–356).
However, with the BNP being operational only in 1959, there was too little time to
properly prepare the new party for the first pre-independence elections in 1960 (Spence,
1968, 37; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127). Accordingly, Mokhele’s
BCP (former BAC) used its advantage in terms of publicity and organization and won
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the majority of District Council seats and concomitant National Council seats. The MTP
came second and Leabua Jonathan and his BNP experienced a devastating defeat. Yet,
BCP’s gains in 1960 were not representative of later elections because women, who were
in the majority in the country due to massive migration of men to South African mines,
were not yet enfranchised while migrant men in turn could cast their vote in South Africa,
which was not the case in later elections. Accordingly, the BCP made most of its gains
in Basotho towns and among Basotho miners in South Africa, which proved to be a ma-
jority of the enfranchised population only in the 1960 elections. Because women remained
in Basutoland, they were more in contact with the chiefs than their migrant men, and
accordingly would have been most likely less willing to vote for Mokhehles’s BCP, which
was considered to be the most anti-chief party of the three parties despite its cautious
rhetoric in this regard (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127; Epprecht,
1995). Because both the MTP and the BNP were identified with the traditional element
but the MTP was more known among the population in 1960 than the BNP, the MTP was
more successful in obtaining the rural vote. Jonathan and his BNP had too little time to
bring the message across that their profile differed decisively from the MTP regarding the
support for lesser chiefs (Spence, 1968, 37).
MTP’s vision of a strong paramountcy invested in the person of Bereng Seeiso, the
stepson of acting Regent Mantsebo, came only half true: Named Moshoeshoe II, Bereng
Seeiso was installed as the Paramount Chief in March 1960. Yet, the 1959 constitution
curtailed the executive powers of the paramountcy instead of expanding it (Weisfelder,
1977, 175f.).
After the first pre-independence elections in 1960, steps towards independence intensi-
fied. In 1964, the British accepted a new constitution that envisioned independence one
year after the second pre-independence elections scheduled for 1965. The new independence
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constitution followed the general line of the 1959 constitution and installed the Paramount
Chief Moshoeshoe II as Head of State and King of future independent Lesotho with rather
ceremonial powers similar to the British constitutional monarchy. The legislative consisted
of the Senate, 22 principal chiefs and 11 member appointed by the King, and the National
Assembly, 60 members elected through single member constituencies by universal suffrage.
The Prime Minister in turn was designated to be responsible to the National Assembly.
The second pre-independence elections under the new constitution were scheduled for 1965
(Coates, 1966, 113; Spence, 1968, 41–43).
Ironically, after the 1960 elections, the two stronger parties BCP and MTP, which rep-
resented the commoner and royalist version, respectively, of the center-side of the territorial
cleavage, experienced ideological and internal turmoils while the so far unsuccessful BNP,
which represented the periphery side, remained intact and enlarged its organization.
With the prospect for independence there, Mokhehle and the BCP’s strings with South
Africa’s ANC proved to be dangerous for future relationships with the powerful apartheid
neighbor and could delay independence after all (Spence, 1968, 38–40). And Mokhehle
feared that the alleged communism of the ANC would be incompatible with BCP’s nation-
alism. Consequently, Mokhehle and the BCP attacked ANC members in both Basutoland
and in the party itself and turned to the pan-Africanist South African anti-apartheid
movement PAC, which lacked any communist influence. Mokhehle and the BCP’s rhetor-
ical stance regarding subordinate chiefs turned from strategic approval towards open hos-
tility after the electoral success in 1960 and was now more in accordance with the socio-
structural foundation of the party (Spence, 1968, 38f. 46, 50; Khaketla, 1972, 56). However,
Mokhehle’s more aggressive rhetoric and his increasingly authoritarian behavior inside the
BCP party organization led to the split of the deputy leader of the party, Bennett Makalo
Khaketla, his followers, and twelve BCP parliamentarians until 1964. Khaketla formed the
Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) in 1961 and in 1962 merged with Matete’s MTP to found
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the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). Although the merger brought together two strains
of the center-side of the territorial cleavage, the alliance was rather “curious” as it brought
together senior chiefs and royalist who hoped for a central role for the paramountcy in the
future independent nation on the one hand and radical ex-BCP commoners who rather
favored a constitutional monarchy with a strong and democratically elected parliament,
on the other hand. Therefore, the uniting element between the two groups was rather
the mutual fear of an increasingly authoritarian Mokhehle (Spence, 1968, 38f., Weisfelder,
1977, 177f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 222f.).
In the advent of the 1965 elections, the BCP experienced further difficulties. The BCP
was against extension of suffrage to Basotho women. It feared that most women would
vote for the BNP. This in turn could have hurt BCP’s chances for another electoral success
because women have the majority of votes in the country due to labour-migration of most
Basotho men to South African mines. Basically, the fear that the women’s vote would
go to the BNP was justified because most women lived in more rural areas and were in
closer contact and under protection of lesser chiefs due to the absence of their migrant
men. And the BNP was the party of the lesser chiefs. As women indeed received suffrage
by the 1964 constitution, the BCP’s fear became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now the BNP
could profitably claim that the BCP was against women’s interests in general because
of the BCP’s previous campaign against women’s suffrage. Additionally, because most
of the lesser chiefs as well as the BNP and Jonathan itself were members of the Roman
Catholic Church itself, Mokhehle and the BCP intensified rhetorical attacks against the
Roman Catholic Church in Basutoland. Many poor catholic women in rural areas did
not approve of these attacks because they profited from support by the Roman Catholic
Church (Epprecht, 1995, 37, 50–52). As previously noted, a further disadvantage to the
BCP in the 1965 elections was the agreement that ex-patriate Basotho, mostly men that
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were not attached to the traditional ways of life in rural areas anymore, were not able to
cast their vote outside the borders of Basutoland anymore (Spence, 1968, 43).
In general, Jonathan and his BNP proved to be much more coherent in their ideolog-
ical and organizational development between the first pre-independence elections in 1960
and second pre-independence elections in 1965 than their competitors. Indirectly, the
BNP profited from the BCP’s (and to some degree also the MFP’s) attack on the Roman
Catholic Church. Quite often, the Roman Catholic Church was the only functioning insti-
tution in rural and mountainous areas besides the chieftainship. It materially benefitted
many women who were left alone by their migrant men. The BCP’s attacks mobilized
nunneries and catholic women against it and they became members of the BNP them-
selves or organized further support for the BNP (Epprecht, 1995, 53f.). Furthermore, in
opposition to the BCP, The BNP did not ally itself neither with the ANC nor the PAC.
Rather, it advocated for pragmatic relationships with South Africa and Jonathan even
welcomed electoral support from South Africa. This also increased women’s support for
the BNP because they feared that the more aggressive stance of the BCP towards South
Africa could harm economic relations with South Africa, on which they were indirectly
dependent due to their migrant men (Spence, 1968, 46–48; Southall, 1994, 110; Coplan
and Quinlan, 1997, 40; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127f.).
The turmoils, splits and switches in ideological standings on the divided center-side of
the territorial cleavage together with the extension of the suffrage to women and new non-
suffrage to migrant Basotho men in South Africa explains the surprising electoral victory
of the peripheral-side party, BNP, in the 1965 elections to the disadvantage of the center-
side parties, BCP and MFP. The BNP gained a slim absolute majority of 35 seats in the
National Assembly, the BCP 21 seats and the MFP four seats. BNP’s leader Jonathan
became the first Prime Minister on July 7, 1965 (Spence, 1968, 43; Nunley, 2009). In
accordance with the socio-structural foundation and rhetorics of the BCP and the BNP,
172
the BCP gained most of its votes among wage earners in the lowlands and towns while the
BNP gained most of its votes among peasants and women in more rural and mountainous
districts (Spence, 1968, 46; Epprecht, 1995, 54).
After the 1965 elections and in preparation for independence in 1966, royalists of the
MFP tried to strengthen the King’s powers by blocking the vote for the necessary indepen-
dence resolution in the Senate after the BNP majority in the lower house already approved
of it. Furthermore, the MFP accused the new BNP government to collaborate with South
Africa. In connection with that, and rather opportunistically, the BCP allied itself with
the King and the royalists of the MFP despite its previous rhetorical attacks on both the
chieftainship in general and the paramountcy itself during the past 1965 election campaign.
Furthermore, the BCP explicitly attenuated its rhetorical platform regarding lesser chiefs.
This contradicted its own socio-structural foundation of mostly protestant commoners and
was rather strategically motivated to profit from the BNP government’s neglect of the
development of the more mountainous and rural areas, which brought the BNP to power
in 1965, after all. The BCP also objected to the BNP government’s friendly relationships
with South Africa despite the BCP and Mokhehle’s previous strategic switch during the
past 1965 election campaign from alliance with the ANC to alliance with the PAC in order
to allow future coexistence with South Africa. Finally, disagreements between the King
and the BNP government over his role and lack of executive power in newly independent
Lesotho cumulated in a violent protest meeting two months after independence. This led
to house arrest for the King and concomitant disruption of the BNP with a fraction of the
subordinate chiefs who supported the King, as well as to the enforced end of the King’s
political agitation for more executive powers. Additionally, the leaders of the BCP and
the MFP were temporarily arrested (Spence, 1968, 48–53; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 128;
Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 289, 387).
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In the following, the elections results of the first post-independence elections in 1970
showed that by the immobilization of the King, the royalist center-side of the territorial
cleavage, embodied in the MFP, lost its appeal, and the split of votes among the center-side
of the territorial cleavage lost its relevance to the advantage of the BCP. At the same time,
the BNP was not able to significantly increase its vote share vis-à-vis the 1965 elections,
which led to the electoral victory and absolute majority of the BCP (Weisfelder, 1977,
180f.; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130; Nunley, 2009). Apart from the new insignificance of
the MFP and the poor government performance of the BNP in its mountainous and rural
strongholds, the surprising victory of the BCP can be explained by the attenuation of its
rhetorics regarding chieftainship in general and relations to South Africa. Furthermore,
many traditional voters did not approve of Jonathan and the BNP’s conflict with the King
and punished the BNP for that to the advantage of the BCP (cf. Weisfelder, 1977, 180;
Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130; Southall, 1994, 110).
The electoral victory of the Mokhehle’s BCP in 1970 led to Lesotho’s second criti-
cal juncture of the abolishment of the electoral regime because Prime Minister Leabua
Jonathan of the BNP reconsidered his decision to hand over power. Jonathan announced
the suspension of the constitution three days after the 1970 elections, and declared emer-
gency powers until the establishment of the new constitution. The coup was supported by
the British-led paramilitary Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which was well stocked with rural
BNP supporters. Leaders of the BCP were temporarily jailed and the King put under
house arrest (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton,
2004, 17, 360).
In sum, the high significance and symbolic relevance of the Basotho chieftainship sys-
tem in general and its two-layered nature of subordinate chiefs on the one hand and a
paramountcy and senior chiefs on the other hand led to a salient, but rhetorically less pro-
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nounced or, at times, even inconsistent center-periphery cleavage in comparison to other
African colonies. Every Basotho party that tried to conquer the position of power in
pre- and post-independence elections did not dare to be too critical of the chieftainship
in general and of lesser chiefs in special. Even the party of the commoner center-side of
the territorial cleavage, the BCP, was rhetorically only explicitly congruent to its socio-
structural foundation of protestant commoners and a following of more urban and less
traditional voters while it had the absolute majority in the National Council between 1960
and 1965. The BNP, in turn, only dared to be most rhetorically explicit about its anti-
paramountcy standing after capturing power in 1965. In both cases, too much criticism of
either the traditional-peripheral side, subordinate chiefs, and the traditional-centrist side,
the paramountcy, proved to lead to the defeat of the party that held the majority in subse-
quent elections. Additionally, the BCP also lacked a coherent rhetoric regarding its stance
vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa. Before the 1960 elections, the BCP was rhetorically ag-
gressive regarding South Africa, between 1960 and 1965 it attenuated its rhetoric only to
be very critical again between 1965 and 1970 of the BNP government’s collaboration with
South Africa. After 1965, the BCP also started to capitalize on the BNP’s initial following,
which was related to the socio-structural origins of its leadership, i.e. Roman Catholicism
and subordinate chieftaincy. The BCP started to win the support of a fraction of disgrun-
tled Roman Catholic subordinate chiefs and mountainous constituencies despite the BCP’s
socio-structural origins of its leadership of Protestant commoners. Hence, on the one hand,
the center-periphery cleavage that formed in advent of the first pre-independence elections
in 1960, established itself during the 1960s due to organizational and leadership continuity
in both the BCP and the BNP, which had two different socio-structural foundations and
were supplemented by the religious cleavage between Protestants and Roman Catholics.
Yet, the ideological rhetoric and therefore the element of collective identity was rather in-
consistent over time, at least in the BCP so far, due to the delicate relation with apartheid
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South Africa, which put pressure on every Basotho government during the apartheid area,
and the significance of chieftaincy for the Basotho nation. Due to its rhetorical inconsis-
tency, the BCP managed to lure away some portions of the Roman Catholic constituencies
and subordinate chiefs from more mountainous and rural areas in 1970, which actually did
not match the BCP’s socio-structural leadership profile.
The MTP/MFP in turn, which represented the royalist center, did not manage to estab-
lish itself and achieve ongoing saliency of this sub-cleavage of the territorial cleavage after
its initial success in the 1960 elections, because the party first blurred its socio-structural
foundation and concomitant ideological profile by adopting disgruntled ex-BCP members,
and second because it lost its battle for enhanced executive powers for the king (cf. with
party system structuring map in figure 16).
Ghana
The Gold Coast was considered to be the British “model colony” in sub-Saharan Africa
(Awoonor, 1990, 133; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011). It was established in 1874 to
organize the coastal areas under British protection. Initially separate administrative units,
the Ashanti and the Northern Territories were added in 1900 to the Gold Coast colony as
well (Apter, 1963, 119; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 78). Local revenues were considered too low
to allow an administrative system of direct rule. The British regarded traditional rule as
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deeply entrenched in the regions of the Gold Coast and rather pragmatically installed the
system of indirect rule. Despite its pragmatic motivation, indirect rule led to a non-neutral
emphasis on inherited rule of mostly uneducated and illiterate chiefs over an educated and
mostly urban and coastal African professional elite that hoped for meritocratic elements of
indirect rule, i.e. the so called intelligentsia (Awoonor, 1990, 135; Rathbone, 2000, 10f.).
As in other African colonies, traditional leaders became agents of British rule (Apter,
1963, 122). While some of their powers increased due to that, their traditional legitimacy
vis-à-vis their subjects decreased (Rathbone, 2000, 13).
After the First World War, the British intensified administration of the colony through
indirect rule. The coastal and cosmopolitan African elite realized that no position of
power was envisioned for them in the British administration. Anti-colonial and anti-chief
resentments, as well as radical nationalism started to thrive among them (Rathbone, 2000,
14).
Finally, after the Second World War, anti-colonial and radical nationalist feelings also
intensified among the returning African ex-serviceman who fought on the side of the British
and realized that they fought for a free Europe while remaining under colonial rule them-
selves (Awoonor, 1990, 133f.). These feelings were supported by the general mood of the
Post-World War order, which put pressure on the colonial powers to give up their colonies
(Boahen, 1975, 149–154). Due to the growing discontent in general in combination with
the older grievances of the Ghanaian intelligentsia, a new constitution, the Burns Consti-
tution, was drawn up in 1946 by the British, which provided for an African majority in
the advisory body for the British Governor, the Legislative Council. Although this was
considered a revolutionary step in British African colonial rule in general, only five of the
total of eighteen Ghanaian seats were envisioned for direct election by the people while
the remainder was reserved for traditional chiefs (Boahen, 1975, 157f.; Awoonor, 1990,135;
Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 159).
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In reaction to this, the disgruntled Ghanaian intelligentsia, which consisted mainly of
educated man, merchants and businessmen, as well as lawyers, founded the United Gold
Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 (Awoonor, 1990, 135f.; Boahen, 1975, 157–160). The
word ‘party’ was explicitly avoided in the name. Nonetheless, the grouping was clearly
political as the members agreed that the UGCC should ensure that the “government [. . . ]
pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs [my emphasis] in the shortest possible
time”. In its opposition to the Burns Constitution, the UGCC considered the “position
[of the chiefs] on the Legislative Council [. . . ] [as] anomalous” (cit. in Boahen, 1975, 158;
Austin, 1964, 52f.). The two statements may seem contradictory, but can be explained
by the conflicting background of the UGCC leadership. Hence, despite its opposition to
the Burns Constitution, the UGCC could not be considered a radical anti-chief party both
in its rhetoric as well as regarding the socio-structural foundation of its leadership. Key
members like the Vice-Chairman, Joseph Boakye Danquah, Ofori Atta or Akufo Addo were
familiarly related to the most influential chief, Nana Sir Ofori Atta I. Hence, they were
ambivalent in their stance on chieftaincy. Accordingly, the UGCC drew its support not
only from professional classes and businessmen, but also from traditional rulers (Boahen,
1975, 160; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 192f.; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).
As General Secretary, the UGCC leadership appointed Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah re-
ceived higher education in the United States and Great Britain and lived abroad for twelve
years. He returned to Ghana to assume his new position. In opposition to most of the rest
of the UGCC leadership, Nkrumah had no family ties to traditional leaders and was of
humble origin (Boahen, 1975. 160f.; Rathbone, 2000, 21; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 186f.). The
charismatic Nkrumah soon assembled his own following behind him. In opposition to the
relatively moderate and traditional following of the UGCC leadership, he assembled more
radical elements of the society, teachers, clerks, women, petty traders, and unemployed
semi-educated youths who had no housing in the city, the so called ‘veranda boys’, all of
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them sharing a commoner background (Austin, 1964, 55; Boahen, 1975, 170; Rathbone,
2000, 24; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).
Nkrumah’s extended studies abroad brought him in contact with Marxist, communist
and radical black writers. Later he described himself as a Marxian socialist. He became an
advocator of Pan-Africanism and played an influential role in the pan-African Congress of
1945 (Apter, 1963, 201; Boahen, 1975, 162). This stood in sharp contrast to the more con-
servative and territorialist, rather than internationalist UGCC leadership (Austin, 1964,
54). Nkrumah also lacked compromising relationships with traditional leaders, in oppo-
sition to most of the other leaders in the UGCC. Hence, he had no restraints in radical
repudiation of colonialism and indirect rule (Boahen, 1975, 162; Rathbone, 2000, 21). In
sum, a potential, future fissure both in terms of the different socio-structural foundation
as well as regarding the element of collective identity between the radical nationalist forces
assembled around Nkrumah and the conservative nationalist forces assembled around Dan-
quah, was in place right from the beginning of the UGCC.
A combination of grievances by Ghanaian merchants over imported goods from Europe
and grievances by Ghanaian World War Two ex-serviceman over their after-service con-
ditions led to a protest march in Accra upon which two ex-servicemen were shot dead by
colonial law-enforcement officers. This triggered riots in Accra, which subsequently spread
to other towns of the Gold Coast. Six leaders of the UGCC, among them Danquah and
Nkrumah, were arrested by the British authorities and released after eight weeks. These
events both made the colonial administration realize the insufficiency of the Burns Consti-
tution to meet nationalist demands and increased the popularity of the UGCC in general
and Nkrumah in special among the masses (Austin, 1964, 76–81; Boahen, 1975, 162f.;
Owusu-Ansah, 2005, xlvif.). The British Government installed an all-Ghanaian committee
to draft a new constitution. The committee was mostly composed of chiefs and the more
conservative and bourgeoise elite of the UGCC, which were familiarly related to influential
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chiefs, amongst them Danquah. Remarkably, Nkrumah, which lacked relations to chiefs,
was not nominated for the committee. This increased the fissure between Nkrumah and
his followers and the more traditional and conservative forces of the UGCC (Austin, 1964,
80f.; Boahen, 1975, 163–165).
Freed of the time-consuming committee work, Nkrumah increased his involvement with
radical youth groups who opposed chiefly influence in the making of the new constitution,
and he also increased the fierceness of his rhetoric. He started to issue a daily news-sheet,
which was radically anti-colonial, against the Committee for the new constitution and
even the UGCC itself (Austin, 1964, 81). Nkrumah summoned a Youth Congress, which
released a statement that demanded “a consitutition that would give [. . . ] [the] country
[. . . ] FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW [sic]” (cit. in Austin, 1964, 82). This stood
clearly in contrast to the UGCC’s initial policy of incremental autonomy, manifested fur-
ther above in the words of “[self-]government [. . . ] in the shortest time possible” (Boahen,
1975, 158; Boafo-Arthur, 2003, 212). Tensions between Nkrumah and the UGCC leader-
ship augmented until Nkrumah made his final break and formed the Convention People’s
Party (CPP). Nkrumah became chairman, K. A. Gbedemah vice-chairman and Kojo Bot-
sio secretary, both of them commoners as Nkrumah himself. Most commoners and young
men started to ally themselves with the CPP instead of the UGCC (Austin, 1964, 85ff.;
Boahen, 1975, 167). Inevitably, the newly-founded CPP repeated the previous rejection of
the Committee for the new constitution and its bias towards chieftaincy, which the CPP
regarded as a repetition of the concept of indirect rule. The UGCC, in turn, strengthened
its alliance with the chiefs. The CPP had the support of the commoner majority of the
population who did not profit from the spoils of the system of indirect rule through chiefs,
and hoped to gain from immediate independence. Due to the CPP’s superior organiza-
tional capacity the party managed to efficiently mobilize this latent majority and won the
first pre-independence elections in 1951 in overwhelming fashion by gaining 34 of the 38
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directly elected Legislative Assembly seats. The UGCC, in turn, only won two seats in
the Assembly. Acknowledging the overwhelming support for the CPP, the British governor
asked Nkrumah to form a government (Apter, 1963, 201; Boahen, 1975, 170–172; Awoonor,
1990, 148f.; Rathbone, 2000, 22-28; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, xlviif.; Nunley, 2009).
Hence, in Ghana, as in other African colonies that followed its pioneering decolonization
path, political cleavages among the indigenous elite in advent of first pre-independence
elections resulted from the decentralizing and pragmatic logic of the British colonial ad-
ministration. What was later officially declared by the British as the policy of “indirect
rule” was basically nothing more than the efficient usage of existing peripheral structures
of traditional rule in order to save the costly deployment of countless district officers to the
periphery of the colonies. Emphasis on traditional leaders led to the disgruntlement of two
different socio-structural groups in the Gold Coast that hoped to gain from increasing cen-
tralization through nationalization and formed different collective identities: A merchant,
lawyer, urban and well-educated class, which could refer to its royal ties, and hoped to
claim the future center through step-by-step take-over from the British colonial power and
accommodation of some sort for allied chiefs and traditional elements in the future, more
centralized nation. On the other side, we find a coalition of more radical elements, petty
traders, teachers, clerks and jobless youth in urban centers, which were hold together by
the charismatic personality of Nkrumah, and their mutual commoner status, i.e. no links
whatsoever to traditional leaders, and therefore did not profit from the British adminis-
trative system of indirect rule and had no access to the concomitant clientelistic spoils and
pork (cf. Rathbone, 2000, 23f.). Accordingly, this group demanded immediate indepen-
dence with no concessions at all towards traditional rulers. The split of the UGCC into
the conservative UGCC assembled around Danquah on the one side and the radical CPP
assembled around Nkrumah gave this two already existing groups the final organizational
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counterpart. The new-old UGCC represented a moderate center-periphery alliance, while
the CPP represented the radical center-side of the territorial conflict (cf. with party system
structuring map in figure 17).
Despite the overwhelming CPP victory in the first pre-independence elections, Joseph
B. Danquah and Kofi A. Busia, an independent, ensured that opposition to the CPP
remained alive inside the assembly. Danquah won one of the two seats for the UGCC in
the 1951 elections. Kofi A. Busia, a member of the royal family of Wenchi, who was of
Akan background like Danquah and an university faculty, inherited the Wenchi seat of a
deceased independent assemblyman (Austin, 1964, 180; Awoonor, 1990, 150, 155; Owusu-
Ansah, 2005, 68f., 91). Because the intelligentsia around Danquah and Busia considered
the name of the UGCC to be tainted with the devastating electoral defeat of 1951, it agreed
on the formation of a new party and leadership under the name of Ghana Congress Party
(GCP) and the person of Busia in 1952. The new party explicitly referred to the tradition
of the UGCC by allying itself with the chiefs and stressing its moderate nationalism in
opposition to the radicalism of the CPP. The new-old party struggled somewhat to hold its
socio-structural foundation and collective identity together because it became an attraction
point for dissident ex-CPP members who felt omitted in the distribution of positions in
the CPP government and selections for constituency-candidacy for the upcoming 1954
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elections. Yet, Busia managed to keep them in line by emphasizing the GCP’s moderateness
and explicitly rejecting to copy the CPP’s rhetoric of immediate self-governance for the
Gold Coast (Austin, 1964, 181). Rather, Busia and the GCP started to invest in rhetoric
that accused the CPP government of dictatorial and corrupt behavior and portrayed itself
as the defender of democracy (Austin, 1964, 226; Awoonor, 1990, 160).
The 1951 victory of the radical nationalist CPP stirred up concerns among peripheral
regions in the Gold Coast and the GCP tried to capitalize on that by emphasizing its
own peripheral aspects due to both its position as the center of opposition and its alliance
with chiefs who tried to retain their peripheral power in the colony. Accordingly, the
GCP started to incorporate Ashanti grievances over seat allocation in the Ashanti region
in advent of 1954 elections and allied itself with three regionalist parties (Austin, 1964,
177–180, 187; Awoonor, 1990, 155; Rathbone, 2000, 64f.): (1) The Northern region of the
Gold Coast distrusted the CPP that it would respect its peripheral interests in a future,
centralized nation (Austin, 1964, 180, 184f.; Awoonor, 1990, 157). In order to defend
Northern interests against Accra-based Southern dominance, mostly Northern, chiefly fig-
ures founded the Northern People’s Party (NPP) in 1954. The NPP’s main aim was to stop
CPP dominance and too rapid self-government, which would leave the peripheral interests
of the Northern region to the alleged arbitrariness of the radical, centralizing nationalists.
(2) The traditionalist Muslim Association Party (MAP), which defended immigrant and
Muslim trader’s interests and feared rough treatment by the centralist-nationalist CPP.
And (3), the Togoland Congress (TC), which opposed the integration of British Togoland
into the Gold Coast and sought unification with its French counterpart on the Eastern side
of the Gold Coast territory (Austin, 1964, 184–191, 228–234; Rathbone, 2000, 65).
The CPP, in turn, continued its radical nationalist rhetoric after its first electoral victory
and repeated its demand for “SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW”. Amongst others, the CPP
intended to establish a democratic and socialist society and supported Pan-Africanism
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(Austin, 1964, 162). In its manifesto for the 1954 elections, the CPP again stressed its
support for the common people in opposition to the aristocrats (Rathbone, 2000, 66), and
the CPP refused to establish a chiefly, second chamber (Austin, 1964, 260).
The election results of 1954 on the one hand both confirmed the CPP’s dominance as it
won 71 of 104 Legislative Assembly seats and the GCP’s weakness in terms of organization
and appeal to the common voter as only Busia managed to win a seat for the party while
no one else, most notably Danquah, captured a seat. Nonetheless, local and peripheral
forces that were allied with the GCP made substantial gains in comparison with 1951
because of the Northern NPP, which won 12 seats from scratch, in addition to the two
seats for the Eastern TC and one seat for the muslim MAC. And 16 independents, which
stood in opposition to the CPP as well, won seats in the Assembly (Austin, 1964, 242–245;
Awoonor, 1990, 160). Obviously, the nationalist appeal of the CPP came under increasing
stress from the peripheral, regional and local side in comparison to the 1951 election (cf.
with party system structuring map in figure 18).
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Ashanti grievances accelerated after the 1954 elections because of a CPP bill that fixed
cocoa prices on a low level for four years. The Ashanti region with its regional capital
Kumasi grew half of the cocoa in the Gold Coast, and therefore was hurt the most by
this policy. Together with the already existing inadequacy of Ashanti representation in
the Assembly in general and the fact that the chiefly element was almost inexistent in
the Assembly since the 1954 elections, despite its symbolic importance for Ashanti unity,
grievances led to the final outburst of Ashanti political agitation (Austin, 1964, 252, 255f.,
258; Boahen, 1975, 183f.; Awoonor, 1990, 161; Rathbone, 2000, 68). In September 1954,
the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM) was founded. Ashanti chiefs
strongly supported the new party as they lost the most due to the radical nationalism and
centralism of the CPP government (Austin, 1964, 250, 264; Boahen, 1975, 183; Awoonor,
1990, 161; Rathbone, 2000, 71). After all, Ashanti chiefs used to have considerable power
and received generous British subsidies due to the British administration through indirect
rule. The objects and aims of the NLM corresponded with its socio-structural foundation,
and it stressed the importance of the traditional rulers, demanded abolishment of traces
of communism in the Gold Coast, and most importantly, a federal constitution for the
future, independent, nation that would give peripheral regions a voice in the legislation and
government of the country (Austin, 1964, 259–262, 279f., 332; Awoonor, 1990, 163). The
unsuccessful GCP representatives of the intelligentsia-chief alliance, Busia and Danquah,
of Akan origin themselves, abandoned their GCP “shell” and supported the new, powerful
movement as well because it represented similar socio-structural elements as the GCP,
and the UGCC before it, and stood for the same anti-radicalism as well as the chiefly-
peripheral alliance, but proved to be more successful in mobilizing larger segments of the
population through its more tribalist approach than the GCP and the UGCC before it.
Busia captured a leading position in the new party and was envisioned as the leader of a
future NLM government (Austin, 1964, 267, 269, 342; Apter, 1966, 277).
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The British administration, in turn, feared violent outbursts in the Ashanti region if
it would grant the promised independence to the CPP government. Hence, it decided on
another, final election before independence, which was intended to serve as a plebiscite on
the federation versus centralization question by the victory of either the peripheral forces
of the NLM or the centralizing forces of the CPP (Awoonor, 1990, 165f.).
In advent of the upcoming, extraordinary 1956 elections and in reaction to the increased
peripheral threat from the Ashanti and other peripheral forces, which have already been
relatively successful in the 1954 elections, the CPP introduced a motion against religion-
based parties such as the muslim MAP (Austin, 1964, 282). Nkrumah himself intensified
rhetoric against the agitation of peripheral parties, which he denounced as “tribal feudal-
ism”. He asked voters to repeat their 1954 vote and vote for “INDEPENDENCE NOW”
(cit. in Austin, 1964, 330). And as in the elections before, the CPP prominently pointed
out that it would be the party of the common people (Austin, 1964, 334) (cf. with party
system structuring map in figure 18).
The 1956 elections produced the results the British government hoped for, i.e. a clear
majority for one of the two sides; either the centralist side, the CPP, or the federalist side,
the combined opposition vote: The CPP confirmed its 1954 victory by winning a clear
absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly (71 seats of 104 as in 1954). Although the
NLM won 12 seats from scratch, it did not suffice to increase the combined opposition
vote. The British conditions for granting independence were met. Danquah again did
not manage to capture a seat while Busia secured his Wenchi seat (Austin, 1964, 353f.;
Awoonor, 1990, 169; Rathbone, 2000, 96).
In the following, the new Assembly accepted Nkrumah’s motion to ask the British gov-
ernment for independence. The opposition boycotted the motion. Nonetheless, the British
granted independence for March 6, 1957. Ghana became the first independent nation south
of the Sahara (Austin, 1964, 357f.; Awoonor, 1990, 170). What was perhaps helpful against
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potential secessionism of the defeated peripheral regions in the new, centralized nation, was
the fact that neither the CPP nor the opposition parties were uniformly supported in their
own strongholds. There was a considerable CPP-vote in the Ashanti region, Togoland and
the Northern regions, and a considerable opposition-vote in the South (Austin, 1964, 367).
And Nkrumah himself belonged to a minority ethnic group, the Nzema. Accordingly, he
preferred anti-tribalistic and unifying mobilization strategies (cf. Dickovick, 2008).
After independence, the CPP and Nkrumah intensified the consolidation of their cen-
tralized power by increasingly suppressing peripheral interests in a non-democratic manner.
Muslim leaders were deported, and parties with a regional, tribal or religious basis forbid-
den. The central government downgraded Ashanti-chiefdoms, installed pro-CPP chiefs to
the disadvantage of anti-CPP chiefs, and abolished the regional assemblies. Nkrumah in-
creased his attacks on the Legon university, which he considered to support opposition
leaders like Busia, who was a Legon faculty himself (Austin, 1964, 365, 377, 380; Awoonor,
1990, 190; Rathbone, 2000, 103). Individual members of the opposition came under increas-
ing threat through the Deportation Act, the Emergency Powers Act, and the Preventive
Detention Act, and several members of the opposition were detained.
Confronted with the increasingly authoritarian power of the CPP, the opposition de-
cided to combine its force by the inauguration of a new party with the combined executive
from the mainly Ashanti NLM, the Northern NPP, the Muslim MAP, the Togoland TC,
and the recently dissident Ga community in Accra. In a rally presided by Busia, the United
Party (UP) was founded in November 1957 (Austin, 1964, 380f., 384; Owusu-Ansah, 2005,
248). The new party, UP, adopted the NLM symbol, a cocoa tree, in order to be recognized
as the follower organization of the NLM. However, under the increasingly undemocratic en-
vironment, the UP had a difficult standing right from the outset. Several members crossed
the floor to the CPP and Busia went into exile in 1959 (Austin, 1964, 384–387; Apter,
1966, 279; Awoonor, 1990, 193).
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In 1960, Nkrumah and the CPP intended to centralize power even more by drafting
a new, republican constitution, with a presidential system, which would give Nkrumah
vast executive powers. The UP ported Danquah, the old antagonist of Nkrumah, as its
candidate for the parallel 1960 plebiscite and presidential election although it – quite
paradoxically – at the same time recommended to vote “NO” on the new, republican
constitution and the introduction of a presidential system (Austin, 1964, 386f.; Awoonor,
1990, 194f.).
Having already achieved the previous main goals, self-governance, centralism and anti-
tribalism, the CPP mainly offered more national welfare in its 1960 campaign program.
Under the impression of the increasing authoritarian behavior of the CPP, the UP issued
pamphlets that mainly pointed out to the dictatorial and communist outlook of the CPP,
and portrayed itself as the democratic alternative (Austin, 1964, 387–389). As the only
alternative to the centralist CPP, the UP could count on the support of peripheral re-
gions, and Danquah kept up his existing alliance with influential chiefs who opposed the
increasing centralism of the CPP government (Rathbone, 2000, 122) (cf. with party system
structuring map in figure 18).
Danquah and the UP did not stand a chance against the organizational machinery
of the CPP and its incumbency advantage. The presidential republic with Nkrumah as
its first president, securing almost 90 percent of the vote, became reality. Both Austin
(1964, 390–394) and Awoonor (1990, 195) present plausible evidence for electoral fraud in
contested regions in the 1960 elections. However, most likely, Nkrumah would have won
anyway, albeit not to that degree (Austin, 1964, 394f.).
While the 1960 election was of a multiparty character in principle and the opposition
still able to stand for election, the opposition media mostly unrestricted and the UP able
to rally in most areas of the country, developments after Nkrumah’s electoral victory in
1960 led to the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the minimally competitive
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multiparty electoral regime. Cocoa prices fell in 1961 and economic difficulties troubled
the young nation. The CPP government introduced a new system of purchase tax, prices
rose and workers’ incomes dropped. Strikes flared up. In the following, Danquah and other
opposition leaders were arrested for alleged participation in the strikes (Austin, 1964, 389–
401, 407; Apter, 1966, 292; Awoonor, 1990, 195). Danquah was released later only to
be arrested again. After surviving assassination attempts and increasing disintegration
in the CPP itself, Nkrumah announced a referendum that would install the CPP as the
sole legal party in Ghana. The 1964 plebiscite was rampant with fraud and produced 99
percent approval rate (Austin, 1964, 413f.; Awoonor, 1990, 196, 202). The first minimally
competitive electoral regime in Ghana came to its end.
In sum, while the radical center-side of the territorial conflict, embodied in the CPP,
remained relatively stable after its victory in the first pre-independence elections, the
moderate center-periphery alliance, embodied in the UGCC, changed its organizational
‘shell’ and party name, UGCC to GCP to NLM to UP, in the following pre- and post-
independence elections before the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the elec-
toral regime (see party system structuring map in figure 18). This changes were mostly
owed to the poor organizational capacity and the electoral inefficacy of the moderate center-
peripheral alliance than to a substantial change of the structural core and its element of
collective identity. Hence, both in this regard and in terms of leadership continuity, em-
bodied in Danquah and Busia, also the moderate center-peripheral alliance side of the
territorial cleavage remained stable over the years 1951 until after the 1960 elections. Yet,
the longer this side had to succumb to the radical centrist-side of the CPP, the more
it adjusted its inner balance towards the peripheral aspect, embodied in chiefs and the
alliances with the Ashanti region grievances, and peripheral-regional and -tribalistic par-
ties to the detriment of its own center-aspiring ambition, embodied in the intelligentsia
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and the leadership of Danquah and Busia. The increasing authoritarianism of the CPP
and Nkrumah increased the collective identity element and concomitant rhetoric of the
moderate center-periphery alliance to represent the democracy-defending side on a latent
democracy-authoritarianism cleavage, albeit it is at least questionable – apart from the
lack of a genuine socio-structural foundation in this regard – how enduring this cleavage
would have been, had the UGCC/GCP/NLM/UP-side captured power in the years 1951
until after 1960. Last but not least, potential ethnopolitical cleavages were clearly cross-cut
by the CPP’s multi-ethnic and centralizing approach with a leader of a minority ethnic
group. On the moderate center-periphery alliance side, in turn, grievances were rather
regional than ethnical and encompassed several ethnic groups with common peripheral
interests. Apart from that, both sides had significant vote shares in each others regional
strongholds. Hence, the initial cleavage between a radical commoner and centralist side
on the one hand and a moderate center-peripheral intelligentsia-chief alliance side on the
other hand remained salient and cross-cut other potential cleavages.
Mali
The French Sudan (official name for the territory between 1920 and independence; there-
after Mali) was established around 1880 as its administration became increasingly au-
tonomous from the French Governor in Senegal, i.e. French military officers started to
report directly to Paris instead of to the Governor in Senegal (Imperato and Imperato,
2008, xxviii, 124). At the outset, French colonial rule in West Africa followed a quite dif-
ferent rationale than the British policy of indirect rule. The French “assimilation policy”
intended to assimilate colonized Africans until they became true Frenchmen themselves.
The policy was based on the assumption that all men are potentially equal and French
culture would be the highest developmental state a culture could reach. While being racist
regarding the fact that African cultures are considered to be inferior to French culture,
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the policy was regarded by many educated Africans in French colonies as a chance to be
integrated in the French colonial political system by meritocratic means (Foltz, 1965, 10f.;
Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 23f.). However, as much as the policy of assimilation was
relatively feasible in Senegalese coastal areas where Africans had been in contact with the
French since decades, it proved to be unpractical the more the French conquered the vast
interiors of West Africa like the French Sudan with a population of several millions in a
relatively short amount of time (Foltz, 1965, 11; Imperato, 1989, 47). Accordingly, just
before World War I, the concept of “association” was introduced, which allowed for more
gradual evolution of African cultures towards the French ideal. The concept of association
allowed methods of administrative rule that would have been considered unacceptable in
France but were more pragmatic for the administration of the vast interior of West Africa.
Amongst others, the concept of association allowed to deny the local population elections
and the usage of indigenous structures of authority for the French administration of the
periphery of the French Sudan. Hence, the actual French mode of rule in French Sudan
resembled more the British system of indirect rule than the French ideal of meritocratically
selected African Frenchmen that basically would rule themselves (Foltz, 1965, 11; Imper-
ato and Imperato, 2008, 24f.). Accordingly, the administrative structures in French Sudan
that came below the cercles and their subdivisions, the cantons, were ruled by local chiefs.
Although usually of noble background, the chiefs were in most instances imposed by the
French on largely arbitrarily drawn administrative divisions, and not necessarily congruent
with the “real” chief of the local people. This decreased the imposed chiefs legitimacy
vis-à-vis the local population. Additionally, as mere agents of French colonial rule, they
were often obliged to carry out unpopular duties like collecting taxes and administering
the foreign French judicial code (Foltz, 1965, 12f.).
Hence, on the one hand the French colonial administrative system destroyed the original
indigenous system of rule to a large degree. On the other hand, the system produced some
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sort of class consciousness on the side of the local “chefferie” and aristocracy because it
united them in their common task of securing control of the periphery for the French and
brought them the peripheral power and spoils that derived from that service. This class
consciousness, in turn, effectively cross-cut potential ethnic or religious cleavages in French
Sudan (cf. Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 257; Foltz, 1965, 15; Bebler, 1973, 107).
Before World War II, a relatively small group of educated African elites started to or-
ganize itself in voluntary associations in Bamako, the capital of the French Sudan. Most
of them received their higher education in Ecole William Ponty in Dakar, a higher school
for the training of teachers, clerks and civil servants. These officially non-political asso-
ciations served as networks to discuss politics and were multiethnic in character. While
the Vichy regime during World War II interrupted these activities, the international an-
ticolonialist tenor after the war and the return of 7000 West African soldiers, engaged in
France, strengthened political agitation and revived the thriving of voluntary associations
in French Sudan (Foltz, 1965, 21f.; Imperato, 1989, 51f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008,
xxxi, 101). In the following, Free France under General Charles de Gaulle committed itself
in the Brazzaville Conference to colonial reforms without touching the topic of indepen-
dence itself. Amongst others, the conference called for a federal structure between France
and its African colonies. This led to the French Fourth Republic’s constitution introducing
territorial assemblies in the French West African colonies and one to three directly elected
deputies per territory to the French National Assembly itself. The executive powers re-
mained in the hand of the French administrations though (Foltz, 1965, 21f.; Imperato and
Imperato, 2008, xxxii).
The first elections for the Assembly of the French Fourth Republic triggered party for-
mation in French Sudan. Three French Sudan graduates from the Ecole William Ponty
ran for the position. They all turned out to be the central figures in French Sudan politics
of the coming years up to independence. Among them was Fily Dabo Sissoko. He was of
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noble descent and an important canton chief. In the elections, he was the French colonial
administration’s favorite due to his conservative views. He considered himself to be a tradi-
tionalist amd a frenchman, and did not want to be associated with communism (Schachter
Morgenthau, 1964, 271f., 275f.; Foltz, 1965, 120; Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and Im-
perato, 2008, 272f.). After Fily Dabo Sissoko won the election in 1945, his supporters
formed the Parti Progressiste Soudanais (PPS). The party drew its support from cantonal
chiefs and traditional segments of the society who were oriented toward the French, and
mostly profited from the French rule through association in the periphery of French Su-
dan. Accordingly, the rather conservative party aimed for gradual, rather than immediate
autonomy of the territory, and in cooperation with France (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964,
280–284; Foltz, 1965, 58; Imperato, 1989, 53; Vengroff, 1993, 548; Imperato and Imperato,
2008, 239f.). Hence, in his campaign rhetoric, Fily Dabo Sissoko emphasized the “prestige
of chiefs”, which needed the be reinforced (cit. in Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 283). Foltz
(1965, 49f.) considers the PPS a “patron party” in opposition to mass parties. The party
had rather a regional than territory-wide appeal, which was owed to the natural narrowness
of any patronage network that is based only on a few traditional leaders (see also Vengroff,
1993, 548).
The second Ponty graduate who stood for the French Assembly elections in 1945, Ma-
madou Konaté, became the early antagonist of Fily Dabo Sissoko. Like Fily Dabo Sissoko,
he came from Bafoulabe in the south-west of French Sudan. Unlike Sissoko however,
Konaté was of commoner background, and not part of the French system of rule in French
Sudan (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 272). Together with Modibo Keita, the third man
standing for these elections, Konaté founded the Union Soudanaise (US) after Fily Dabo
Sissoko’s electoral victory. Eventually, the US affiliated itself with the Rassemblement
Démocratique African (RDA), an interterritorial and anti-colonial party led by the Ivorian
Felix Houphouet-Boigny that served as a meeting ground for West African political parties,
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and became the US-RDA. In opposition to Sissoko and the PPS, the US was strongly anti-
colonialist and aimed for a radical break with France (Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and
Imperato, 2008, 255, 330). Initially, the US drew its support mostly from urban dwellers
(Foltz, 1965, 121; Imperato, 1989, 58). By 1953, Konaté intensified efforts to establish the
party also in more rural areas, which turned it into an effective mass party. Both the urban
and rural followers of the US had a socio-structural background of being part of the non-
privileged strata in the traditional society in common. Hence, they had more to gain from
radical political change and immediate independence than the following and leadership
of the PPS, which was affiliated with the traditional segments of the society (Schachter
Morgenthau, 1964, 257; Foltz, 1965, 50f., 57, 121; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 186).
Modibo Keita, the third man in the 1945 elections, was initially backed by the French
Communists and the West African radical and Marxist Groupes d’Etudes Communistes
(GEC). After having founded the US with Konaté, he accepted to take the second place in
the party because he realized Konaté’s appeal to enfranchised voters. Modibo Keita was
born in Bamako, became a schoolteacher after graduation from William Ponty, and – like
Konaté – lacked connections to the French administration through traditional chieftaincy
(Hodgkin and Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 264; Imperato, 1989, 52f., 58; Imperato and
Imperato, 2008, 169f.). Besides the general support of urban dwellers, the US and Konaté
and Modibo Keita enjoyed the backing of the influential town groups of traders, which
were discriminated by the aristocracy because of their lower caste affiliation. Through
the traders, the US had access to a vast communication network, which touched distant
marketplaces, and the vast number of artisans in rural areas, which were susceptible to the
US’ anti-traditional rhetoric of equality (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 287f.; Foltz, 1965,
121). The US explicitly opposed the French system of indirect rule and was against the
involvement of chiefs in modern political parties (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 289).
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With the introduction of the loi cadre by the French in 1956, which strongly increased
the powers of the territorial assemblies and granted universal suffrage in the French ter-
ritories of West Africa, fortunes shifted from the PPS and Fily Dabo Sissoko, which won
all the elections since 1945 for the French National Assembly and the Territorial Assembly
with restricted suffrage, to the US of Konaté and Modibo Keita (Schachter Morgenthau,
1964, 284; Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 195). With the introduction
of universal suffrage in French Sudan, the mass-party character and the anti-chief rhetoric
of the US trumped the narrow and mostly chiefly patron-based support structure of the
PPS because the legitimacy of the chiefly system was already eroded to a stronger degree
among the newly enfranchised masses in the French Sudan in comparison with Ghana,
Lesotho or Botswana due to the more invasive transformation of the traditional system
by the French colonial administration. The PPS hastily tried to reduce chiefly influence
in the party but it was already too late and the US-RDA won the first pre-independence
elections with universal suffrage in 1957. The party gained an overwhelming absolute ma-
jority in the Territorial Assembly with 64 out of 70 seats while the PPS only captured the
remainder of six seats. Both Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, another influential
figure and canton chief in the PPS leadership, lost in their home constituencies. Modibo
Keita, who took over the US party leadership after Konaté died in 1956, rose to power
(Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 276, 279–281, 284, 294; Foltz, 1965, 12f.; Imperato, 1989,
54f.; Nunley, 2009).
After the PPS’ defeat, Fily Dabo Sissoko first tried to recapture electoral success by
strategically changing the party’s name into Parti du Regroupement Soudanais (PRS).
However, by March 1959, because of a disadvantageous altering of the electoral law by
the US majority, Sissoko and his party decided to rather opportunistically merge with the
US-RDA, which rendered the second pre-independence elections in French Sudan basically
meaningless due to the lack of other, alternative parties to the US in the new Territorial
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Assembly. Months later, the other former PPS strong men, Hamadoun Dicko, crossed lines
to the US-RDA as well. The US-RDA became the sole political party in French Sudan,
which set the stage for future developments (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 298; Foltz, 1965,
113f.; Imperato, 1989, 54; Nunley, 2009).
In sum, despite the somewhat different design of French administrative rule in French
Sudan (later Mali), rule through association with chiefs in the periphery of the vast terri-
tory provoked the same territorial political cleavage in advent of the first pre-independence
elections as in British colonies. The peripheral side of the cleavage was represented by the
leadership of canton chiefs, embodied in the PPS, which had the support of the aristocracy
and its immediate patronage network. In line with its socio-structural foundation, the PPS
only supported gradual ascent to independence, and in close association and cooperation
with the French. The PPS’ outlook was largely conservative and anti-communist. The
center side, in turn, materialized in the US-RDA, a mass party with a commoner leader-
ship and following, initially rooted among urban dwellers, later spread to the rural areas
through a network of traders and artisans. The party was progressively nationalist and
egalitarian as it aimed for a radical break with the colonial power and the abolishment of
chiefly powers in French Sudan politics. After Mamadou Konaté’s death, the party had a
fervent Marxist, the former number two Modibo Keita, as its new leader (cf. with party
system structuring map in figure 19).
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However, the rather opportunistic merger with the center-side party by the leaders
of the peripheral side of the territorial cleavage after their devastating defeat in the first
pre-independence elections with universal suffrage in 1957 led to the early demise of the
territorial cleavage in Mali. Hence, at least the organizational element of the peripheral
side ceased to exist. The early demise of the territorial cleavage was owed to the fact that
on the one hand, the mass-appeal of the peripheral side of the cleavage was rather weak
because the collective identity component, the attachment to traditional and chiefly rule,
was already eroded due to the highly disruptive way the French used the chiefly system for
their objectives. On the other hand, the leaders and followers of the center side were less
extreme in their repudiation of the traditional elements in the French Sudan society than
their peers in other African colonies. They were less radically assimilationist-minded and
hence less repugnant towards their traditional past than their colleagues from the coastal
territories like Senegal, Guinea or Ivory Coast, which were for a more extended period in
contact with French policy of assimilation. Finally, the outlook on a future independent
federation with Senegal suppressed the salience of the internal Sudanese territorial cleavage
to some degree (cf. Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 299; Foltz, 1965, 112–118).
Regarding potential ethnopolitical cleavages in French Sudan, the ethnopolitical sup-
port pattern adhered to the territorial logic: Ethno-regional groups like the Bambara and
the Fulani that welcomed French colonization and secured subsequent inclusion in the
French system of rule through association with chiefs supported Fily Dabo Sissoko’s PPS.
The Diawara, the Malinke or the Songhai, in turn, supported the US because of various
reasons that were rooted in their less favorable treatment by the French conquest and ad-
ministration of the colony (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 280–282). The party leaderships,
in turn, were largely non-ethnically based. Leaders like Modibo Keita came from minority
ethnic groups. And general inter-ethnical cooperation among the leadership derived from
the mutual experience in the Ecole William Ponty and needed to be maintained anyway
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upon return to the ethnical melting-pot of Bamako where the first political groupings and
parties were founded. No ethnical group in French Sudan was big enough to allow sustain-
able exclusionist behavior in social and political relationships. Ancient trade routes and
the common denominator of Islam helped to strengthen inter-ethnic alliances (Schachter
Morgenthau, 1964, 280; Imperato, 1989, 52; Dickovick, 2008, 1126f).
After the uprising in Algeria, and with General de Gaulle back to power in France, West
African territories could chose between total integration into France, autonomy within the
French Community or immediate independence. All but Guinea, which chose immediate
independence, opted for political autonomy, which was what the French government had
hoped for. The US in the French Sudan did not dare to support the immediate indepen-
dence option – despite its previous radicalism in the question of independence – because it
feared that it would lose the northern regions of the French Sudan if it did not follow the
course that was envisioned by De Gaulle. In the following, the old French West African
Federation dissolved and only the French Sudan and Senegal decided to form a new in-
dependent federation within the French Community, the Mali Federation, which became
independent from France on June 20, 1960. Presidential elections were set for August, but
soon differences between the Senegalese side, which opted for a less centralized federation,
and the Sudanese side, which pressed for a unitary state with centralized power in the
hands of one powerful president broke out openly and led to the dissolution of the Mali
federation and the subsequent proclamation of the Republic of Mali (Foltz, 1965, 129,
168–184; Imperato, 1989, 54–57; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, xxxiif.).
As the president of the newly independent Mali and with no opposition in the assembly,
Modibo Keita intended to realize his Marxist-socialist visions and implemented a highly
centralized form of government. He associated Mali with communist and socialist govern-
ments around the world. In 1961, the US government crushed the remaining powers of the
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traditional system by eliminating the canton chiefs from the system of local government
altogether. Only the chiefly powers of the Tuareg nomads in the northern Mali were left
intact due to the special position they have already enjoyed under French rule (Schachter
Morgenthau, 1964, 289; Foltz, 1965, 129; Imperato, 1989, 58–60).
The already economically weak position of newly independent Mali deteriorated fur-
ther because of the tensions between Senegal and Mali that led to the interim closing of
the Bamako-Dakar railway and economic isolation of Mali. Modibo Keita announced an
austerity program and pullout of the West African Monetary Union. Mali issued its own
currency in July 1962, the Mali-Franc, which was deemed necessary for the implemen-
tation of a non-capitalist development plan and the final break with the colonial power
(Meyer, 1980, 4f.; Imperato, 1989, 60). Merchants and traders started to riot in Bamako
because their regional trade was destroyed by the introduction of the nonconvertible cur-
rency. Modibo Keita used the riots as a pretext to get rid of his last potential challengers,
and charged Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, the former strongmen of the PPS,
and their associates with treason. After a death sentence for Sissoko that was changed into
a life sentence and hard labor, Sissoko and his associates were transferred to Kidal in the
northeast where a Tuareg rebellion took place. Later it was announced that they had been
killed by Tuareg in an ambush. However, it was widely believed that they were executed
by the government itself. With the effective elimination of the last potential opposition
figures by the Keita government there was no doubt anymore that the abolishment of the
minimally competitive electoral regime became a certainty. Subsequently, Modibo Keita
was reelected as president by the National Assembly. In the 1964 National Assembly elec-
tions, the US-RDA was already the sole legal party (Bebler, 1973, 82; Imperato, 1989, 60f.).
Hence, while Modibo Keita and the US-RDA remained faithful to their centrist, anti-
chief and Marxist-socialist program after independence, they also effectively eliminated
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the last traces of the peripheral side of the territorial cleavage by the final elimination of
its former leaders.
First Comparison
The analysis of the first two process stations, “birth” and “establishment”, in the four
cases reveal a striking similarity in cleavage-formation of embryonic African party systems
at the time of independence. Both former English and French colonies in both West Africa,
Ghana and Mali, and Southern Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, experienced the formation of
a political center-periphery cleavage in the advent of the first indigenous pre-independence
elections.
The end of the Second World War and the return of African soldiers who fought for
Britain and France and a free Europe fueled indigenous aspirations for independence. The
new Post-World War II order forced the colonial powers to prepare their colonies for self-
governance and led to the installation of pre-independence elections in British and French
African colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. Higher education for a narrow African elite
in the United States, Europe, South Africa, or colonial Senegal on the one hand, and
British indirect rule and the French concept of “association” on the other hand juxtaposed
two sets of indigenous elites structured according to a center-periphery cleavage: on the
one side a mostly commoner-based and educated urban elite that did not profit from the
spoils of indirect rule and had more to win from immediate independence and a modern
system of self-rule, on the other side a mostly traditional and rural aristocratic elite that
secured the penetration of the periphery for the colonial administration and preferred
an incremental and pacted transition to independence that preserved its privileges. The
antagonistic indigenous preferences in the context of decolonization and nationalization
led to the formation of two opposed collective identities among the indigenous elite, one
progressive and anti-traditionalist, and one moderate or conservative and traditionalist.
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The opposed interests of the two sides resulted in the organizational form of competing
parties for the first pre-independence elections.
Despite the absence of a functional cleavage due to the lack of an effective industrializa-
tion in the four cases, the two territorial sides mimicked the dominant Western European
left-right party system structure by either investing in communist, marxist or socialist
rhetoric and trying to attract support from the Eastern Bloc or investing in capitalist
rhetoric and trying to win the support of the Western Bloc in general, and the former
colonial power in special. As expected, in each of the four analyzed cases, the progressive
elite who opted for a radical break with the former colonial power invested in left-leaning
rhetoric and was sympathetic to the Eastern Bloc whereas a conservative, moderate and
traditional elite who opted for pacted transition invested in capitalist rhetoric and tried to
ensure the continued support of the former colonial power and other Western countries.
While the similarities in cleavage formation are striking, the four analyzed cases differ
regarding the exact composition and the strength of the two sides of the center-periphery
cleavage. These differences can be attributed to differences in development and the exten-
siveness of colonial involvement, the strength and variety of the traditional systems of rule,
and the ethno-regional structure of the four cases.
In comparison with Lesotho, Ghana and Mali, the center-side was almost inexistent
in advent of the first pre-independence elections in Botswana. Nonetheless, the birth of
the party system was initiated by a narrow politicized elite of Batswana commoners upon
their return from studies and work in South Africa. Yet, lack of urbanization, a very low
development level, and a strong traditional and moderate or conservative elite backed by
the British colonial administration led to an overwhelming victory of the peripheral side in
the first pre-independence elections in Botswana. The moderate-peripheral side managed
to perpetuate the imbalance of strength to its advantage and remained victorious until the
beginning of the third wave without having to resort to coercive means of power. And
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because the state and security forces were underdeveloped and had to be constructed from
scratch by the governing BDP itself (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 255), its incumbency was
never challenged by the barrel of the gun. Ironically, the relatively strong imbalance of
power between the peripheral and the center side most likely secured the survival of the
territorial cleavage in Botswana until the beginning of the third wave.
After the first pre-independence elections, the context of underdevelopment forced each
side of the territorial cleavage in Botswana to adapt to the realities on the ground. Con-
fronted with the task of state-building and development, the governing embodiment of the
peripheral side, the BDP, became de facto a centralizing force, which, in turn, disgruntled
an important fraction of its allied chiefly powers. This provided the embodiment of the
center-side, the BNF, to form an uneasy, but potentially electoral useful alliance with pe-
ripheral and traditional forces. However, in the long run, the two parties re-adjusted their
socio-structural foundation and collective identity according to the original constellation.
Moreover, the BNF profited from an increasing urbanization over time. Nonetheless, elec-
tions are still won in the more rural parts of Botswana, which secures the dominance of
the BDP.
In Lesotho, the electoral balance between center and periphery was much more even
than in Botswana. The party of the progressive commoner center, the BCP, and the party
of the traditional-conservative periphery, the BNP, alternated in holding power between
1960 and 1970. In opposition to Botswana, Ghana and Mali, Lesotho has a paramount
chief. This led to the formation of an additional party, the royalist MTP/MFP, which
claimed the center of the territorial cleavage, too. However, the MTP/MFP never obtained
the electoral significance of the BCP. The main antagonism between the BCP, center,
and the BNP, periphery, was additionally strengthened due to a salient religious cleavage
between protestants and catholics that formed alongside the dominant cleavage between
the commoner center, mostly protestant, and the traditional periphery, mostly catholic.
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Furthermore, the difficult relationship with and geographic encapsulation within apartheid
South Africa reinforced the cleavage between the two sides, although it was overshadowed
by inconsistency, at least on the progressive side between 1960 and 1970, and later on both
sides.
Notably, Lesotho’s peripheral party, BNP, experienced the same dilemma as Botswana’s
peripheral BDP when it won power in 1965. Centralizing tendencies due to the construc-
tion of a modern state disgruntled its peripheral support-base and created incentives for
the BCP to opportunistically attenuate its centrist rhetoric and attract peripheral forces.
Generally, the cases of Botswana and Lesotho differ from Ghana and, most notably, Mali
in view of the fact that chiefs and the traditional system of rule were less discredited by
the general population due to the comparatively less disruptive way they were instrumen-
talized by the colonizers to secure colonial rule in the periphery. Moreover, chiefs played a
pivotal role in the creation of pre-independence national feelings, most notably in Lesotho,
triggered by the constant threat of the Boers (cf. Coplan and Quinlan, 1997).
Ghana was certainly the most modernized and economically most important colony
of the four cases due to its access to the ocean and its resources. Accordingly, the stock
of elites was larger than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, and indigenous pressures for
independence were strong and materialized earlier. Accordingly, there existed not only a
broader commoner-based and educated elite, but also a significant moderate and educated,
center-aspiring elite with ties to the traditional and aristocratic periphery. Hence, we
observe a territorial cleavage in Ghana between a progressive center-side on the one hand
and a moderate-center and traditional-peripheral alliance on the other. In opposition to
Lesotho and most notably Botswana, the progressive center remained victorious over four
elections due to higher organizational power, stronger cohesiveness, and a larger electoral
potential. However, the longer Nkrumah’s CPP stayed in power, the more authoritarian it
became. The moderate center-periphery alliance, in turn, had to emphasize its peripheral
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identity and forge alliances with regional and tribalistic parties in order to remain a viable
competitor. It also became associated with the economically important Ashanti region and
vocalized Ashanti-grievances. Nonetheless, despite a stronger significance of ethno-regional
identities than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, Ghana never went down the tribalistic path
as other African countries did. The center-side was significantly ethnically cross-cutting in
its mobilization and appeal, and both sides of the territorial cleavage obtained considerable
vote-shares in each others’ regional strongholds (cf. Elischer, 2013).
Although of less importance to the French than Ghana to the British, and also less
developed, Mali was similar to Ghana in view of the fact that the progressive center-
side was overwhelmingly victorious in the first national pre-independence elections. As in
Ghana, the embodiment of the center-side, the US-RDA, was better organized than its
peripheral equivalent, the PPS. However, the strength of the center-side in Mali can also
be explained by the very weakness of the peripheral side. The traditional system of rule
was more strongly discredited than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana due to the highly
disruptive way the French had used and re-structured it for their own purposes. Despite
of – or exactly because of – its weakness, after the electoral victory of the center, its
leader Modibo Keita literally erased the last traces of the peripheral side. Only five years
after the first pre-independence elections and two year after independence, the de-facto
authoritarian one-party state became reality in Mali.
In both Mali and Ghana, authoritarian one-party states were installed by the victorious
center-side parties, amongst others, because of increasing economic problems in both new-
born nations and the concomitant fading of the honeymoon of independence. In Lesotho,
in turn, the governing embodiment of the peripheral side, the BNP, allowed a third, free
election in Lesotho despite increasing voter apathy among its rural voters due to a poor
performance in government and severe conflict with the King. However, after losing the
elections, the BNP, in collaboration with the security forces, refused to hand over power
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and installed a de facto authoritarian one-party state. Only Botswana escaped the fate
of authoritarianism due to the special constellation of a strong governing party that had
nothing to fear from the polls and the concomitant absence of significant security forces
that could have acted on their own or be instrumentalized by one of the two sides of the
territorial cleavage.
Blurring and Suppression of the Center-Periphery Cleavage During the Au-
thoritarian Phase in Lesotho and Mali
In opposition to Botswana and Ghana, both Lesotho and Mali did not experience any
further elections until the advent of the third wave. Nonetheless, the following analysis
reveals differences between the two countries as it shows that Lesotho’s authoritarian phase
was much shorter than Mali’s authoritarian phase. Amongst others, this allowed the
survival of both the de facto authoritarian BNP, the embodiment of the peripheral side of
the territorial cleavage, and the illegally ousted embodiment of the center side, the BCP,
until the advent of the third wave.
Apart from enduring a much longer phase of authoritarianism, Mali soon experienced
another regime change due to the military coup against Modibo Keita’s authoritarian one-
party regime in 1968 by a junta that had neither ties to the ousted authoritarian center-side
nor the short-lived peripheral side of the territorial cleavage in Mali. The following two
sections analyze to what degree the territorial cleavage was suppressed and blurred during
the two and three authoritarian decades in Lesotho and Mali, respectively.
Lesotho
Having lost popular legitimacy in their rule due to their annulation of the 1970 election
results and the declaration of emergency powers, the BNP and Prime Minister Leabua
Jonathan now relied heavily on the security forces, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), in
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order to stay in power. While the detention of main opposition leaders like the election’s
winner, BCP’s Ntsu Mokhehle, ensured the stability of Jonathan’s unconstitutional rule
to some degree, the PMU crushed potential opposition outbreaks ruthlessly with the help
of weapon deliveries from South Africa. The apartheid neighbor endorsed Jonathan’s coup
because Pretoria was most suspicious of Mokhehle and the BCP who initially had ties with
the ANC, and later the PAC. (Spence, 1968, 47f.; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 131; Rosenberg,
Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 360f.).
Britain, in turn, decided to withhold much needed aid in consequence of the coup. To
prove Britain the legitimacy of their rule, Jonathan and the BNP started reconciliation
talks with the opposition parties, BCP and MFP. The opposition leaders agreed to the
annulation of the 1970 election results because they hoped to be released from detention and
become part of an all-party transitional government. The mere announcement of Jonathan
to install such an all-party arrangement convinced the British to restore aid. As soon as the
British lifted their ban, the BNP and Jonathan decided to abort the all-party plans and the
BNP remained in government alone. As a consequence, important BCP elements around
Mokhehle refused to participate in the interim National Assembly, which became a rubber
stamp for the government. The BCP leadership around Mokhehle started to intensify
forms of violent opposition. In 1974, police stations were attacked by BCP supporters
who tried to obtain weapons for an uprising. The attacks failed, and were followed by
brutal counter-attacks of the government, upon which Mokhehle and most of the BCP
leadership went into exile in Botswana and Zambia. In the following, the civil service
was purged of opposition elements and filled with BNP supporters. The pro-BCP trade
union came under increasing pressure whereas compliant voluntary associations received
substantial patronage. A faction of the BCP, in turn, agreed to participate in the interim
National Assembly and was later co-opted into Jonathan’s government, which enhanced the
government’s legitimacy and at the same time led to increasing disintegration and confusion
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among the BCP supporters because Mokhehle did not approve of the alignment of parts
of the BCP with Jonathan’s government (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 131–137; Rosenberg,
Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 361).
To enhance the legitimacy of their unconstitutional grip to power and consolidate the
de facto one-party rule, Jonathan and the BNP pragmatically adjusted their ideological
identity in several ways. The BNP started to abort its collaborative stance towards South
Africa and increasingly attacked the apartheid system. This strategy both undercut the
BCP’s previous anti-apartheid appeal and secured prestige and assistance from the inter-
national community, which became increasingly anti-apartheid in these years. In complete
opposition to its previous beliefs, the BNP even started to offer ANC refugees sanctuary
and forged diplomatic ties with the Communist bloc. Especially the latter move was badly
received by the Roman catholic hierarchy in Lesotho and disrupted their previously close
alliance with the BNP and Jonathan. In another deviation from its previous identity, the
BNP also started to attenuate its strong opposition vis-à-vis the King after he was sent to
exile during the coup. Hence, soon the King was allowed to return home as a constitutional
monarch in order to increase the legitimacy of the illegal BNP regime. The very core of the
BNP identity, the defense of lower chiefs’ interests, already decreased during its legitimate
rule between 1965 and 1970 because of the BNP’s weak performance in rural areas at that
time. Now, this dealignment found its continuation by the BNP regime’s rule through
increasingly centralizing state structures of urban bureaucrats and the collaboration with
senior chiefs, which both did not reverse the trend, of course (Khaketla, 1972, 297; Bardill
and Cobbe, 1985, 137–139, 146f.; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 41; Southall and Fox, 1999,
673; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 18f., 129–131).
Meanwhile, the part of the BCP that refused co-optation by the BNP and went into exile
after the failed uprising in 1974 factionalized further over the best strategy how to return
to power. A sub-faction around Mokhehle decided to intensify armed struggle against
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Jonathan’s regime and founded the military arm of the BCP, the Lesotho Liberation Army
(LLA). The LLA invested in guerrilla war-tactics, which resulted in regular bombings and
other violent destabilization attacks in Lesotho between 1979 and 1986. The LLA recruited
combatants among Basotho miners in South Africa and turned to its old South African
ally, the Pan-African Congress of South Africa. After 1981, Mokhehle became persona
non grata in Botswana and Zambia due to the insurgency. It is widely alleged that after
that expulsion, the LLA was forced to rely on tacit support from apartheid South Africa,
Mokhehle’s once outspoken enemy. Pretoria’s rationale for this was twofold: First, it was
directed against Jonathan’s ANC support, and second, it followed South Africa’s general
applied strategy to destabilize its southern African neighbors in order to avert alternative
power bases in the region (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 139–141; Southall, 1994, 111; Coplan
and Quinlan, 1997, 41f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 28f., 177f.).
The increasing destabilization of the BNP regime through the actions of the LLA and
South Africa led to general popular frustration in Lesotho and tensions inside the BNP.
Additional pressures from aid donors prompted Jonathan to restore legitimate rule through
elections in 1985. However, opposition parties boycotted the 1985 election and nullified its
legitimacy completely. Senior officers of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), formerly
PMU, became increasingly frustrated over Jonathan’s ANC support, which they considered
to be the cause for a South African economic embargo and Pretoria’s alleged support of
the insurgent LLA. In January 1986, allegedly backed by South Africa, the officers staged a
successful military coup and Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya became the chairman
of the new Military Council, which was installed as new governing body of Lesotho. Like
Jonathan, Lekhanya was a Roman catholic and installed by Jonathan himself as Mayor-
General of the PMU in 1974. In the following, Jonathan was put under house arrest, and
most BNP ministers dismissed while some remained in place, under the direction of the
Military Council. Mokhehle and other BCP leaders were allowed to return from their exile,
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in turn, which effectively ended the conflict with the LLA. Relations with South Africa
were restored as well and let Lesotho gain in temporary stability. Reductions in donor
funding for the military, however, led to tensions between senior and junior officers and
the subsequent enforced deposition of Lekhanya in 1991. Subsequent pressures by South
Africa, after the end of apartheid, and international donors prompted the military regime
to set up a new constitution and first multiparty elections in 1993; elections, which marked
the beginning of the third wave in Lesotho after 23 years of unconstitutional rule (Bardill
and Cobbe, 1985, 141–143; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 42f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and
Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 19, 130f., 155–157, 251–254, 361f.).
I consider the territorial cleavage of Lesotho to be rather “medium established” instead
of “more than medium established” despite the survival of both the BNP and the BCP
as organizational units until the advent of the third wave: First, there was no multiparty
disruption of the authoritarian BNP rule between the coup in 1970 and the founding third
wave elections in 1993. Consequently, the two sides of the territorial cleavage could not
and did not have to reinvigorate and routinize their political rhetoric and organizational
coherence. Second, the inconsistency in terms of the ideological identity of the two sides of
the territorial cleavage, which was already present during the electoral phase between 1960
and 1970 (see above), found its continuation during the years of the authoritarian BNP
single-party rule. Most notably, the BNP’s collective identity and structural foundation
of representing the lesser chiefs became more and more tainted. Policies that were not
in the interest of lesser chiefs, the increasingly centralizing governing style after 1965 as
well as the collaboration with the King and senior chiefs after 1970 proved otherwise and
largely hurt its popularity among the rural, Roman catholic population. Analogously, the
BNP’s dramatic policy switches from fervent anti-communism to diplomatic ties with the
Communist Bloc after 1970 strongly blurred its previously rather consistent conservative
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identity and alienated the Roman catholic church from the party. In the same line, the
switch from a party that collaborates with apartheid South Africa to one that strongly
provokes its neighbor with anti-apartheid rhetoric and the harboring of ANC-activists in
Lesotho did not help to clear the image of a rather opportunistic party of skilled power
brokers than an ideologically coherent party. The lack of multiparty elections for a time-
span of 23 years allowed this opportunistic behavior, but damaged the identity of the party
for third wave party competition to effectively rely on. And finally and most importantly,
the military coup of 1986 only secured the survival of the most opportunistic figures inside
the BNP leadership while more militant figures were effectively expelled. Longterm leader
Jonathan, the most prominent figure of the party, died of natural causes in 1987, one year
after his deposition (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 130f.).
The BCP, in turn, was already ideologically inconsistent in advent of the second and
third elections of the pre-authoritarian phase. It switched its ideological positions, which
were initially rather congruent to its socio-structural basis, each time in advent of the
second and third election before the coup of 1970 (see above). After the co-optation of
parts of the BCP by the BNP in the aftermath of the coup and the concomitant deprivation
of political participation and even physical presence in Lesotho for the BCP-core around
Mokhehle, the BCP could not cultivate its ideological identity anymore until 1986. The
BCP’s military arm, the LLA, even had to opportunistically ally itself with the BCP’s once
most outspoken enemy, apartheid South Africa, in order to remain a threat to Jonathan
and the BNP.
Hence, even though both political-organizational counterparts of the center-side and
the peripheral-side of the territorial cleavage survived until the advent of third wave –
in opposition to Mali, as we will see below – their ideological identity and organizational
cohesion was strongly blurred after 23 years of authoritarianism, and rather resembled two




After the successful elimination of every potential locus of political opposition in the coun-
try and the incorporation of most voluntary organizations into its party structures, the
US-RDA gained a great and coherent political monopoly in Mali (Bebler, 1973, 103f.;
Imperato, 1989, 59f.). The party determined its option socialiste and introduced several
measures that should lead to a socialist economic structure and accumulate enough capital
for the industrialization and modernization of Mali. State-owned companies were founded
and agriculture reorganized with the intention of collectivization. Foreign trade became a
state monopoly (Meyer, 1980, 5f.; Bebler, 1973, 83). However, the socialist option proved
to yield poor results because it was based on a faulty assessment of the financial and hu-
man resources of the country and did not take into account Mali’s unfavorable geographic
conditions of its landlocked position, a vast hinterland and endless, ungovernable borders.
Farmer productivity decreased and the previously positive balance of trade changed to
a negative one. Corruption, black markets and smuggling started to thrive in this con-
text. Political dissatisfaction rose among peasants, merchants and the urban population,
of which most belonged to the initial following of Modibo Keita and the US-RDA (Be-
bler, 1973, 83; Meyer, 1980, 6f.; Imperato, 1989, 61). Economic and financial difficulties
reached a stage where the Keita government had to swallow its pride and enter monetary
negotiations with France in 1967, where the devaluation of the Mali Franc and the con-
comitant blocking of government expenditures and government salaries were agreed upon
in exchange for French aid. The subsequent dramatic drop in purchasing power now even
led to conflicts between the US-RDA leadership and state employees as well as party mem-
bers itself. Factions cracked up inside the leadership between moderates who welcomed
the reapprochement towards France and radical Marxist who regarded the agreements as
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violations of party principles. As Modibo Keita came under increasing pressure of the
latter, he started a Malian “cultural revolution”, got rid of the centrists and moderates
inside the party leadership, and strengthened the US-RDA’s para-military People’s Mili-
tia to purge the party and the population from dissent and potential opposition. Strains
between the militia and the army during 1968 led to fears on the side of the army officers
that Modibo Keita and the radicals would arrest them and replace the army by the militia.
Sensing the great discontent of the public with the Keita regime, Yoro Diakité, an army
captain, and Lt. Moussa Traoré, a military instructor, decided to carry out a coup d’état.
After returning from a meeting in Mopti, Modibo Keita was arrested and the newly formed
Comité Militaire de Liberation Nationale (CMLN) announced the fall of the Keita regime
with Moussa Traore new chief of state and president of the CMLN (Bebler, 1973, 84–88;
Meyer, 1980, 7–9; Imperato, 1989, 61–63).
The new military regime, the CMLN, embarked on a political vacuum in Mali (cf. Be-
bler, 1973, 105f.). Modibo Keita effectively destroyed the only opposition that was based on
an already modestly salient political cleavage through the co-optation and subsequent elim-
ination of Fily Dabo Sissoko and the PPS. The composition of the CMLN leadership was
based on personal relationships in the military rather than a common socio-structural or
ethnopolitical background besides shared service in the army (Bebler, 1973, 90; Imperato,
1989, 64; Dickovick, 2008, 1126f.). Accordingly, the junta had no actual coherent politi-
cal platform after capturing power besides the goal of economic recovery. It did neither
reject the socialist options nor did it dismantle the state-run economy because this would
have hurt the many urban dwellers employed in it. And the junta also reaffirmed Keita’s
agreements with France. Internal and external trade was liberalized to please traders and
merchants whereas the dismantling of the collectivized agriculture was intended to secure
the support of the rural population. The junta dissolved the People’s Militia and restored
individual liberties to some degree. Regarding foreign policy, Mali remained aligned to the
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Eastern Bloc, although relations to the West improved (Bebler, 1973, 92f.; Meyer, 1980,
13; Imperato, 1989, 64f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 54f.).
Initial promises to return to civilian rule quickly were abolished during 1969 because of
sharp disagreements on this issue inside the CMLN. Subsequently, frictions inside the junta
intensified between the more senior members around Diakité who favored closer relations
with the West and more junior members around Traoré who wanted to uphold relations
with the Eastern Bloc. After accusations of plotting a coup, Diakité was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Shortly thereafter he died in prison (Bebler, 1973, 101f.; Meyer, 1980,
14–16; Imperato, 1989, 65; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 55).
By June 1974, the Malian population accepted a new constitution, which was drawn
up by the CMLN. The constitution arranged for a one party state, universal suffrage, a
president and a national assembly. US-RDA members with important positions in the
ancien regime were barred from party membership and both government and national
assembly participation for a period of ten years. The CLMN was provided with the task of
interim government for a five-year span until 1979. The new constitution did not arrange
for a radical break with the pragmatic governing style of the military regime. Rather it
provided the CLMN leadership the opportunity to get rid of the uniforms and transform
the military regime towards constitutionally legitimate civilian rule (Meyer, 1980, 19–21;
Imperato, 1989, 67f.; Nunley, 2009).
Despite some considerable amount of internal resistance, the foundation of the new
single political party, the Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), was announced
in September 1976. President Moussa Traoré became the head of the new party and CMLN
members spread throughout the country to establish the party at the grassroots. Likewise
to the US-RDA, the UDPM incorporated most of the voluntary organizations in the country
to avoid the potential formation of organized dissent from the outset. While a faction of
hawks inside the CLMN was purged from the leadership, Traoré made it clear that the
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military would remain involved in politics. After the new party was firmly established
throughout the country, former US-RDA leaders were released from prison. The timing
of this gesture of reconciliation ensured the former elites’ effective exclusion in the new
regime. In the general elections of 1979, Moussa Traoré ran unopposed and was elected by
over 99 percent of the votes. UDPM candidates for the National Assembly were elected
unopposed as well. Later assembly elections became party-internally contested in order to
give the regime a democratic touch and channel public grievances and protest-voting from
the top leadership of the UDPM to the rank and file, and by that also effectively suppressed
potential future power bases among the rank and file of the party. In its programmatic
outlook, the UDPM intended to remain unaligned to neither socialism nor capitalism.
Nonetheless, rather in coherence with the previous Keita regime and the military regime,
it aimed for the construction of an independent, state-directed economy and it did not
dare to retain Keita’s socialism by reducing parastatals, which provided employment for
the politicized contemporary and future urban elite, students and teachers. As soon as the
UDPM regime started to cut the flow of students to the civil service in 1980, opposition
of the students to the new regime started to grow (Meyer, 1980, 22–35; Imperato, 1989,
68–71; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 324–326; Nunley, 2009).
During the 1980s, increasing donor dependence led to pressures for privatization and
cutbacks in the civil service. While on the one hand this rather pragmatic change of
policy ensured the continuation of aid flows, it was a risky move because it threatened
the availability of job-opportunities for the higher educated youth in the bureaucracy.
Additionally, recurring delays in the payment of teachers led to strikes organized by the
teachers’ union. However, the different protest groups did not manage to forge mass-based
protest, which would have included other segments of the society or even inside the civil
service itself. The protesting groups had a relatively narrow common socio-structural basis,
and lacked an element of collective identity or even ideological content despite the common
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denominator of general discontent with the current performance of the Traoré regime. The
new groups also lacked an organized historic opposition core they could have attached
themselves to because of the early elimination of the peripheral-conservative opposition by
Modibo Keita around independence, and the subsequent effective exclusion of elements of
the Keita regime by the Traoré regime (Imperato, 1989, 72–77; Levitsky and Way, 2010,
297).
Still, the growing discontent in combination with the changing international environ-
ment and the example of prodemocracy movements elsewhere in Africa led to demands
for multiparty democracy in 1989. In disrespect of the signs of the time, Moussa Traoré
refused to give up single-party democracy. Yet, his governing style of constantly reshuf-
fling his own cabinet and the military leadership, which allowed him to avoid independent
power bases inside the UDPM and the military, now proved to backfire (Imperato, 1989,
78; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 327f.). Violent protests by the pro-democracy move-
ment, students and unions led to the disintegration of disgruntled parts inside the UDPM
leadership and a subsequent successful military coup on March 26, 1991. The coup was
led by Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré (known as “ATT”). ATT and 24 other mili-
tary officers arrested Moussa Traoré and dissolved the UDPM. They formed the Conseil
de Réconciliation Nationale (CRN). Prodemocracy groups threatened the CRN that they
would resume violent protests if the CRN would not make way for a democratic and civil-
ian government and likewise, Western donors warned that they would suspend aid. A
transitional government was installed and a new, democratic constitution approved, which
led to the founding elections in February and April 1992. The third wave of democratiza-
tion arrived in Mali (Imperato, 1989, 78; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 71, 296–298; 327f.).
Hence, we can see that the authoritarian interregnum did not change the general pattern
that was already put in place shortly after the first pre-independence elections in 1957:
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Mali is a clear case where the establishment of a potentially salient territorial cleavage
failed completely.
The legitimacy of traditional chiefs was weaker in advance of the first pre-independence
elections than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana because of the even more intrusive way the
French administration in the French Sudan transformed chiefly institutions to suit their
system of indirect rule. Additionally, the lack of an established bourgeoise intelligentsia as
in Ghana precluded the establishment of a moderate center-periphery coalition in Mali (cf.
Bebler, 1973, 105f.). Accordingly, the initial electoral gains of the peripheral-side in Mali,
embodied in the person of Fily Dabo Sissoko and the PPS, were rather owed to the exclusive
suffrage than to the viability of the party itself. The first pre-independence elections
with universal suffrage demonstrated the predominance of the center-side of the territorial
cleavage, embodied in Modibo Keita and the US-RDA. The party was predominant both in
the broadness of its socio-structural base, the formation of a collective identity and coherent
ideology, as well as the organizational penetration of the country. After that, Modibo
Keita and the US-RDA, effectively destroyed the already weak peripheral opposition by
the deliberate altering of the electoral rules, the co-optation of the PPS and its leadership,
until its final physical elimination. Consequently, the military regime of Moussa Traoré,
which replaced the US-RDA one-party regime, embarked on a political vacuum and could
not ally itself with an organized opposition. As it lacked any socio-structural foundation or
collective identity itself, it rather continued the platform and organizational shell of the US-
RDA in a more moderate and pragmatic fashion, which it transformed later into civilian-
military rule under Moussa Trouré’s newly established one-party vehicle, the UDPM.
Hence, there was no chance that any traces of the already weak peripheral side could
survive the almost three decades of authoritarian rule that were to follow until the be-
ginning of the third wave in Mali. Yet, the 23 years of Moussa Traoré’s regime also left
no legacy of the center side of the territorial cleavage for third wave parties to effectively
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rely on. The reasons for this are fourfold: First, almost 6 years of unopposed dominance
of the center-side of the cleavage and another 23 years of unopposed pragmatic continua-
tion through moderated replication of its platform and organizational structure by Moussa
Traoré’s military junta led to the blurring of its own contours. Second, Moussa Traoré
made sure that former strong men of the US-RDA had no chance of re-entering Malian
politics. Third, Moussa Traoré was rather a pragmatic power broker than a fervent ide-
ologist as Modibo Keita. Hence, he had no problems to revert Keita’s legacy of socialism
as soon as changes of the domestic and international economic environment during the
1980s rendered it necessary. Lastly, while Moussa Traoré’s skilled balancing of internal
competition in the CMLN/UDPM secured his own political survival for 23 years, it also
ensured that he left no political heirs and political legacies for the parties of the third
wave to rely on. Hence, the political vacuum Mali embarked on in 1991 was total. The
forces that had to build up a new party system in 1991 were several weakly structured
voluntary associations and ad-hoc groupings, which had as their only political common
denominator the dissatisfaction with the Traoré regime and the introduction of multiparty
democracy but lacked a broad socio-structural foundation, coherent collective identity or
organizational form.
Renaissances of Pre-Third Wave Party Competition and Authoritarian Back-
lashes in Ghana
One year after the fraudulent 1964 plebiscite, which installed Kwame Nkrumah’s Con-
vention People’s Party (CPP) as the sole legal party, the long-time important opposition
figure Joseph Boakye Danquah died in prison (Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 91). With Danquah
dead, Kofi A. Busia in exile, and most former UP leaders in jail, the CPP was not only
legally but also practically the sole political party in the country. Lacking any oppositional
threat, factionalism inside the CPP started to thrive during the first half of the 1960s.
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As Nkrumah started to implement his socialist and pan-africanist ideas into practice this
stirred up resistance among more moderate elements of the party, most notably Minister of
Finance, Komla Gbedemah, one of the founding members of the CPP. Ruling increasingly
authoritarian and mostly by decree, Nkrumah sacked Gbedemah, who subsequently went
into exile. The fate of Gbedemah was exemplary of Nkrumah’s move to exchange older
elements of the CPP leadership with younger personell who would not question his actions
(Austin, 1964, 402–408; Boahen, 1975, 206–210 ; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 128f.).
In 1963, Nkrumah drew up a seven year development plan, which was supposed to
realize quick industrialization and agricultural revolution by means of active state control.
The government started to rigidly control imports and distribution of goods in the country.
While these developments yielded some noteworthy results as the completion of the Volta
Dam, it generally proved to have disastrous consequences for the country’s economy over-
all. By the end of 1964, the country experienced shortage in basic commodities and the
overhasty industrialization failed leading to virtual state bankruptcy. In sum, Nkrumah’s
concrete socialist policies and authoritarian rule not only led to increasing factionalism
inside his leadership, but to wide unpopularity of his rule and disillusionment among most
Ghanaians (Boahen, 1975, 210–219).
Most dangerous to Nkrumah’s regime, however, was the growing discontent among
the police and the armed forces. Nkrumah started to expand the presidential guard to
the detriment of the regular security forces, which considered themselves increasingly ill-
equipped and feared to be eventually completely replaced by the presidential guard. The
announced dismissal of two of the most senior officers and Nkrumah’s intention to send
Ghanaian troops into the settler oligarchy of Rhodesia triggered Major Afrifa and General
Kotoka’s decision to stage a coup. The timing for a coup was good, not only because
of Nkrumah’s increasing domestic isolation, but also because he became increasingly un-
popular among newly independent African governments, and both Britain and the United
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States. The former did not appreciate the ruthless and increasingly egomaniac way he tried
to achieve African unity. The latter were alienated because of his increasingly unbalanced
pro-communist foreign policy. Major Afrifa and General Kotoka declared the successful
coup on February 24, 1966 while Nkrumah was out of the country. The government was
dissolved, the CPP declared illegal and all political prisoners released. The National Lib-
eration Council (NLC), mostly staffed with personnel from the police and the army, was
established as interim governing body of Ghana. The NLC made great efforts in promoting
national reconciliation, restoring the Ghanaian economy according to IMF standards and
reinvigorate diplomatic relations with the West. Yet, counter-coup threats and increasing
unpopularity of the introduced austerity measures convinced the NLC to not hold on to
political power and to prepare the draft of a new constitution and return to civilian rule.
The general ban of political parties was lifted and elections scheduled for August 29, 1969
(Bebler, 1973, 33–43; Boahen, 1975, 219–235).
Clearly, sympathies of the NLC relied with the conservative tradition of the Danquah-
Busia opposition, which was embodied in the United Party (UP) before the CPP was
made sole legal party in 1964. After the NLC’s coup in 1966, Kofi A. Busia was allowed to
return from his exile and made national chairman of the newly inaugurated Center for Civil
Education, which intended to re-strengthen popular morale through traditional christian
values. He was an important member of the Constituent Assembly, which prepared the
new constitution and made sure that de-stooled chiefs were reinstalled and advisory and
consultative powers of chiefs extended in a new national House of Chiefs. During that time,
he prepared the foundation of a new party, the Progress Party (PP). The party was mostly
organized by previous members of the UP. The PP rallied on the fact that its leader Busia
was all along a fervent opponent of Nkrumah, i.e. the candidate who would be the most
credible conversion of the disasters of the last years of Nkrumah’s rule, and on the greater
experience and higher eduction and status of the PP’s candidates in opposition to the
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other parties. The PP candidate field clearly echoed the Danquah-Busia party tradition,
the UGCC, GCP, NLM and UP, before the first abolishment of multiparty competition in
1964 (Bebler, 1973, 40–43, 105; Boahen, 1975, 230, 235–238; Jones, 1976, 288; Awoonor,
1990, 213–215, 218; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 68f., 212; cf. Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).
Although a political decree forbid pro-Nkrumahist parties, and any associated symbols
or names, former CPP ministers, most notably Gbedemah, founded new political parties
that were regarded as heirs of the CPP legacy. Gbedemah’s National Alliance of Liberals
(NAL) was the most important and best organized among them. The opponent PP’s
rhetoric made sure that Gbedemah and the NAL would be identified with the tyranny of
the last years of Nkrumah’s rule. Radical former CPP supporters, in turn, abstained from
voting because the NAL and Gbedemah were associated with the moderate wing of the
CPP. And the NAL was also certainly hurt by the fact that it was not allowed to make
use of any CPP symbols. These factors contributed to the defeat of the NAL with 29 seats
in the National Assembly of the Second Republic vis-à-vis 105 seats for the winning PP.
Busia, as the leader of the PP, became Prime Minister (Bebler, 1973, 52f.; Boahen, 1975,
235–238, Awoonor, 1990, 219f.; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011) (cf. with party system
structuring map in figure 20).
Likewise to the 1954, the 1956, and also the 1960 elections, the Danquah-Busia tradition
embodied in the PP, was most successful among the regions who considered themselves
to belong to the peripheral regions of Ghana, most notably the Akan regions, among
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them Ashanti, and the northern regions. In opposition to previous elections, however, the
CPP and Nkrumah-heir, the NAL, did not manage to effectively cross-cut ethnic cleavages
anymore and was most successful in the Volta region, where the Ewe are predominant, the
ethnic group to which Gbedemah belonged. Hence, for the first time in Ghana’s electoral
history, the two sides of the territorial cleavage could each be associated with one big
ethnic group. Interestingly, during Nkrumah’s CPP regime, Ewe and Akan were rather
allied with each other in peripheral opposition to the CPP, which was echoed in the ethnic
background of the two 1966 military coup plotters Afrifa, who was from an Ashanti region,
and Kotoka, an Ewe. However, the 1967 death of Kotoka in an attempted counter-coup
by Akan junior officers, and the subsequent castling of the NLC military leadership in
favor of Afrifa brought the two ethnic groups in opposition to each other. Nonetheless,
neither the PP nor the NAL could rely solely on either Akan or Ewe support, because the
northern regions and the Ga-dominated Greater Accra regions were still necessary to win
the elections (Bebler, 1973, 54f.; Boahen, 1975, 238–240, Awoonor, 1990, 219f.; Daddieh
and Bob-Milliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 107f.).
After the elections the junta stepped down. The National Assembly and the House of
Chiefs voted Edward Akufo-Addo for president with ceremonial functions. The person of
Akufo-Addo was also exemplary of the new order. He was of Akan and royal background, a
member of the conservative intelligentsia that founded the United Gold Coast Convention
(UGCC) and an anti-Nkrumah candidate in the 1951, 1954 and 1956 elections. Ethnic
representation in Busia’s cabinet was exclusionist insofar as none of the 19 ministers was
of Ewe origin. A majority of senior Ewe officers and Ewe public servants were dismissed
from the army and the civil service. Northerners and Ga were represented besides the
Akan majority, though (Bebler, 1973, 55; Awoonor, 1990, 220; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 32;
Osei, 2012, 108).
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Under Busia’s democratic regime, Ghana’s massive economic problems continued. They
eventually triggered the second military coup, on January 13, 1972, led by Col. Ignatius
Kutu Acheampong, while Busia was in London for medical treatment. The new military
body that would rule the country was named National Redemption Council (NRC) (later
Supreme Military Council, SMC). Despite Acheampong’s Ashanti background, the new
ruling body initially reversed most of Busia’s capitalist policies and adopted some flavor
of Nkrumahist rhetoric and policy. Amongst others, the NRC unilaterally repudiated
international debts, reactivated state farms, a nation-wide food production program, and
strengthened ties with the Eastern Bloc. They rehabilitated Nkrumah to some degree
by repatriating Nkrumah’s body after he died in Romania from cancer. Nonetheless,
Acheampong was neither too accommodating to the Busia-Danquah nor the Nkrumah
political camp, and propagated no-party government in 1977 (Bebler, 1973, 55–63; Jones,
1976, 289f.; Awoonor, 1990, 224–231; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011).
Soon however, economic problems and rampant corruption flared up again, and Acheam-
pong’s governing style became increasingly dictatorial. Accordingly, in 1978, a palace coup
was staged, and General Fred Akuffo became the new Head of State. General public pres-
sure and looming threats from junior officers who felt neglected by their corrupt seniors
in the NRC/SMC forced Akuffo to legalize political parties, return to civilian rule and
general elections for June 18, 1979. Yet, in full preparation of the elections for the Third
Republic, junior officers around Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, who formed the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) disposed General Akuffo, anyway, in an alleged ef-
fort to clean the military of the corrupt leaders of the 1966 and 1972 military regimes. The
“housecleaning” was brutal indeed, as the AFRC executed many former military leaders,
among them Akuffo himself and Acheampong of the SMC, as well as the 1966 coup leader
Afrifa who formed the NLC. Despite general popular consent with the punishment of the
old guards, Rawlings and the AFRC knew that it was difficult to have civilian support for
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another military regime, and they did not suspend the planned elections and the return
to civilian rule (Jeffries, 1980, 397f.; Awoonor, 1990, 229–239, Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 18, 24,
32; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 109).
The constitution for the third republic resembled the U.S. constitution as it envisioned
an executive president, an elected parliament and an advisory council of state. Some
restrictions on the formation of political parties remained in place. Amongst others, no
party was allowed to use symbols and names of parties that competed in former Ghanaian
elections, i.e. most notably the CPP and the last embodiment of the Danquah-Busia
party tradition, the PP. Nonetheless, the two parties that stood out in the elections both
rather explicitly referred to their historic legacy of belonging to one of the two sides of the
historical, territorial cleavage (Awoonor, 1990, 239–241; Jeffries, 1980, 398; Owusu-Ansah,
2005, 187f.).
The Nkrumahist People’s National Party (PNP) ported Hilla Limann, a rather un-
known politician, former member of the CPP and nephew of Imoru Egala. Egala was the
former foreign minister in the Nkrumah government and barred to stand for presidency as
the PNP candidate because he was found guilty of using his office for private gain during
the Nkrumah area. Egala held the CPP network together since the 1966 coup and made it
available to the organization of the PNP and the presidential bid of his nephew Limann.
The PNP explicitly referred to its Nkrumahist heritage, was clearly leftist and socialist in
its outlook, and inherited the CPP-image of being in touch with ordinary people (Awoonor,
1990, 240–241; Jeffries, 1980, 399, 408; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Owusu-Ansah, 2005,
160, 187f.; cf. Osei, 2012, 109).
The Danquah-Busia conservative party tradition was embodied in the Popular Front
Party (PFP) and the presidential candidacy of Victor Owusu. As a successful lawyer, one
of the founders of Busia’s Progress Party and minister in the Busia government he was the
logical choice. Of Ashanti origin himself and being one of the most outspoken agitators
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of the Ewe-exclusionist policies of the former Busia government, it was difficult for the
PFP not to be associated with the Ashanti-Akan bias of the former PP. The PFP mainly
portrayed itself as democracy-promoting force and pro-Western, which it claimed would
bring Ghana much needed Western assistance and revive the economy (Awoonor, 1990,
240; Jeffries, 1980, 399, 409f.; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 204f.; Osei, 2012, 109) (cf. with party
system structuring map in figure 21).
The elections resulted in a narrow absolute majority for the Nkrumahist PNP, 71 of
140 National Assembly seats, and only 42 seats for the conservative PFP, most of them
in the Ashanti region. Amongst others, the conservative PFP did not win a single seat
in the Ewe-dominated Volta region. Clearly, the PFP was hurt by the anti-Ewe image of
its presidential candidate Owusu and the PFP leadership’s general reluctance to ally itself
with Ewe-elements who did not want to associate itself with Limann’s PNP. With Limann
having a northerner background, the PNP, in turn, proved to be a truly national party as
it won seats in every single region, even Ashanti, and managed to cross-cut ethnopolitical
cleavages. It rather followed the cross-cutting appeal of Nkrumah’s CPP than the rather
tribalist elections result of its immediate forerunner in the 1969 elections, the NAL (see
above) (Jeffries, 1980, 399f, 401–405, 410f.; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 160).
On September 24, 1979, Rawlings handed over power to Limann and ordered his men
to return to the barracks. The Limann government did neither manage to stop the eco-
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nomic downward spiral that plagued Ghana since almost two decades nor did it combat
rampant corruption inside the government. Accordingly, Rawlings staged his second coup
on December 31, 1981. He suspended the constitution, banned political parties and de-
clared a revolution of the people and the common man and a war against the abuses of
authority. Rawlings’ newly found Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) took over
government with Rawlings as chairman. Similar to the CPP and Nkrumah, Rawlings and
the PNDC tried to anchor their movement in grass-roots structures and established the
People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) and Workers’ Defense Committees (WDCs). Like
its forerunner AFRC, the PNDC was mainly constituted of junior military officers. Yet,
the PNDC did also include civilians and had the support of socialist elements in the soci-
ety, workers and the youth. Effectively not aligned with any of the two party traditions,
the PNDC became a new force in Ghana politics. Nonetheless, the organizational style,
charisma of Rawlings and initial revolutionary rhetoric of the PNDC was certainly more
in tune with the progressive Nkrumahist tradition than the conservative Danquah-Busia
tradition. This Nkrumahist flavor foreshadowed the effective co-optation of Nkrumahist
rhetoric to the disadvantage of the ‘real’ Nkrumahists and CPP-heirs in the advent of the
founding third wave elections in 1992 (see further below). Until then, and rather ironically
however, the devastating economic situation of Ghana forced Rawlings and the PNDC to
soon turn for help to the IMF and the Worldbank in opposition to the intended potentially
helpful alliance with the Eastern Bloc. In return for economic bailout, the PNDC gov-
ernment had to initiate painful economic reforms that stood in opposition to the PNDC’s
rather socialist outlook (Awoonor, 1990, 242–250; Jonah, 1998; Fleischhacker, 2010, 106–
108; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 124; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 109f.).
The austerity measures hurt the rather urban following of the PNDC and strained the
initial alliance. In reaction to that, the PNDC tried to widen its support basis among ru-
ral groups, which benefitted to some degree from the implemented structural adjustment
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measures. By the end of the 1980s, the authoritarianism of the PNDC eventually led to
an unusual pro-democracy alliance of both protagonists from the Danquah-Busia tradition
and the Nkrumahist tradition as well as trade unions and the Ghanaian student union.
These pressures together with the changing international and regional environment let the
Rawlings government realize that political liberalization was inevitable. In an attempt to
control change from above, Rawlings set up a National Commission for Democracy, which
envisioned the re-introduction of multiparty democracy. The ban on parties was lifted and
general elections scheduled for November and December 1992, i.e. the founding elections of
the third wave in Ghana (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 334–337; Bratton and van de Walle,
1997, 138; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011, Osei, 2012, 110f.).
In sum, I can safely conclude that Ghana’s territorial cleavage was more than medium
established by the beginning of the third wave. There are several reasons for that. First,
Ghana experienced three pre-independence elections. This routinized electoral competition
among the political elites and the voters and helped to establish the territorial cleavage
before the country even became independent. Second, Nkrumah and the CPP’s fully au-
thoritarian regime only lasted for two years, between 1964 and 1966, which was to short
a time to eradicate the conservative Danquah-Busia center-periphery alliance. Third, the
first military coup, which ousted Nkrumah and the CPP in 1966, was associated with Bu-
sia’s conservative opposition and quickly re-introduced civilian rule and multiparty elec-
tions, which allowed another electoral competition between the two sides of the territorial
cleavage, the conservative center-periphery alliance side and the progressive center side,
associated with Nkrumah’s heritage. Both the 1966 coup and the 1969 election for the first
time brought the Danquah-Busia side of the territorial cleavage into power and strength-
ened the relevance of this side for the future of political competition in Ghana. Forth,
the second military coup in 1972 brought military forces into power that loosely followed
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the progressive policies of Nkrumah and rehabilitated his political heritage to some degree
after the disastrous last year of Nkrumah’s rule. And, like their 1966 military antecessors,
their reign was anyway rather too brief to effectively eradicate the heritage of both sides
of the cleavage. Fifth, the enforced return to civilian rule in 1979 again brought parties
in opposition to each other which both capitalized on one of the two sides of the historic
territorial cleavage. Finally, although the authoritarian Rawlings decade, which started
with the military coup on 1981, brought a third force into the game, which was not asso-
ciated with either of the two traditions, it neither destroyed the heritage nor completely
eliminated the heirs of the two traditions. Rather Rawlings and the PNDC co-opted, to
some degree the rhetoric, and the leftist and progressive heritage of Nkrumahist parties.
Hence, no authoritarian force in Ghana managed to be in power long enough to disrupt
the historic territorial cleavage and its organizational expressions long enough to effectively
eradicate its appeal and organizational network for future parties to rely on. The two pre-
third wave elections after the second critical juncture and the heritage of rhetoric and
policies, on which the three different military regimes relied themselves on, allowed the
survival of the rhetorical and organizational legacy of the territorial cleavage to make it a
viable basis for third wave parties to rely on (see below).
Regarding ethnopolitical cleavages between the second critical juncture and the begin-
ning of the third wave, the Akan bias, which strengthened the peripheral forces inside the
conservative Danquah-Busia tradition, intensified after the Nkrumah era. The strong pro-
Akan and anti-Ewe bias of the Busia government of 1969 on the one hand strengthened
the viability of the Danquah-Busia tradition, but on the other hand made it strongly un-
popular among the initially allied Ewe and foreclosed the potential of future cross-cutting
alliances. The Nkrumahist party tradition, by contrast, only had an ethnopolitical bias in
the 1969 elections as it almost exclusively relied on Ewe support, but managed later to
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reinvigorate the ethnopolitically cross-cutting heritage of the Nkrumah years (cf. figures
20 and 21).
Degree of Center-Periphery Cleavage Structuring in Third Wave Party Com-
petition
Botswana
The electoral cycle was never interrupted in Botswana since the first pre-independence
election in 1965. Nonetheless, Botswana’s elections since 1989 take place in an international
context that promotes democracy more credibly than before, i.e. the authoritarian option
would become much more difficult to obtain in case the dominant BDP would lose an
election one day.
In general, the Botswana party competition pattern during third wave elections con-
tinues the developments that cumulated in the last pre-third wave elections of 1984. The
dominant BDP continues to embody the legacy of the conservative peripheral side of the
territorial cleavage, although it is at times a hard task for the governing party to balance
that image with its position as a longtime incumbent of a relatively strongly centralized
government. The BNF, in turn, consolidated its position as the runner-up opposition
party. The party is an offspring of the progressive center side of the territorial cleavage,
but opportunistically allied itself with alienated peripheral forces between 1969 and 1984.
In the 1984 elections, the BNF finally managed to become more successful in urban
areas and and started to liberate itself from its paradoxical electoral dependence on tra-
ditional chiefs that were alienated from the dominant BDP. This opportunistic alliance
with peripheral forces stood in contrast to the BNF’s ideological identity and original
socio-structural foundation as the party of the progressive center of the territorial cleavage
(Charlton, 1993, 334f.; Wiseman, 1998, 258). In the 1989 elections, the BNF continued its
urbanization trend and reached a vote share of almost 27 percent. This was the highest
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vote share an opposition party ever reached in Botswana’s political history at that time.
And it led to the weakest result for the BDP since its foundation, although the BDP
still retained a comfortable absolute majority. Furthermore, the BNF contested almost
every constituency, hence it achieved a national stature, which was so far unprecedented
for opposition parties in Botswana. The BNF reinvigorated its egalitarian rhetoric and
promised to deliver more social justice than the BDP. The party strengthened its urban
support basis, and won two Gaborone seats. In sum, the party gained in ideological and
socio-structural cohesiveness as well as in vote share. And although the result did not look
good on the seat share side due the defections from the traditional elements of the BNF
in advent of the 1989 elections, the party nonetheless managed to hold a considerable vote
share in these districts. Obviously, the accumulated symbolic and ideological capital since
1969, made the party immune to large defections on the supporter side despite defections
of their leaders, even in its more rural strongholds. In sum, while the seat share of the
runner-up in Botswana, was below the average of other African dominant party systems at
the beginning of the third wave, the actual vote share was was almost double the average.
Hence, while the combination of first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies with
a dominant party of nation-wide and cross-regional appeal resulted in an overall low seat
share for the BNF, the vote share of 1989 indicated potential for future elections (Charlton,
1993, 346f., 350f.; Nunley, 2009).
Finalizing the trend of previous elections, by 1994, the runner-up BNF became dom-
inant in the urban and semi-urban areas. The increasing urbanization of Botswana was
adjusted by the reconfiguration of the urban constituency size, and amongst others, led to
unprecedented seat gains for the BNF. The elections resulted in 13 seats for the BNF and
27 for the BDP. For the first time, not only the vote share, but also the seat share of the
runner up in Botswana was double the average of other African dominant party systems.
The socio-structural core of the growing BNF support came from the urban working class,
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which grew heavily in recent years before the 1994 elections, and was dissatisfied with
its relative poverty in relation to the urban elite. Further support came from the urban
unemployed, mostly labour migrants from rural areas. Hence, because the BNF amended
its progressive-centrist identity with socialism between its foundation and the beginning of
the 1990s and afterwards with social democracy, it could reap the “delayed” growth of the
corresponding socio-structural groups (Wiseman, 1998, 256–258; Emminghaus, 2003, 146;
Morton, Ramsey and Mgadla, 2008, 181, 247).
Although the BNF’s chances for defeating the BDP and ending the dominant party
system looked as good as never before in the 1999 elections, the BNF started to disin-
tegrate in advent of the elections. After BDP president Masire retired in 1998, fellow
Bangwato tribesmen of the BNF-leader, Koma, regained the leadership of the dominant
BDP. This fueled old allegations among the BNF leadership that Koma secretly intends to
be co-opted by the BDP due to his tribal linkages. The history of opportunistic inclusion
of disgruntled chiefs by Koma into the BNF between 1969 and 1984, which blurred the
original collective identity and socio-structural foundation of the BNF, started to backfire
on the cohesiveness of the party. It supported the allegations that Koma is a disguised
tribalist in the clothes of a progressive centralist and social democrat. In April 1998, after
failed attempts to dispose Koma from the BNF leadership, members of the BNF central
committee broke away and founded a new party, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP).
Five BNF members of parliament defected to the BCP. In advent of the elections, the
BCP tried to ideologically position itself in the center between the left, BNF, and the
right, BDP. Nonetheless, it basically tried to mobilize the same voter segments as the
BNF, i.e. the poor and unemployed. In rural areas, it tried to mobilize the non-Tswana
speaking minorities. In this last respect, it proved to be a viable alternative to the BNF,
which had a rather diffuse profile regarding the rights of non-Tswana minorities. In sum,
the birth of the BCP prohibited a BNF triumph in 1999 and helped the BDP to regain
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Figure 22: Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in
Botswana 1999 and 2004
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strength in comparison with the 1994 elections. While the vote share of the BNF and the
BCP resulted in a combined, respectable, 37 percent, the seat share of the runner-up BNF
dropped to the African dominant party system average of 15 percent while the BCP only
managed to win one seat in parliament. After the defeat, some BCP members returned to
the BNF. Hence, the BNF managed to retain its position as the runner-up in Botswana’s
dominant party system, albeit on a much lower level than in 1994. The BDP’s dominant
position, in turn, was back into more safe waters again (Wiseman, 1998, 258–260; Em-
minghaus, 2003, 146f., 152f.; Makgala, 2005, 305–314; Morton, Ramsey and Mgadla, 2008,
77f.; Nunley, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 257f.).
Factionalism and allegations of co-optation by the BDP continued in the BNF after
the 1999 elections and led to the suspension of Koma and the old, socialist guards of the
party. The reformers inside the BNF took over, managed to keep the party together and
emphasized the more recent social democratic identity of the party. The party’s position
as the runner-up in Botswana’s dominant party system, its ideological identity, symbolic
capital, and support pattern was too well established as to be hurt too much by the loss
of its long-time leader, and experience another electoral depression after 1999. It regained
in strength, an increased its seat share from 15 to 21 percent in 2004 (Makgala, 2005,
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316–322; Nunley, 2009, Fleischhacker, 2010, 205f) (cf. with party system structuring map
in figure 22).
In sum, although Botswana never experienced any disruption of its multiparty electoral
regime after independence, conducted five sufficiently fair pre-third wave elections, and has
one of the oldest runner-up parties in African dominant party systems, the runner-up op-
position party, BNF, only managed to remain partially cohesive after impressive electoral
gains in 1994. Problems of internal cohesiveness were largely owed to the blurring of its
identity and socio-structural foundation due to the pre-third wave alliance of Koma with
disgruntled traditional chiefs, which defected from the BDP. Together with allegations of
potential co-optation of Koma by the BDP, the history of Koma’s proven opportunistic
tribalism gave the younger reformers inside the party arguments to revolt against Koma
and the old guards. This resulted in the break-away of members, the formation of the
BCP, and electoral backslide in 1999. Nonetheless, the 2004 elections, after the break-
away of Koma from the party, demonstrated the organizational persistence of the BNF as
the long-time runner-up in Botswana’s dominant party system.
Lesotho
The founding third wave elections in Lesotho in 1993 demonstrated the survival and via-
bility of both the BNP and the BCP as political parties and organizational units, which
each embodied one side of the historic territorial cleavage. This can be ascribed to the
unusual character of the authoritarian regime in Lesotho. Until the advent of the third
wave, neither party was ever constitutionally forbidden, nor was a de jure single party
state ever established. Accordingly, both parties competed in the first multiparty elections
and were either associated again with pro-chieftaincy, as in the case of the BNP, or anti-
chieftaincy, as in the case of the BCP. The BCP adjusted its ideological profile to the new
world order, and strongly attenuated its radicalism of old times in favor of more neoliberal
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rhetoric. The party mostly rallied on its historic role in achieving independence, the fact
that its electoral victory of 1970 was stolen by the authoritarian BNP and by the charisma
of the BCP’s long-time leader, Ntsu Mokhehle (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43; Rosenberg,
Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 29f.).
Although the BNP was still generally identified as the lesser chiefs’ party after 1993,
its policies, increasingly centralizing governing style after 1965 as well as the collaboration
with the King and senior chiefs after the 1970 coup proved otherwise and largely hurt its
popularity among the rural, Roman catholic population. Furthermore, in opposition to the
BCP, the BNP lacked leadership continuation. The more militant figures of the BNP were
expelled from the party in the 1986 military coup. And longterm BNP-leader Jonathan
died of natural causes in 1987. Rather ironically, the leader of the same coup, Justin
Lekhanya, became the new BNP-deputy under the newly reconstituted party in 1991. The
selection of the new BNP leader was problematic as well. Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana was a
highly controversial figure among BNP members because of allegations of corruption while
being minister in Jonathan’s government and political opportunism during the 1986 coup.
This factors together with the authoritarian history of the party proved to be a heavy
burden for the founding elections (interviews with political experts and chiefs in Lesotho,
2010; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 19f.,
130f., 371f.; Southall, 1994, 113).
Not very surprisingly, the BCP scored a big win and won almost 75 percent of the
vote in opposition to 22 percent for the BNP. The BNP lost almost half of its vote share
in comparison with the 1965 and 1970 elections. The blurring of its identity during its
authoritarian rule and the leadership discontinuation obviously hurt the party. While
the vote share of the runner-up BNP was still above the average of runner-up parties in
other African dominant party systems, the party did not manage to win a single seat in
parliament due to the majoritarian FPTP electoral system and unfavorable spreading of
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its voters (Southall, 1994, 115; Nunley, 2009). Soon after the 1993 elections, the BCP
government around its prime minister Mokhehle was deposed by an opportunistic alliance
of the BNP, the military and King Letsie III. The King issued a decree to dissolve the
BCP government, reinstate his father, Moeshoeshoe II, and install an interim government
under BNP-associated elements, among them the new BNP-leader Sekhonyana. Hence, the
first electoral cycle of the third wave was already disrupted. Only combined international
pressure from the governments of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa managed to force
Letsie III to reinstall the BCP government (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43–45; Rosenberg,
Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 20).
After re-installation of the BCP, the growing age of Mokhehle fueled looming faction-
alism in the BCP. When Mokhehle’s former colleagues threatened to oust Mokhehle from
the party leadership, Mokhehle founded the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and
took away the majority of BCP parliamentarians as well as the party colors from the old
BCP. The LCD co-opted the collective identity and organizational structure of the BCP as
well, and practically left behind the old party as an empty shell. Still having the absolute
majority in parliament, Mokhehle remained prime minister and his cabinet stayed intact.
In advent of the 1998 elections, Mokhehle’s health deteriorated and Pakalitha Mosisili be-
came the new party leader (Southall and Fox, 1999, 675f., 692; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and
Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 30f., 164–166).
Meanwhile, the BNP associated itself with BCP-leftovers that inhabited the old BCP-
shell as well as with the old, royalist MFP in order to protest the apparent change of party
membership by the prime minister and most of the former BCP parliamentarians and party
members. The opportunistic go-together with the BNP’s erstwhile ideological antagonists
did not help to restore the BNP’s damaged identity and organizational cohesiveness, which
was also tainted by its opportunistic alliance with Letsie III in the events around the short-
lived coup after the 1993 elections. Under these confusing circumstances, the voters opted
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for the incumbent party LCD, the party that was effectively the same old/new BCP with
just another name, but the most close ties to the legacy of the charismatic Mokhehle,
and the legacy of the old BCP. While the LCD lost some of its vote share in comparison
with the vote share it attained as the old BCP in 1993, the opposition parties did not
coordinate their electoral bid. The BNP experienced another electoral disaster, and won
only one seat in parliament despite a vote share of 24 percent. The BCP-remainder only
managed to obtain 10 percent of the votes and no seat in parliament. The elections were
considered sufficiently free, and it was rather the majoritarian FPTP electoral system in
combination with the unfavorable scattering of the opposition vote, which accounted for the
weak opposition result. Nonetheless, the BNP leader Sekhonyana claimed electoral fraud
and the opposition started to demonstrate in Maseru while BNP-associated junior ranks
of the Lesotho Defense Forces (LDF) started a mutiny against their senior officers because
they believed them to have sold out to the LCD. Lesotho became ungovernable again,
and the new LCD prime minister, Mosisili, had to ask the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) for help. South African and Botswanan troops ended the mutiny and
the LCD remained in power. However, the more inclusive mixed member proportional
was installed for the next elections (Southall and Fox, 1999; Elklit, 2002; Southall, 2003;
Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxxii, 20, 31, 96, 165f., 364f.; Nunley,
2009).
In 1999, the very man that staged the military coup against the BNP and Jonathan in
1986, Lekhanya, succeeded Sekhonyana as BNP leader. This alienated many old guards of
the BNP, which already found it difficult to come to terms with Sekhonyana as their leader.
They stopped to support the BNP, and the party deteriorated further regarding party
cohesiveness. Lekhanya exchanged important party figures, and inserted fellow military
colleagues into the party. Although the party did not disintegrate fully, it certainly did
not became a stronger competitor for the governing LCD by that. Accordingly, the vote
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Figure 23: Blurring and fractionalization of the historic territorial cleavage during the third











share of the runner-up BNP did not improve in the 2002 elections. However, the party
won 21 seats of the one third of the 120 parliamentary seats that was allocated through
proportional representation. Hence, the BNP reached a seat share of 17.5 percent vis-à-vis
the comfortable 64 percent of the dominant LCD. This was slightly above the runner-up
seat share in other African dominant party systems (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-
Fulton, 2004, 20f., 157f.; Southall, 2003, 284, 288–290). (cf. with party system structuring
map in figure 23).
After the 2002 elections, Lekhanya intensified his authoritarian leadership style in the
BNP, and the party started to become a one-man show that increasingly lacked ties to the
traditional BNP-heritage. Attempts to revitalize the party’s image by some BNP members
were prevented. Additionally, a split inside the dominant LCD in 2006 gave birth to a new
party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC), which became a serious rival both for the LCD
and the runner-up BNP. The charismatic minister Tom Thabane resigned from the LCD
government, and founded the new party. He managed to convince 17 LCD parliamentarians
and one independent to cross the floor to the ABC and forced the LCD prime minister
to dissolve the parliament and call for early elections. As an important minister under
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Figure 24: Blurring and fractionalization of the historic territorial cleavage during the third








Jonathan’s authoritarian BNP government, civil secretary to the Military Council after
the coup in 1986, political advisor to Mokhehle, and minister under Mosisili, he was a man
of both party traditions and was part of every government since 1970. Accordingly, he
managed to attract support from both sides of the historical cleavage. In the subsequent
early 2007 elections, the entry of the ABC hurt the disintegrating BNP more than it hurt
the LCD, which still had the advantage of incumbency to counter the electoral attack.
The BNP’s vote share dropped from 22 percent in 2002 to less than 7 percent in 2007
while the ABC became the new runner-up opposition party in Lesotho’s dominant party
system. With only three seats in parliament and further factionalization problems after
2007, the BNP ceased to play a significant role in Lesotho politics (Rosenber, Weisfelder
and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 387f.; interviews with political experts and former BNP militants
in Lesotho, 2010) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 24).
In sum, although the organizational embodiments of the two sides of the historic ter-
ritorial cleavage were present in Lesotho’s first third wave election, the two parties were
not able to alter the trend of increasingly blurred ideological identities and patterns of
disintegration that were already present during the pre-third wave phase. The BCP/LCD
side, which embodied the original progressive-centrist side of the territorial cleavage, had
the advantage to compete the founding third wave elections under its long-time, charis-
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matic leader, Mokhehle, and to be untainted by the corruption of the authoritarian BNP
government in the pre-third wave phase. In addition to its damaged identity after 23
year of authoritarianism, the BNP also lacked charismatic leadership after the death of
Jonathan and lost the founding third wave elections to the BCP. Clearly, in a context
of general organizational disintegration and damaged collective identities, the opposition
party is henceforth in a weaker position than the incumbent party, which has access to pa-
tronage in order to hold the party together. Hence, the BNP started its slow decline after
its electoral defeat in 1993, while the BCP/LCD managed to hold its absolute majority
together after its electoral triumph despite significant turmoils in advent of the subsequent
1998 and 2007 elections, which both signified looming cohesiveness problems as well.
Ghana
The first presidential elections of the third wave in Ghana were scheduled for November 3,
1992, the parliamentary elections for December 29, 1992 (subsequent third wave elections
in Ghana were held simultaneously). As in the 1979 elections, political parties were not
allowed to use names and symbols of parties that contested previous Ghanaian elections.
Nonetheless, as soon as the ban on political parties was lifted in the advent of the founding
elections, the unusual anti-Rawlings and pro-democracy alliance between the two dominant
party traditions came to its end and parties were formed again according to the structuring
logic of the historic territorial cleavage. While the Danquah-Busia side managed to hold
its tradition together in one cohesive political party organization, and formed the New
Patriotic Party (NPP), the Nkrumahist tradition splintered into different party offshoots,
the National Convention Party (NCP), the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), the National
Independence Party (NIP) and People’s National Convention (PNC). Rawlings’ PNDC
and the associated grass-roots committees transformed into a third force, the National
Democratic Congress (NDC), which co-opted Nkrumahist elements and supporters (Jeffries
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and Thomas, 1993, 338, 343; Nugent, 1995, 222–226; Jonah, 1998, 95; Boafo-Arthur, 2003,
219; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 300; Osei, 2012, 111).
The Danquah-Busiaist’s cohesion was stronger because it could rely on an ideologic
identity, which was still relevant after the end of the Cold War and more real than ever,
i.e. the promotion of Western liberal capitalism and the party’s pro-democracy stance
since the last years of the Nkrumah-era. The cohesion of the NPP’s leadership was strong
and rather immune to defections because of the mutual experience of political persecution
during the Rawlings era. The NPP explicitly referred to its Danquah-Busia heritage and
drew most of its leadership and support from Akan regions, former PP and PFP supporters,
as well as business people. In an effort to mitigate its Akan bias, the party decided on
Albert Adu Boahen, a retired university professor, to be the presidential candidate. Boahen
had family roots in both the Ashanti and the Eastern region. He was a prominent figure
in the pro-democracy movement against the PNDC and Rawlings and therefore a natural
choice for the founding third wave elections. (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 346; Nugent,
1995, 223f.; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 184; Ayee, 2008, 192).
The heirs of the Nkrumahist tradition were less cohesive and were handicapped both
by a somewhat outdated collective identity after the end of the Cold War, a generational
conflict between the old guards and the younger elements inside the tradition and the fact
that Rawlings and the PNDC successfully co-opted some of the Nkrumahists’ programmatic
heritage and a fraction of Nkrumahists itself during their 11 years of authoritarian rule.
Younger elements of the Nkrumahist opposition to Rawlings transformed the Nkrumahist
tradition into the People’s Heritage Party (PHP). The old guards of the CPP and the
Nkrumahist embodiments of the 1969 and 1979 elections, the NAL and the PNP, however,
soon formed the National Independence Party (NIP). Yet, the former president of the
third republic (1979–1981), Limann did not accept that he was not envisioned to be the
presidential candidate for the NIP. Consequently, he defected from the NIP and formed
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the third Nkrumahist party, the People’s National Convention (PNC), which guaranteed
his nomination, of course. The fourth Nkrumahist party that was formed in advent of 1992
election, the National Convention Party (NCP), was the very embodiment of the blurring
between the Nkrumahist parties and the PNDC. Some members of the NCP were close to
the PNDC and regarded Rawlings as a modern version of Nkrumah himself. (Jeffries and
Thomas, 1993, 343–345; Nugent, 1995, 220–229; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107f.)
The PNDC and the party to which it transformed after the lift of the political party ban,
the National Democratic Congress (NDC), had an inherent advantage as it controlled the
transition agenda. Amongst others, it used the intermediary period between the initiation
of the transition process until the final lift of the ban on political activity and the formation
of political parties, which was relatively closely scheduled in advent of the elections, to
already covertly campaign and use government resources under the pretext of conducting
normal government business. In advent of the 1992 elections, Rawlings made great efforts
to co-opt the Nkrumah heritage for himself and his new party, the NDC. Amongst others,
he inaugurated an Nkrumah mausoleum, and he convinced the Nkrumahist NCP, alongside
the grassroots supporter party of Rawlings, EGLE (Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere),
to form an electoral alliance with the NDC and support Rawlings’ presidential bid. The
NDC also adopted some of the Nkrumahist rhetoric and chants in rallies. Rawlings toured
the more rural parts of the country and denounced the intellectualism of most notably
the NPP, but also parts of the Nkrumahist heirs that did not ally themselves with the
NDC. In rather populist manner, Rawlings claimed that he would rule in the interest of
the common man (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 340, 347, 358; Nugent, 1995, 218, 229–232;
Elischer, 2013, 176) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 25).
The presidential elections of 1992 resulted in a clear victory for Rawlings with 58
percent of the votes. The overall result pattern did not deviate from the 1969 and 1979
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elections as it displayed an opposition support of 30 percent for the candidate who came
second in place, this time Boahen of the Danquah-Busiaist NPP. His runner-up vote share
is almost double the average of other founding third wave elections in African dominant
party systems and most certainly can be attributed to the historic support pattern and the
organizational cohesiveness of the Danquah-Busiaist tradition. Boahen was most successful
in the Ashanti region as well as among the urban middle-class, a pattern similar to the
Danquah-Busiaist NLM in the 1956 elections. The Nkrumahist parties, however, were
devastatingly defeated. The three Nkrumahist presidential candidates of the PNC, NIP
and PHP only reached a combined 11 percent of the total vote. The regional voting pattern
showed that they even lost in regions, which used to be Nkrumahist strongholds in the 1969
and 1979 elections, most notably the Volta region. Rather Rawlings’ disaggregated results
resembled the ethno-regionally cross-cutting appeal of previous Nkrumahist parties like the
PNP of 1979 and the CPP itself during the 1950s. Rawlings reached 50 percent or more in
all regions besides the Ashanti region and gained 93 percent support in the Volta region.
Rawlings was most successful among rural voters and the urban poor. Quite clearly,
the NDC’s co-optation of the Nkrumahist heritage and some of the Nkrumahist elites
and supporters worked in favor of Rawlings and the NDC in the context of factionalizing
Nkrumahist heirs (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 355–358; Nugent, 1995, 232–234; Nunley,
2009).
The opposition parties claimed fraud and boycotted the subsequent 1992 parliamentary
elections. It is difficult to verify their allegation. Certainly, the presidential elections were
not fair due to the skewed playing field in advent of the elections, but the polling day
itself was rather free. Occasional electoral fraud did happen in some polling stations,
but international observers did not witness systematic fraud and accepted the results. In
general, the literature on Ghana’s 1992 elections is undecided about the decisiveness of
electoral fraud for the final results (cf. Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, Nugent, 1995, 234–242;
242
Levitsky and Way, 2010, 302). Whatever the case may be, the parliamentary elections
were only contested by Rawlings’ NDC and its allied parties, the Nkrumahist NCP and
the EGLE-party. With 189 seats for the NDC, eight seats for the NCP, one seat for the
EGLE, and two independents, the parliament lacked any parliamentary opposition party
for the next four years and became practically a “rubber stamp” legislature (Nugent, 1995,
248f.; Nunley, 2009).
In an attempt to increase the international legitimacy of Ghana’s young electoral
democracy, the NDC government invested in the independence and capacity of the elec-
toral commission and the courts after 1992. Nonetheless, the playing field remained skewed
to some degree in favor of the the governing NDC in advent of the 1996 elections (Levit-
sky and Way, 2010, 303f.). The Nkrumahist parties – as a lesson of the 1992 disaster –
tried to unite their forces and the NIP and the PHP merged to become the PCP (People’s
Convention Party). However, they did not manage to convince the Nkrumahist PNC of
Limann of the necessity of unity. The new Nkrumahist PCP even supported the NPP’s
renewed presidential bid in acknowledgment of the Danquah-Busiaist NPP’s contemporary
superior opposition strength. The NPP was confident that it could win this time against
Rawlings and the NDC. The NPP explicitly drew its confidence from the fact that the
Danquah-Busia tradition managed to produce an electoral victory in 1969 and accom-
plished respectful runner-up results in the 1979 and the 1992 elections. This confidence
together with the organizational and ideological cohesiveness of the Danquah-Busia tra-
dition held both the party leadership and the rank and file together for another round of
elections and provided immunity against major defections and factionalizations after 1992.
The NDC, in turn, increasingly capitalized on the charisma of Rawlings himself and the
visibility of modernization projects and rural development throughout the country. The
NDC tried to create the same atmosphere of departure as the CPP did under the charis-
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matic Nkrumah in the early 1960s (Nugent, 1999, 291–304; Osei, 2012, 112f.) (cf. with
party system structuring map in figure 26).
The results of the 1996 presidential results practically echoed the 1992 results. Rawlings
won by 57 percent of the vote. The NPP came second again, but its candidate, John
Kufuor, managed to increase the vote share to 40 percent. In parliament, the NDC obtained
133 seats and the NPP 60 seats of the 200. This time, the opposition accepted the results.
In the subsequent 2000 elections, Rawlings was barred by the constitution to stand for
elections a third time, and his less-charismatic hand-picked successor, John Evans Atta
Mills, had a much harder task to compete against John Kufuor of the NPP. In most
narrow fashion, the NPP and John Kufuor won both the the presidential and parliamentary
election, and effectively ended the dominant party system of Ghana. The party system
materialized to become the two-party system it already resembled during the 1990s, and the
1969 and 1979 elections. Through the person of Atta Mills, Rawlings remained the NDC
strong man and managed to keep the party together despite the defeat in the 2000 elections
(cf. Nugent, 1999, 305–316). The 2004 and 2008 elections consolidated the Ghanaian two-
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Figure 27: Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in
Ghana 2000, 2004 and 2008
Center Center-Periphery
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party system, embodied in the NPP and the NDC. The NDC effectively established itself
as the third force in the political history of Ghana, thanks to the successful co-optation
of the Nkrumahist’ legacy, and the disintegration of the actual Nkrumahist heirs (cf. with
party system structuring map in figure 27).
In sum, the “more than medium establishment” of the historic territorial cleavage in
Ghana between independence and the advent of the third wave provided rich symbolic and
ideological capital, on which the runner-up opposition party, the Danquah-Busiaist NPP,
could rely in the context of a dominant governing party. It ensured both a stable support
basis and a cohesive party organization, which secured an over-average runner-up presi-
dential election result despite the skewed playing field and alleged electoral fraud. The
same factors prevented the disintegration of the opposition between the founding third
wave elections and the second third wave elections, and led to an even more impressive
runner-up result for the NPP. This cleared the way for turnover in the 2000 elections and
the end of the Ghanaian dominant party system. At the same time, the NDC acquired
enough symbolic and ideological capital itself due to the co-optation of some amount of
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the Nkrumahist heritage and the charisma of Rawlings, whose historical stature echoed the
one of Nkrumah. Hence, it managed to avoid disintegration after the loss of dominance,
which eventually led to the second turnover through the ballot in Ghana’s history in 2008
and the further institutionalization of Ghana’s two-party system.
Mali
The founding third wave elections of Mali in 1992 marked the end of almost 30 years
without minimally competitive multiparty-elections. The two parties that turned out to
be the most successful in the 1992 parliamentary elections were two former allies and
broad-based pro-democracy movements, which turned into political parties in advent of
the elections. The ADEMA (Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice) gained a
comfortable absolute majority with 65 percent seat share. The runner-up, the Congrès
National d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID), only gained 7 percent seat share, which is well
below the runner-up average in African dominant party systems (Vengroff, 1993, 544–549;
Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 12f., 252; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party
system structuring map in figure 28).
The ADEMA was rather a broad-based coalition of clandestine political grouping dur-
ing the Moussa Traoré regime than an established political party with historical roots. It
cooperated with student groups and unions in the pro-democracy demonstrations against
the Traoré regime. Its militants were teachers and health professionals. The party also
included some reformists from Moussa Traoré’s dissolved UDPM. The leader and founder
of the ADEMA, Alpha Oumar Konaré, won the presidential elections for the party two
months after the parliamentary elections. The former archeology professor was for a brief
period minister of youth, arts and culture in Moussa Traoré’s regime, but resigned soon
after a dispute with Moussa Traoré. The success of the party was mostly owed to the
superior communications network it could establish through its well-educated teacher and
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health professionals that were deployed throughout the country. And the party rather prof-
ited from the charisma of its leader and the role that it played during the pro-democracy
demonstrations. An established collective identity or identifiable socio-structural founda-
tion was largely absent (Vengroff, 1993, 546; Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato,
2008, 12f., 180–183, van Vliet, 2013).
The runner-up in the 1992 elections, the CNID, had a more narrow support base, which
largely consisted of urban students. The party lacked the ADEMA’s country-wide network,
and was only successful in cities and its leader Mountaga Tall’s home area around Ségou.
Mountaga Tall, a lawyer, was relatively young and lacked ties to any of the pre-third
wave parties. After the elections, the party became a vocal opposition to the ADEMA-
government. In advent of the 1997 elections, internal disputes over co-optation efforts by
the ADEMA, led to the expulsion of 10 committee members of the CNID and the formation
of a CNID-offshoot, the PARENA (Parti Pour la Renaissance Nationale). As the CNID
lacked electoral success, and could neither rely on an element of collective cohesion nor
a defining socio-structural foundation, it was not surprising the party could not prevent
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factionalism. While the PARENA agreed to co-optation by the ADEMA government in
advent of the 1997 elections, the CNID, together with other opposition parties, boycotted
the second running of the 1997 presidential and parliamentary elections after irregularities
that led to the annulation of the first running of the elections by the constitutional court.
It is dubious whether these irregularities were systematically in favor of the governing
ADEMA. Public opinion polls showed that the ADEMA was still very popular, anyway.
Certainly, the boycott was contra-productive for the CNID and most of the opposition
parties as it increased ADEMA’s dominance. ADEMA won 87 percent of the seats in
parliament and Konaré was easily reelected. The CNID-offspring, PARENA, became the
runner-up party with only eight of the 147 seats in parliament (Vengroff, 1993, 547; Smith,
2001, 74f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 62f., 237, 239, 252; Nunley, 2009; Levitsky and
Way, 2010, 298) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 29).
Interestingly, even the ADEMA’s electoral success and de facto dominant position was
not sufficient to secure the organizational cohesiveness in advent of the 2002 election. Be-
cause of the two-term limit, Konaré was barred from running for the presidency again.
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This triggered a succession crisis, which led to the formation of the party, Rassemblement
Pour le Mali (RPM) under the leadership of the ADEMA’s ex-prime minister and party
baron, Ibrahim Boubacar Këıta (“IBK”). Together with IBK, 38 ADEMA parliamentarians
defected to the new RPM, and supported IBK as presidential candidate. The former coup
leader of 1991, Amadou Toumani Touré (“ATT”), entered the presidential race as well. He
ran as an independent candidate with no intentions to form a political party. Factional-
ism inside the ADEMA was so deep that many remaining politicians inside the ADEMA,
including Konaré, supported ATT instead of ADEMA’s official candidate, Soumäıla Cissé.
PARENA, the runner-up of the 1997 elections, which was in alliance with ADEMA, de-
fected as well, and fielded its own presidential candidate for 2002. Under these adversary
circumstances, ADEMA lost both the presidency to ATT and its absolute majority in par-
liament, i.e. the de facto dominant party system could not consolidate, and Mali became
a multi-party system (Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 239, 256; Nunley,
2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 297–299) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure
30).
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After 2002, the volatility of the opposition party system of the 1990s spread out to the
Malian party system as a whole. While the ADEMA remained the political party with the
most seats in parliament, it did not manage to return to its absolute majority of the 1990s
in the 2007 elections. Rather it factionalized further, and gave birth to another party, the
Union pour la République et la Démocratie (URD). The RPM, in turn, did not manage to
repeat its success of 2002. An impressive number of 15 parties gained seats in the 2007
elections (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 31).
As a president without a political party, ATT intended to minimize parliamentary
dissent and followed ADEMA’s co-optation tactics, which it applied in advent of the 1997
election. Accordingly, ATT included as many parties as possible in an oversized coalition
government. In doing this, he effectively deprived Mali’s parliament of an opposition.
Despite 15 political parties in parliament and 5.32 “effective” political parties, the Malian
electoral regime started to resemble a “no-party democracy”. And even more than before,
political parties in Mali resembled electoral clubs rather than distinct political entities
(Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 330; Nunley, 2009; Fleischhacker, 2010, 127; Levitsky and
Way, 2010, 299). It can be argued that the lack of institutionalized forums of opposition
250
in ATT’s “consensus” democracy was one of the triggering factors for the military coup in
March 2012 and the end of Mali’s electoral democracy (cf. van Eerd, 2012).
It is important to note that the two historic parties of Mali’s first pre-independence
elections, the progressive-centralist US-RDA and the conservative-peripheral PPS/PSP
reappeared in the first third wave elections of 1992. After the formation of political parties
was legalized following the coup in 1991, old Marxist hard-liners and associates of Modibo
Keita re-formed the former sole legal party, US-RDA. However, ideologic factionalism be-
tween the Marxist hard-liners and moderate reformers, which was already present during
the last years of Modibo Keita’s single-party regime, soon re-flared and weakened the party.
Amongst others, the party contested the 1992 presidential elections with two candidates!
This proved to be very disadvantageous for a party, whose grass-roots organization and
support basis have been damaged, and its identity seriously blurred by 23 years of sup-
pression under Moussa Traoré’s military regime, anyway. In the parliamentary elections
of 1992, the party did not manage to become the runner-up. After the elections, the more
successful of the two US-RDA presidential candidates, Tiéoulé Mamadou Konaté, son of
the co-founder of the historic US-RDA, Mamadou Konaté, formed his own party, the Bloc
pour la Démocratie et l’Intégration Africaine (BDIA). Hence, the younger Konaté volun-
tarily forgone the possibility to further profit from the remainders of the historical capital
of the US-RDA. Not very surprisingly, both the BDIA and the remains of the US-RDA
became insignificant in the subsequent third wave elections (Vengroff, 1993, 546f. 554f.;
Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 331f.; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party system structuring
maps in figures 28 and 29).
A historian, Sékéné Sissoko, tried to profit from the historical legacy of the old con-
servative-peripheral PPS/PSP, and re-founded the party after the coup in 1991. However,
besides organizational and financial problems, the party lacked any real ties to the old PPS,
which was first co-opted and the effectively destroyed already around independence by the
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US-RDA and Modibo Keita. Accordingly, the party only won two parliamentary seats in
the 1992 elections, and fell into oblivion afterwards (Vengroff, 1993, 548, 553; Imperato
and Imperato, 2008, 240; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure
28).
In sum, 29 years of authoritarianism, which totally destroyed the conservative-peripheral
heritage of the territorial cleavage and seriously blurred and damaged the organizational
and ideological capital of the progressive-centrist side for its heirs to successfully rely on,
led to a de facto dominant party system in the 1990s, which was not confronted by a chal-
lenging opposition at all. Interestingly, the lack of any cohesiveness-promoting element as
some sort of collective identity, distinct socio-structural foundation or symbolic-historical
capital even proved to be a problem for the dominant governing party ADEMA. In the
following of the succession crisis in advent of the 2002 elections, the party seriously fac-
tionalized, and lost both its absolute majority and the presidency. Most symptomatically,
the new president, ATT, was an independent candidate, did not intend to found a polit-
ical party, and rendered the meaning of the word “party” almost to insignificance by his
consensus governing style, which virtually deprived the Malian state of any parliamentary
opposition and rendered political parties to mere “electoral clubs”.
Concluding Comparison
The comparative-historical analysis of four crucial cases confirmed the large-N results of
the previous section of the book. If salient legacies of cleavages manage to survive until
the advent of the third wave, they make opposition parties more cohesive and stabilize
their support pattern despite the unfavorable circumstances of a dominant party system in
the context of relatively young electoral regimes and relatively low modernization levels.
Opposition parties in third wave dominant party systems that can rely on historic ideo-
logical and symbolic capital are comparatively more successful and stable than opposition
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parties that have to compete with the dominant party from scratch. They profit from an
established ‘brand identity’ that increases voters’ trust in both programmatic mobilization
strategies as well as clientelistic promises. On the one hand, voters become more receptive
to programmatic offers, on the other hand, they are more likely to suspend demands for
immediate disbursement of clientelistic promises.
While survival of the historic territorial cleavage in Mali was almost impossible due to
29 years without multiparty elections, and rather stable authoritarianism, and survival in
Botswana was more easy, because the electoral cycle was never interrupted since the first
pre-independence elections, a juxtaposition of the cases of Lesotho and Ghana teaches us
additional lessons: It is rather the element of collective identity of the territorial cleav-
age, which has to survive over time for third wave party system structuring to viably rely
on than the actual survival of the organizational shell and/or party name. In Ghana,
the authoritarian phase was interrupted by two democratic interregnums, which forced
politicians to reinvigorate the collective and symbolic identity related to the historic terri-
torial cleavage and helped to sustain cleavage-based party system structuring. In Lesotho,
in turn, no such democratic interregnum took place during the authoritarian phase and
the lack of electoral competition for the hegemonic one-party as well as the opposition
in exile/insurgent underground led to the fading of the respective collective and symbolic
identity despite the survival of the organizational shell and party names of the two sides
of the historic cleavage. Accordingly, the organizational embodiments lacked cohesiveness
as soon as their party founders died; in opposition to Ghana where the two organizational
embodiments of the historic cleavage remained cohesive despite frequent leadership rota-
tions. Hence, although Lesotho started on a much more promising path after independence
than Mali, and experienced three pre-third wave elections between 1960 and 1970, its un-
interrupted authoritarian phase between 1970 and 1993 was nonetheless long enough to
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destroy the legacy of the historic cleavage too much for third wave parties to effectively
rely on.
As the first two third wave elections in Ghana have shown, legacies of historic cleavages
provide opposition parties with non-material sources of cohesiveness in the difficult context
of competition with a dominant party that has access to state resources and is – to some
degree – able to skew the playing field in party competition in its favor. Moreover, lega-
cies of historic cleavages ensure that a party as an organization “stands for something”,
socializes voters into the political system, and develops a life of its own as an organization
that is independent from dominant party figures. In a similar vein, Botswana’s long-time
runner-up opposition party, BNF, survived as a viable organization despite losing eight
elections in a row. It even maintained its runner-up position despite the defection of its
charismatic long-time leader and other important figures from the party, as well as the
subsequent formation of a splinter party.
Specificially, the analysis showed that non-material sources of cohesiveness ensure that
elites do not defect from the opposition to the dominant party after electoral defeats, let
themselves co-opt or regularly spark disintegrating factionalism in the party. Moreover,
it ensures that parties ‘stand for something’, i.e., have a ‘brand identity’ and are a more
trustworthy choice for voters despite the fact that opposition parties cannot prove their
clientelistic or valence potential in advance of the elections, but instead have to rely on
promises. If the historic cleavage still shapes the party system, voters are socialized into
to these structures, which increases their loyalty to the party they have voted for, even if
they belong to the looser side for several elections in a row. While this certainly allows
opposition parties to compete more viably with the dominant party on the terrain of
clientelism and valence issues, it also allows opposition parties to invest more effectively in
conflictive position-taking programmatic mobilization. Position-taking voter mobilization,
in turn, allows competition on an equal standing with the dominant party, and enhances
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the programmatic responsiveness of the dominant party itself, as well as the party system
overall.
While transition to a multiparty electoral regime in Lesotho at the beginning of the third
wave was almost exclusively initiated by international pressure, pro-democracy protest
movements in Mali and Ghana had their share in inducing democratic change. However,
Malian protest groups did neither rely on a broad common socio-structural basis, nor did
they develop an element of collective identity besides their common goal of ending Moussa
Traoré’s regime. In Ghana, in turn, pro-democracy protest formed alongside the temporary
alliance of the heirs of the historic territorial cleavage. Yet, Ghanaian protest groups, apart
from the historic party traditions, did not manage to form an original third and viable
organization besides the Nkrumahist and Daquah-Busiaist heirs. They lacked an original
collective identity apart form their broad demand for political liberalization. In this respect,
the analysis demonstrates that the third wave cannot be regarded as a critical juncture
that triggers new cleavage formation and sets party system developments in countries
apart due to different strengths and constellations of protest movements. Instead, it is the
complete lack (Mali) and the relative lack of viable legacies of cleavage-based party system
structuring (Lesotho) vis-à-vis the survival of significant legacies of cleavages (Botswana
and Ghana) that account for varieties in party system structuring and opposition party
system competitiveness degrees during the third wave. This, in turn, can be explained by
the common occurrence of the first critical juncture of first pre-independence elections in
combination with variance regarding the occurrence, timing and character of the second
critical juncture of installation of post-independence authoritarianism.
The analysis of the four cases shows that a salient legacy of cleavages is not only
important for the cohesiveness of opposition parties, but also for the cohesiveness of the
dominant party itself. The cases of Lesotho and most notably Mali show that if the
dominant party is not confronted by a relatively strong opposition relying on historical
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capital, it has not enough incentive to uphold its own cohesiveness despite its resource
advantages in terms of “buying” internal consent. Especially in times of succession crises,
which is exemplified by both Mali and Lesotho, a dominant party that lacks non-material
sources of cohesiveness to keep succumbed succession-aspiring elites in line has serious
difficulties to avoid disintegration. On the one hand, this finding is in line with studies
that emphasize the importance of organizational power of the incumbent party in order to
avoid electoral turnovers in hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). On the other hand,
my analysis also contributes evidence to a recent study by LeBas (2011), which underlines
the fact that the non-material cohesiveness of incumbent parties is partially endogenous
to the existence of a strong and cohesive opposition challenging the incumbent party. Yet,
in contrast to my main argument, LeBas relates the strength of its pivotal case, the main
opposition party in Zimbabwe, Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), to the existence
of pre-third wave corporatism and contingency in strategic choice, rather than to legacies
of independence cleavages.
Levitsky and Way’s (2010) theoretical framework cannot explain Ghana’s democratiza-
tion and the underutilization of authoritarian means of power in Botswana. In contrast to
Levitsky and Way, my analysis shows that cohesive incumbent parties are not necessarily
stumbling blocks for democratic consolidation and eventual future democratic turnovers,
and that cohesive opposition parties matter in this process. In both Botswana and Ghana,
incumbent (dominant) parties base their cohesiveness to a substantial degree on (co-opted,
in the case of Ghana) legacies of cleavages. And in both cases, cohesiveness gave incum-
bent parties the self-confidence to underutilize authoritarian means of power and allowed
them to induce improvements in terms of democratic party competition. Yet, a dominant
governing party is more likely to reinvigorate available non-material sources of cohesion if
it is forced by a cohesive opposition to do so.
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Paradoxically, although incumbency change is per se more likely in cases like Mali in
2002 – and Lesotho in 2012 – where the dominant party is less cohesive due to the lack
of salient legacies of cleavages and a weak opposition, the multiparty systems that were
born out of these constellations proved to be volatile and un-structured, and did not lead
to improvements in the fairness of party competition and full democratization so far, as in
the case of Lesotho (cf. van Eerd, forthcoming), or even to regime breakdown, as in the
case of the military coup in Mali in 2012. Hence, although incumbency change is more
difficult in cases like Ghana, where the dominant party was cohesive, it leads to less volatile
and more structured multi-party systems that give voters the necessary orientation and
lead to democratic consolidation. Due to its (co-opted) historic source of non-material
cohesiveness, the dominant party in Ghana did not disintegrate after losing elections, as
in the cases of Senegal and Kenya, but ensured the continued responsiveness of the (new)
governing party. Hence, although incumbency change seems more difficult in Botswana, if
it happens, I would expect Botswana’s party system rather to follow Ghana’s path towards
full democratic consolidation than Lesotho’s volatile path or even Mali’s path of regime-
disintegration due to the legacies of cleavages that are present in Botswana’s party system
and a more cohesive opposition party.
In addition, the analysis shows that it does not matter whether the peripheral or the
center-side of the territorial cleavage turned out to be the victorious side during the birth
of the historic party system around independence. Opposition parties were stronger in
the third wave dominant party systems of both Ghana, where the historic center-side was
victorious, and in Botswana, where the historic peripheral side was victorious. Nonetheless,
the analysis shows that historic peripheral parties in power have to find a way to deal with
the inherent contradictions of building a modern, centralized state, and keep their winning
coalition with representatives of the traditional system of rule and their rural clientele
together; something that obviously worked better in the case of Botswana than in the case
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of Lesotho. The peripheral side in Ghana, in turn, profited from an alliance with moderate,
center-aspiring and educated elites, which ensured the viability of the Danquah-Busiaist
party tradition in the long run.
Furthermore, it does not matter whether countries were underdeveloped at the time
of independence, as in the case of Botswana, or comparatively developed, as in the case
Ghana, to result in the survival of legacies of cleavages until the third wave and more com-
petitive opposition parties. In the case of Botswana, underdevelopment presumably was
even an advantage due the lack of security forces and means of coercive power, which de-
creased the appeal of authoritarian entrenchment and foreclosed the possibility of military
coups during Botswana’s first decade of independence.
Lastly, ethnic cleavages played a considerable role in Ghana while the makeup of the
ethnic structure in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali rendered ethnopolitical mobilization a
less useful tool for electoral competition. The analysis of Ghana shows that an ethnic
cleavage between Ashanti and Ewe developed since the democratic interregnum of 1969
that aligned itself to the dominant territorial cleavage. The moderate center-periphery
alliance of the territorial cleavage already used to have an increasing Ashanti-Akan bias
since the second pre-independence election in 1954. While the progressive center-side
managed to cross-cut ethnic cleavages during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s,
it failed to do so in the 1969 elections, which resulted in the most ethnically structured
elections in Ghana’s history. The center-side managed to regain its ethnically cross-cutting
appeal in the next democratic interregnum of 1979, however, whereas the moderate center-
periphery alliance won most of its votes in the Ashanti region. With the beginning of the
third wave in Ghana, the moderate center-periphery alliance mitigated its Ashanti-bias,
and managed to attract voters beyond its traditional voter base, which eventually led to its
electoral victory in 2000. Hence, despite the more important role ethnicity played in the
structuring of the party system of Ghana than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, ethnicity
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became never as salient in structuring political conflict as in cases like Kenya, or worse,
Rwanda and Burundi. Ghanaian elections never had the character of an ethnic census,




5 Party System Responsiveness in Four African Cases
In the following, I want to test whether the survival of the historic territorial cleavage and
the consequential presence of a more competitive third wave opposition party (system) in
the context of a dominant party system is actually conducive to a programmatically more
responsive third wave party system overall. After all, section 2 presented evidence that
the presence of a competitive opposition party (system) enhances the general quality of
democracy in African dominant party systems. Note that I do not expect that third wave
parties still explicitly formulate concrete policies associated with the historic territorial
cleavage. Rather, I expect the survival of the historic structure to be conducive to the
successful representation of new conflicts and issues.
In this section, I focus on a more specific measure of the quality of democracy in an
electoral democracy than in section 2, where I relied on Freedom House’s Civil Liberties
index. I analyze the degree of party system responsiveness, i.e., the clarity and distinctive-
ness of parties’ programmatic offers, and the congruence between partisan voters’ policy
preferences and their political representatives’ policy preferences. I measure the respon-
siveness degree in the small-N case selection, which I defined in the previous section of the
book (on p. 117), i.e. the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho, as well as the
former dominant party systems of Ghana and Mali. According to my historic comparative
analysis of the survival of legacies of cleavages in section 4 of the book, as well as my
theoretical model and the evidence presented in section 2, I expect to find higher party
system responsiveness degrees in the contemporary party systems of Botswana and Ghana
than the contemporary party systems of Lesotho and Mali (cf. with section 2. Figure
9 on p. 132 summarizes the expectations for the four selected cases). Both Botswana’s
contemporary and Ghana’s former dominant party system feature a relatively strong and
institutionalized opposition party (system), structured according to the historic territorial
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cleavage, whereas in Lesotho and Mali, opposition parties were relatively weak and/or non-
institutionalized during the third wave and their party systems not effectively structured
according to the historic territorial cleavage. Consequently, the former party systems of
Ghana and Mali transformed into non-dominant party systems that were competitive and
institutionalized in Ghana and highly volatile in Mali.
It is important to compare Botswana and Lesotho with two cases of the group of
contemporary non-dominant party systems, because non-dominant party systems are so
far generally regarded as favorable for democratic consolidation in the literature. They
set the benchmark against which any positive assessment of a dominant party system has
to be tested. The two contemporary non-dominant party systems of Ghana and Mali are
ideal cases to compare with Botswana and Lesotho because they used to be dominant party
systems themselves during the first decade of the third wave (see case selection in section
4).
Operationalization, Data and Method for Party System Respon-
siveness Analysis
In the following, I discuss the details of the operationalization of party system responsive-
ness, which will be measured by the clarity and distinctiveness of parties’ programmatic
offers and the assessment of the degree of congruence between partisan voters and party
representatives’ issue positions. The data will be discussed ensuing.
Operationalization and Method
“Party system responsiveness” is an important yardstick to assess the quality of democ-
racy in African electoral regimes, as argued in section 1 (cf. Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2004). I
conceptualize party system responsiveness as the clarity and distinctiveness of parties’ pro-
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grammatic offers, as well as the congruence between partisan voters’ policy preferences and
their political representatives’ policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004; Luna and Zechmeis-
ter, 2005). The measurement relies on self-collected elite survey data and Afrobarometer
(2008) data in Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali.
Programmatic party system responsiveness will be operationalized by looking into the
clarity and distinctiveness of parties’ programmatic offers and preferences and the degree
of congruence between voter’s policy preferences and their political representatives’ pol-
icy preferences: Do politicians as members of a political party have significantly distinct
preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions and issues in relation to politicians of
other political parties? And do voters who intend to vote for the very same party have
congruent preferences in relation to the politicians of that party? The analysis will show
whether competing parties significantly diverge from each other regarding different pol-
icy preferences and offerings, and if this divergence corresponds with the diverging policy
preferences of their respective partisan voters (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005).
In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of issues and dimensions, it is important to
empirically determine the relevant dimensions of contemporary conflict in a country. Oth-
erwise, distinctiveness and congruence among and between partisan representatives and
their respective partisan voters could be a product of chance. Hence, it is important to
assess the degree of congruence in policy dimensions, which actually set political parties
apart, i.e. are relevant for political conflict in a country. In doing so, I focus on the
“supply”-side of democratic politics rather than the initial preferences of the voters and
the degree to which parties respond to their demands. If parties do not stand for something
in the first place, it will be difficult for citizens to identify representatives that promote
their policy preferences. This focus corresponds with the cleavage approach that has been
developed in the previous two parts of the book. Cleavages at independence structure
party systems and channel historic political conflict. If legacies of cleavage survive until
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the third wave, it is very likely that present issues of conflict are channeled along the same
historic cleavage lines, and new voter generations are socialized accordingly; regardless
wether the initial issues of the historic cleavages are still salient (cf. Bartolini and Mair,
1990; Bornschier, 2012a).
Hence, the first step of the analysis has to identify policy dimensions that set contempo-
rary parties in the four cases apart. The second step analyzes whether the same dimensions
also set the voters in the four countries apart. The final step assesses the actual degree
of congruence between voters and their political representatives (cf. Bornschier, 2012a).
For that matter, only congruence that is based on salient distinctness on both the elite
and the voter side can be trusted. Because the analysis focuses on the “supply”-side of
democratic politics, I value significant distinctness on the party representative’s side higher
than significant distinctness on the voter side.
The first step relies on discriminant analysis to determine which issues structure party
membership on the party representatives’ side. When results lack significance in general,
the issue bundles are taken that yield the best results of all issues analyzed.67 The second
step uses analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess whether party membership significantly
explains the most relevant issue bundle, i.e., parties are significantly set apart. Subsequent,
the analysis investigates whether partisan voters are significantly set apart as well by the
issues deemed relevant in the analysis of the party representatives’ issue positions. The
final step qualitatively assesses the match of congruence by visually comparing the mean
positions of the partisan representatives of the same party and the mean positions of
their respective partisan voters. Note, that the positions of the party representatives
and partisan voters are not measured on the same scale. Hence, congruence can only be
interpreted in relative terms (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005; Bornschier, 2012a).68
67Insignificance will most likely be the case in the discriminant analyses of the party representatives’
positions and should not be taken at face value considering the low number of respondents in the dataset.
68The visualization method follows Bornschier (2010, 2012a).
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Data
To measure the degree of partisan distinctiveness among political representatives and
among the electorate, as well as the congruence between the two sets of respondents,
the analysis relies on original elite survey data for the party representatives’ side and
Afrobarometer survey data for the partisan voters’ side. The elite data is extracted from
interviews with parliamentarians and other party representatives, which have been con-
ducted by the author in Botswana and Lesotho in 2010, and in Ghana and Mali in 2012.
Politicians from the three most relevant parties (two parties in the case of Ghana) – re-
garding seat and vote share in the last parliamentary elections – were asked to position
themselves in their function as official representatives of their party on different policy
issues.69 In Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, three elite respondents have been selected for the
two most relevant parties (BDP and BNF, LCD and ABC, as well as ADEMA and RPM)
and two respondents for the third-most relevant party (BCP, BNP and URD), which re-
sults in eight respondents per country. In the case of Ghana, five respondents were selected
for the opposition party, NPP, and three respondents for the governing party, NDC.70 To
account for the relatively small sample of party elites, the selection of respondents fol-
lowed the general ambition to include a mixture of influential party cadre, ministers and
important parliamentarians (some in double function) with rural and urban background
per each party. The most proximal mass survey data available for all four countries, in
turn, is Afrobarometer Round 4, which was conducted in 2008.
The questions in the survey of party representatives focus on four items related to the
economic policy dimension and two questions that tackle non-economic issues. Table 10
69The issues asked correspond with Kitschelt (2009).
70Unfortunately, it proved to be very difficult to successfully agree on interview dates with more politi-
cians from the NDC, and achieve a more balanced sample in Ghana.
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Table 10: Matched Policy Dimensions for Elite Level and Voter Level
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groups them with Afrobarometer questions that are most proximate.71 I use principal
component factor analysis to test whether the single items are indeed related to the same
issue.
Analysis
The congruence analysis is based on the policy dimensions of table 10 that separate the
parties’ representatives in each of the four countries the most. First, the two dominant
cases, Botswana and Lesotho, are presented; subsequent the two former dominant cases,
Ghana and Mali.
The results of the canonical linear discriminant analysis in table 11 show that Botswa-
na’s partisan elites are most strongly divided on issues of economic liberalism, i.e., general
left-right placement and privatization. The canonical structure coefficient of -0.49 for the
issues of economic liberalism in opposition to the smaller structure coefficients of welfare,
ethnic tolerance and cultural liberalism indicates that issues of economic liberalism are most
constitutive in the discrimination of elite party membership in Botswana.72 The overall
canonical correlation of 0.94 is rather high (1.0 being the maximum), which means that the
canonical variable is very close to the issue categories, whereof economic liberalism is the
most constitutive, in turn (cf. Klecka, 1980, 36f.). Despite the high canonical correlation,
the F-statistic in table 11 indicates insignificance of the canonical correlation. Yet, this
should not be taken at face value due to the low number of elite respondents.
71The exact wording and scaling of the survey questions can be found in the appendix on
p. 307 and 309, as well as in http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-rounds-merged/item/
750-merged-round-4-codebook.
72As a rule of thumb, issue categories that load higher than |0.4| can be regarded as constitutive for
discriminating elites’ party membership. Accordingly, I reconstruct the voters’ conflict dimension on basis
of the very same issue category that has been deemed relevant by the canonical discriminant analysis on












































































































































































































































































































































































In sum, I consider the dimension of economic liberalism the most valid dimension to
assess the significance of programmatic distinctiveness of partisan elites in Botswana and
construct the respective dimension on the voter side in Botswana to assess the degree of
programmatic congruence.
ANOVA confirms the results of the discriminant analysis above (analysis of variance
not displayed in book): A model that explains party elites respondents’ position on the
economic liberalism dimension by party membership is indeed significant (p < 0.1 in figure
32). The standard deviations in figure 32 do not overlap: an additional indicator for the
fact that Botswana’s party representatives are indeed significantly divided on the economic
liberalism dimension.
Figure 32: Botswana – Party representatives and voters on the economic liberalism divide
Hence, as theoretically expected and indicated by the results of the previous sections of
the book, Botswana indeed features a programmatically structured party system. A long
history of un-interrupted party competition structured according to a historic territorial
cleavage led to a dominant party system with a comparatively strong and institutionalized
opposition in the third wave and to opposition parties and a dominant party that are
programmatically cohesive and distinct from each other. While the opposition parties
BNF and BCP are left and center left on the economic liberalism dimension, the dominant
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BDP is clearly right of the center.73 The BDP’s recent internal struggles and its catch-all
character of a party in democratic dominance since more than 40 years is reflected by the
relatively bigger standard deviation.
There is no significant divide on the economic liberalism dimension among Botswana’s
voters, however (see insignificance of ANOVA, as well as indistinguishable programmatic
position means and overlapping standard deviations in figure 32).74 Hence, we cannot
analyze the degree of programmatic congruence between partisan elites and partisan voters
in Botswana. In the context of a dominant party system, however, lack of congruence is not
necessarily problematic for democratic responsiveness. Rather, it shows that programmatic
party-voter linkage is not fixed in Botswana, and BDP-dominance therefore not for eternity.
Due to the significantly diverging offers of the institutionalized opposition parties, BNF and
BCP, vis-à-vis the dominant BDP, the BDP is forced to position itself programmatically
and be responsive to the median voter.
In line with theoretical expectations, both the large and overlapping standard devia-
tions in figure 33, as well as the insignificant ANOVA show that parties in the dominant
party system of Lesotho, which lacks an institutionalized opposition, fail to be significantly
divided even on their most relevant dimensions of contemporary conflict, the welfare di-
mension.75
Hence, the fact that the historic territorial cleavage lost its significance for third wave
party system structuring in Lesotho to rely on despite the survival of the organizational
73All issues have been recoded so that lower values indicate economically more ‘left’ and culturally more
liberal positions, and higher values the opposite.
74The economic liberalism dimension on the mass level is based on the issues of privatization and
the support of international business in the national economy, q10 and q99b in Afrobarometer, R4 (see
Afrobarometer survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix). The canonical structure coefficient of 0.73 for
the issues of cultural liberalism in table 15 indicates that the cultural liberalism dimension would structure
mass partisan membership better than the dimension of economic liberalism. Yet, neither the canonical
correlation in table 15 nor ANOVA (not displayed in book) indicates statistical significance.
75The relatively small canonical structure coefficient of 0.37 for issues of welfare (based on the items
of redistribution and extensive public spending) in table 11 is the most constitutive issue bundle in the
discrimination of party representatives’ party membership in Lesotho.
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Figure 33: Lesotho – Party representatives and voters on the welfare divide
‘shells’ of the two sides of the historic cleavage until the beginning of the third wave is
not only corroborated by the volatility of the opposition in Lesotho and the instability
of the dominant party, but also by the fact that important contemporary representatives
of the apparent heirs of the two historical sides, the LCD and the BNP, as well as the
LCD-splinter, ABC, do not manage to cohesively identify the programmatic positions of
their own parties.
As shown in figure 33, Basotho voters are also not significantly divided regarding the
welfare dimension despite the issues of welfare being the most constitutive for discriminat-
ing partisan voters in Lesotho (see canonical structure coefficient of 0.83 in table 15 in the
appendix). Hence, the coherent ordering between the partisan elites and voters in figure
33 should not be overestimated.76
In accordance with theoretical expectations, the championed two-party system of Ghana
is significantly divided on both the party representatives and partisan voters’ side (see fig-
ure 34). Note, that due to the large sample of 645 partisan voters in Ghana, ANOVA
yields highly significant results for explaining voters’ positioning on issues of welfare and
economic liberalism by their partisanship despite an overlap of the standard deviations in
figure 34 (p < 0.001). Nonetheless, the differences in mean programmatic positioning of
NDC and NPP voters are considerably distinctive in comparison with voters in Botswana,
76The welfare dimension on the mass level in Lesotho is based on the issue of support for economic
recovery programs, q10 and q11 in Afrobarometer, R4 (see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).
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Lesotho and Mali in figures 32, 33 and 35. Both NDC voters and NDC party representatives
take a consistently more left position on the combined dimension of welfare and economic
liberalism than the voters and representatives of the main opposition party, NPP.77 The
large canonical structure coefficients of 0.79 on the representatives’ side in table 11 and
0.98 on the voters’ side in table 15 in the appendix for the combined dimension of welfare
and economic liberalism indicate that economic issues are most constitutive in Ghana for
discriminating both elites’ and voters’ party membership.
Figure 34: Ghana – Party representatives and voters on the welfare/economic liberalism
divide
In sum, It is safe to say that Ghana confirms to the Anglo-Saxon ideal of two-partyism
structured on the economic dimension. The survival of the historic divide between the
centrist-progressive Nkrumahist party tradition and the centrist-peripheral moderate Dan-
quah-Busiaist party tradition led to a dominant party system with a competitive opposition
party, and finally, an institutionalized two-party system during the third wave in Ghana.
The results of the distinctiveness and congruence analysis of the contemporary representa-
tives of the two party traditions and their respective partisan voters shows that both the
party representatives and partisan voters are programmatically cohesive and significantly
77In Ghana, the combined welfare and economic liberalism dimension of party representatives is based
on the issues of redistribution, extensive public spending, general left-right placement and privatization
(see survey questions on p. 307 in the appendix). On the mass level, the dimension relies on q10 and q11
(see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).
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distinct among each other, in line with their party affiliation. Hence, the two parties suc-
cessfully managed to align contemporary issues in accordance with the historical cleavage.
For Mali, the canonical discriminant analysis reveals that a combined dimension of is-
sues of welfare and ethnicity is most constitutive in the discrimination of representatives’
party membership. However, the two canonical structure coefficients are rather small (0.36
and 0.37 in table 11; based on issues of redistribution and ethnic tolerance).78 Moreover,
figure 35 shows that parties in the non-dominant, but also non-institutionalized party
system of Mali fail to be significantly divided even on their most relevant dimensions of
conflict: Whereas the former (almost-)dominant party, ADEMA, and the party URD are
programmatically significantly distinct from each other, the standard deviations from the
mean positions of the RPM and the ADEMA are relatively large and do overlap, which
leads to an overall insignificant distinctiveness between the three parties, i.e., insignificant
ANOVA (ANOVA-analysis not displayed in book). Furthermore, the significant program-
matic distinctiveness between the ADEMA and URD is paradox as the two parties entered
the 2007 elections as coalition partners (last elections at the point of interviews in Febru-
ary and March 2012). This points out to a deeply programmatically unstructured party
system, which, in turn, is reflected by its rampant volatility since the beginning of the
thrid wave. Figure 35 demonstrates that Malian voters are not significantly dived among
each other, too.79
Hence, in accordance with the main argument of this book, the early abortion of party
competition, only two years after Mali’s independence in 1960, and the subsequent 29
years of authoritarianism, which effectively blurred the last traces of the historic territorial
78See survey questions on p. 307 in the appendix.
79The welfare/ethnicity dimension on the mass level in Mali could not be meaningfully combined due to
canonical structure coefficients that have opposite signs (-0.59 vis-à-vis 0.44 in table 15 in the appendix).
Accordingly, figure 35 shows only the welfare dimension on the mass level, based on q11 and q99b, because
the partisan mass are more divided in this dimension than in the ethnicity dimension, based on q66, q67
and q83 (see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).
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Figure 35: Mali – Party representatives and voters on the welfare/ethnicity divide
cleavage for parties of the third wave to effectively rely on, led to a volatile third wave party
system that does not provide its electorate with programmatic structuring and orientation.
Conclusion
In sum, Ghana’s institutionalized two party system is generally more responsive than
Botswana’s dominant party system, which features institutionalized opposition parties.
And Botswana outperforms Lesotho’s dominant party system, which features volatile op-
position parties. The first fact is not really surprising, the second corresponds with the
general argument of the book. Furthermore, Botswana’s dominant party system also out-
performs Mali’s non-dominant multi-party system. This contradicts the research that has
so far been done on African party systems and supports my argument that not dominance
of one party and the concomitant lack of electoral turnover are the biggest problems for
responsiveness in African electoral democracies, but instability and fragmentation of the
general party system, or instability and fragmentation of the opposition in dominant party
systems. This indicates that in the African context, where institutionalized two-party sys-
tems or institutionalized multi-party systems are rare, an institutionalized opposition party
(even if too weak to take power) that confronts a dominant party can lead to programmatic
party system responsiveness and democratic consolidation. Accordingly, Lesotho and Mali
experienced major turmoils in their political systems in 2012 (cf. van Eerd, 2012; forth-
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coming), while Botswana’s dominant party, BDP, managed to stabilize itself again after
the break-away of a splinter in 2010. Ghana in turn, managed the death of president Mills
in a smooth, democratic and constitutional way without delay.
Moreover, during the 1990s, Ghana used to be a dominant party system with a strong
and institutionalized opposition, i.e., it had the same party system configuration as con-
temporary Botswana. And, as in Botswana, Ghana’s electoral regime already became
more democratic during times of electoral one-party dominance. Hence, Ghana projects
a potential positive journey from a dominant party system to an institutionalized and
responsive two- or multi-party system for contemporary dominant party systems with rel-
atively strong and institutionalized opposition parties, i.e., party systems like Botswana.
In opposition to that, during the 1990s, Mali used to be a dominant party system with a
weak and non-institutionalized opposition, and developed into a chaotic and unresponsive
multi-party system during the 2000s, cumulating in break-down of democracy in 2012. This
projects a less favorable journey for contemporary dominant party systems with weak or
non-institutionalized opposition parties that transform into non-dominant party systems,
as in the case of Lesotho.
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6 General Conclusion
In this book I have argued that an institutionalized and relatively strong opposition in
a dominant party system is more important for higher qualities of democracy and demo-
cratic consolidation than actual turnovers that end dominance in African electoral regimes.
Overall, both the quantitative as well as the qualitative analysis of the book confirm this
argument. Hence, dominant party systems – where one party gains the presidency and
an absolute majority in parliament for several elections in a row – can reach relatively
comprehensive civil liberties and lead to programmatically distinct parties despite lack of
incumbency change. Yet, in order to fulfill their potential to lead to democratic consol-
idation, dominant parties need the electoral confrontation with an institutionalized and
relatively strong opposition party. This gives them the incentive to be responsive to voter
demands, uphold internal elite cohesiveness and underutilize their ability to skew the play-
ing field in party competition.
Hence, it is important to differentiate between dominant party systems that are good
for democratic consolidation due to the existence of a strong and institutionalized oppo-
sition and dominant party systems that are bad for democratic consolidation due to the
absence of a strong and institutionalized opposition. The quantitative large-N section of
the book shows that it is helpful to use an index that measures the competitiveness degree
of the opposition in dominant party systems through the volatility of the opposition party
system and the strength of the runner-up opposition party. More competitive opposition
parties in dominant party systems of the third wave between 1990 and 2008 lead to more
comprehensive civil liberties in contemporary African electoral regimes, regardless whether
dominant party systems experienced turnover and became non-dominant party systems or
whether they remained dominant party systems.
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Furthermore, the last section of the book exemplifies that dominant or formerly dom-
inant party systems with an institutionalized and relatively strong opposition lead to
programmatically more structured party systems reflected in more significantly distinct
programmatic party positions and more responsive parties. Moreover, turnover and the
concomitant end of a dominant party system with non-institutionalized and relatively
weak opposition parties – as in the case of Mali – does not lead to an institutionalized
multi-party system, but instead to a volatile and fragmented party system that is not pro-
grammatically structured and not responsive to its voters. Hence, turnover and the end
of a dominant party system does not automatically lead to democratic consolidation, as
some accounts in the literature suggest. Rather, my analysis implies that turnover and the
end of a dominant party system needs to be preceded by a dominant party system with an
institutionalized and competitive opposition where improvements in the skewness of the
playing field in party competition and the quality of democracy have already been initiated
before actual turnover, which is exemplified by the case of Ghana. Hence, if incumbency
change and the end of dominance would take place in Botswana, I would expect Botswana’s
electoral regime rather to follow Ghana’s path to full democratization than Mali’s path to
low quality of democracy and eventual regime disintegration, because Botswana already
features a relatively competitive opposition and a relatively high quality of democracy
despite long-time dominance of the incumbent party.
Accordingly, the book makes an important contribution to our general understanding
of the role of party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation
in late third wave democratization processes. More precisely, it contributes to a more
careful assessment of the role of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and
democratic consolidation. Likewise, the book provides further evidence that turnovers do
not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation. Rather, regimes that experience electoral
turnover are dependent on the same requirement of an institutionalized opposition party
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as dominant party systems to help further consolidate democracy. Furthermore, the last
section of the book shows – through the use of an original elite-survey dataset – that
political mobilization in contemporary African electoral regimes is not exclusively of a
clientelistic or charismatic nature. If contemporary and formerly dominant party systems
feature competitive and institutionalized opposition parties, they are distinctively set apart
on contemporary dimensions of programmatic conflict and responsive to the electorate.
In addition, both the results of the large-N as well as the comparative historic analysis
of four crucial cases show that opposition parties in the difficult context of a dominant
governing party and a young electoral regime need non-material sources of cohesiveness
that are rooted in legacies of historic cleavages from processes of de-colonization and na-
tionalization in order to remain competitive. Otherwise, they risk internal fragmentation,
factionalism due to infighting and co-optation by the dominant party, because they have not
enough material resources to keep the party together in a context of rampant clientelism.
Furthermore, legacies of historic cleavages provide opposition parties with the necessary
historic and symbolic capital, i.e. a recognizable ‘brand identity’ that is independent from
the current leadership. This enhances its voters’ loyalty despite the experience of recurring
defeats in elections. If parties stand for something, regardless whether the historic cleavage
is still effectively related to contemporary issues of programmatic conflict, they socialize
voters into a pre-existing party system structure that is attached to different identities.
This makes it more likely that opposition voters are willing to suspend demands for the
immediate fulfillment of clientelistic and valence promises. On the one hand, this allows
opposition parties to compete more effectively in clientelistic and valence mobilization de-
spite the fact that they mostly have to rely on promises. On the other hand, it makes
programmatic position-taking mobilization strategies more effective.
Interestingly, a competitive opposition that relies on legacies of historic cleavages also
increases the incentive on the side of the dominant party to reinvigorate its own non-
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material sources of cohesiveness. This in turn, makes the dominant party less likely to
disintegrate over succession struggles and infighting. On the one hand, a dominant party
that relies on sources of non-material cohesiveness is more stable, and this decreases the
chance for turnover in the short run. Yet, on the other hand, it also enhances the qual-
ity of democracy of a dominant party system, and provides better conditions for further
democratic consolidation after eventual, future turnovers because it makes the dominant
party more likely to survive defeat and act as a future competitive and institutionalized
opposition.
Both the results of the quantitative as well as the qualitative analysis demonstrate
that legacies of historic cleavages can only survive from their initial formation around
independence until the beginning of the third wave if authoritarian phases did not follow
too soon after the introduction of pre-independence elections and were not too stable
or suppressive enough to effectively extinct the territorial cleavage – as in the case of
Mali – or did not bereave the cleavage of its meaning and ‘brand identity’ despite the
survival of the organizational shells – as in the case of Lesotho. Hence, in Botswana,
which never experienced an authoritarian breakdown after independence, and in Ghana,
which experienced both substantial routinization of electoral competition before its first
authoritarian breakdown as well as two more democratic interregnums before the beginning
of the third wave, party systems are still structured according to the historic territorial
cleavage.
Hence, this book shows that Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage approach not only
helps to make sense of Western European party systems, but can make a decisive contribu-
tion to understand contemporary party system structures in African electoral regimes of the
third wave, too. Processes of nationalization led to territorial (center-periphery) cleavages
in both former African colonies and during the formation of historic party systems in Eu-
rope (a church-government cleavage did not play any role in Africa). While the qualitative
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analysis demonstrates this in detail, the quantitative large-N analysis makes an important
contribution through its systematic and successful quantification of path-dependency: It
proxies the path-dependent effect of historical cleavages through an additive index of the
age of contemporary runner-up opposition parties in relation to the years since indepen-
dence and the number of minimally competitive pre-third wave elections.
The results of both the large-N as well as the small-N analysis show that the beginning
of the third wave cannot be regarded as a critical juncture that sets subsequent paths
of party system and electoral regime evolution in Africa apart. Rather, the first critical
juncture of de-colonization and nationalization during the 1950s and the first half of the
1960s together with the occurrence, fashion and stability of the second critical juncture
of authoritarian disruption during the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s matter for
differences in contemporary party system structure and the quality of democracy in Africa.
In the same line, my analysis suggests that the size and shape of protest movements in
advent of the third wave were not decisive for the subsequent party system structure and
quality of democracy.
Lastly, the historic analysis of Ghana shows that ethnic mobilization does not necessar-
ily have to lead to fragmented, volatile, and conflict-prone party systems, as in the case of
Kenya, but can lead to an institutionalized party system and a high quality of democracy
under the following condition: Ethnic cleavages need to be aligned to an ethnically cross-
cutting center-periphery cleavage, and dominant ethnic groups need to gain significant vote
shares in each other’s ethno-regional strongholds.
This book’s results are first and foremost generalizable to African electoral regimes of
the third wave that featured a dominant government party at a point in time between
1990 and 2008 and reached overall minimum degrees of freedom in party competition, i.e.,
elections were accompanied by a minimum degree of uncertainty for the incumbent party.
While institutionalized opposition parties in full electoral autocracies most certainly cannot
279
lead an authoritarian one-party regime to democratization through the ballot box, I do not
rule out that they nonetheless can lead to programmatically more responsive authoritarian
parties. Hence, this could be an interesting hypothesis for future research. Moreover, it
would be an interesting project to investigate whether institutionalized opposition parties
in African electoral autocracies also draw some of their non-material sources of cohesiveness
and voter loyalty from legacies of historic territorial cleavages. Certainly, Burkina Faso,
which has a relatively institutionalized opposition despite being on the brink of my large-
N case selection because of its many authoritarian features, would be an interesting case
for more detailed investigation in this regard. Furthermore, it seems that Burkina Faso
has relatively comprehensive cilvil liberties despite its authoritarian tendencies regarding
party competition and regime type, which points to the importance of institutionalized
opposition parties, even in rather authoritarian electoral regimes. Regarding Zimbabwe’s
relatively strong and institutionalized opposition party, the MDC, however, a recent study
by LeBas (2011) does not find evidence for a significant role of a historic-territorial cleavage
in the make-up of the MDC’s non-material cohesiveness.
Both Mozambique and Nigeria’s dominant party systems feature competitive and in-
stitutionalized opposition parties, yet they did not reach as comprehensive quality levels
of democracy as expected. In the case of Mozambique, non-material opposition cohesive-
ness and institutionalization was reached due to violent conflict rather than legacies of
non-violent historic cleavages. This could explain why high opposition competitiveness in
Mozambique is not as conducive to higher quality levels of democracy as in other cases.
Regarding Nigeria, the reasons for its outlaying status are more unclear. I suspect that the
demanding institutional requirements for parties’ electoral registration in Nigeria led to a
rather artificial institutionalization that has not been as conducive to democratic consoli-
dation as in other cases. Hence, a more detailed analysis of Nigeria’s contemporary party
system could yield interesting, theory-building insights.
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While the quantitative analysis demonstrates that old opposition parties also lead to
more opposition competitiveness in the former settler oligarchies Namibia and South Africa,
these two cases have not been part of the qualitative historical small-N analysis. Hence,
future research has to investigate whether contemporary party system structures in these
cases can be traced back to the same territorial cleavage as in the case of former British
and French African colonies.
The presented results are only partially transferrable to African party systems of the
third wave that never experienced dominance by a governing party. For example, both
Malawi and Niger proved to have institutionalized multi-party systems despite relatively
young parties and a small record of pre-third wave elections. Nonetheless, my general
argument also works to some degree for African electoral regimes that never experienced
dominant governing parties since 1990. Accordingly, future research should look into the
historic roots of African non-dominant party systems of the third wave. Especially through
a detailed analysis of the historic roots of Malawi and Niger’s party systems, we could gain
valuable insights.
Last but not least, the case of Ghana shows some interesting parallels to cases out-
side of Africa, most notably Mexico and Taiwan, were dominant parties led the way to
lower skewness degrees in the playing field of party competition, higher quality levels of
democracy, and subsequent turnovers without subsequent disintegration of the previously
dominant party. At least in the case of Taiwan, and other Asian nations, which feature
a similar timing of decolonization as most African states and experienced dominant party
system rule during the third wave, it could be a fruitful exercise to trace the roots of the
contemporary party systems structures back to independence, and look for parallels with
African cases. Hence, while I do not intend to overgeneralize my results, I argue that some
of this book’s arguments could apply to countries outside of the African continent that
meet similar conditions regarding the timing of decolonization and democratization.
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Bornschier, Simon. Forthcoming. “Historical Polarization and Representation in South
American Party Systems, 1900-1990.” British Journal of Political Science .
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa:
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow.
2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT.
284
Carbone, Giovanni M. 2005. “Continuidade na renovação? Ten years of multiparty politics
in Mozambique: roots, evolution and stabilisation of the Frelimo–Renamo partysys-
tem.” Journal of Modern African Studies 43(3):417–442.
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of The Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy
13(1):5–21.
Carr, Adam. 2007. Adam Carr’s Election Archive. [Date accessed: 25 June 2007].
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/
Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works – Disorder as Political Instru-
ment. Oxford: James Currey.
Charlton, Roger. 1993. “The Politics of Elections in Botswana.” Africa: Journal of the
International African Institute 63(3):330–370.
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Lemarchand, René and Keith Legg. 1972. “Political clientelism and development.” Com-
parative Politics 4(2):149–178.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative
Research.” American Political Science Review 99(3):435–452.
Lijphart, Arendt. 1975. “Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research.” Compar-
ative Political Studies 8(2):158–177.
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2006. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University.
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2007. “Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluid-
ity among Legislative Parties in Africa’s Democracies.” Government and Opposition
42(2):215–241.
292
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2009. The Power of Elections in Africa Revisited. In Democratization
by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, ed. Staffan I. Lindberg. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins pp. 25–46.
Linz, J. J. and A. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Devel-
opment and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(1):69–105.
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and
Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In Party systems and voter alignments: cross-
national perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: Free
Press pp. 1–56.
Luna, Juan P. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2005. “Political Representation in Latin
America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries.” Comparative Political
Studies 38(4):388–416.
Maddison, Angus. 2009. Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD. [Date
accessed: 4 May 2013].
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm
Mainwaring, Scott and Edurne Zoco. 2007. “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of
Interparty Competition – Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies.” Party
Politics 13(2):155–178.
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. Introduction: Party Systems in Latin
America. In Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America, ed.
293
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press pp. 1–
34.
Makgala, Christian John. 2005. “The Relationship between Kenneth Koma and the
Botswana Democratic Party.” African Affairs 104(415):303–323.
Manning, Carrie. 2005. “Assessing African Party Systems after the third Wave.” Party
Politics 11(6):707–727.
Manning, Carrie. 2007. “Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo
and Mozambique.” Democratization 14(2):253–272.
Maundeni, Zibani. 2001. “State Culture and Development in Botswana and Zimbabwe.”
Journal of Modern African Studies 40(1):105–132.
Melber, Henning. 2011. “One-Party Dominance and its Consequences in Namibia.” Work-
ing Draft presented to the International Conference on Party Systems and the Future
of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, University of Warwick .
Meyer, Reinhold. 1980. Mali – Demokratisierung und ihre gesellschaftspolitischen Grund-
lagen. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Moehler, Devra C. and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2009. “Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap:
Turnovers as a Cause of Democratic Consolidation.” The Journal of Politics
71(4):1448–1466.
Moestrup, Sophia. 2006. “Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa: Is it working?” Pa-
per presented at the International Political Science Association’s 20th World Congress
Fukuoka, Japan, July 9-13, 2006 .
Mogalakwe, Monageng. 1997. The State and Organised Labour in Botswana ‘Liberal
Democracy’ in Emergent Capitalism. Hants: Ashgate.
294
Morrison, Minion K. C. 2004. “Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics. A Path
to Democratic Consolidation.” Comparative Politics 36(4):421–442.
Morton, Fred, Jeff Ramsay and Part Themba Mgadla. 2008. Historical dictionary of
Botswana. 4th ed. Lanham: Scarecrow.
Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson and Nicolas van de Walle. 2008. An aid-institutions para-
dox? A review essay on aid dependency and state-building in Sub-Saharan Africa. In
Reinventing Foreign Aid, ed. William Easterly. Cambridge: MIT.
Mozaffar, Shaheen and James R. Scarritt. 2005. “The Puzzle of African Party Systems.”
Party Politics 11(4):399–421.
Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt and Glen Galaich. 2003. “Electoral Institutions,
Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africas’s Emerging Democracies.”
American Political Science Review 97(3):379–390.
Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. Measuring Democracy. A Bridge between Scholarship & Politics.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy:
Evaluating Alternative Indices.” Comparative Political Studies 35(1):5–34.
National Electoral Board of Ethiopia. 2007. [Date accessed: 25 June 2007].
http://www.electionsethiopia.org/
Nugent, Paul. 1995. Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. London: Pinter.
Nugent, Paul. 1999. “Living in the past: urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and
1996 elections in Ghana.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37(2):287–319.
295
Nunley, Albert C. 2009. African Elections Database.
http://africanelections.tripod.com/
O’Brien, Donal B. Cruise. 1999. Does Democracy Require an Opposition Party? Impli-
cations of Some Recent African Experience. In The Awkward Embrace: One-Party
Domination and Democracy, ed. Hermann B. Giliomee and Charles Simkins. Ams-
terdam: Harwood pp. 319–336.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. “Illusions about Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy
7(2):34–51.
OECD. 2010. Development Database on Aid from DAC Members. [Date accessed: 18
November 2011].
http://stats.oecd.org/
Olaleye, Wole. 2003. “Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Lesotho.” EISA
Occasional Paper (15).
Osei, Anja. 2012. Party-voter linkage in Africa : Ghana and Senegal in comparative per-
spective. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Owusu-Ansah. 2005. Historical dictionary of Ghana. Third ed. Lanham: Scarecrow.
Parline Database. 2007. [Date accessed: 25 June 2007].
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp
Pedersen, Mogens N. 1979. “Dynamics of European Party Systems – Changing Patterns
of Electoral Volatility.” European Journal of Political Research 7(1):1–26.
Pempel, T.J. 1990a. Introduction. In Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominant
regimes, ed. T.J. Pempel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press pp. 1–32.
296
Picard, Louis A. 1987. The Politics of Development in Botswana. A Model for Success?
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Polhemus, James H. 1983. “Botswana Votes: Parties and Elections in an African Democ-
racy.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 21(3):397–430.
Posner, Daniel N. 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal
of Political Science 48(4):849–863.
Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2004. “The Chain of Responsiveness.” Journal of Democracy
15(4):91–105.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.”
World Politics 49(2):155–183.
QoG. 2013. The Quality of Government Dataset. University of Gothenburg: The QOG
Institute.
Rae, Douglas W. 1971[1967]. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Randall, Vicky. 2001. Party systems and voter alignments in the new democracies of the
Third World. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited, ed. Lauri Karvonen
and Stein Kuhle. London: Routledge pp. 238–260.
Rathbone, Richard. 2000. Nkrumah & the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana.
1951–60. Oxford: James Currey.
297
Rokkan, Stein. 2000. Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorie Stein Rokkans
aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeletet von Peter Flora. Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp.
Rosenberg, Scott, Richard F. Weisfelder and Michelle Frisbie-Fulton. 2004. Historical
dictionary of Lesotho. Lanham: Scarecrow.
Ross, Michael L. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53:325–361.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist
Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Rupley, Lawrence, Lamissa Bangali and Boureima Diamitani. 2013. Historical dictionary
of Burkina Faso. 3rd ed. Lanham: Scarecrow.
Sartori, Giovanni. 2005 [1976]. Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis.
Colchester: ECPR.
Scarritt, James R. and Shaheen Mozaffar. 1999. “The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and
Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary
Africa.” Nationalism And Ethnic Politics 5(1):82–117.
Schachter Morgenthau, Ruth. 1964. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.
London: Oxford University Press.
Schedler, Andreas. 2001. “Measuring Democratic Consolidation.” Studies in Comparative
International Development 36(1):66–92.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2006. Prozessanalyse. In Methoden der Politikwissenschaft. Neuere
qualitative und quantitative Analyseverfahren, ed. Kai-Uwe Schnapp, Delia Schindler,
Thomas Gschwend and Joachim Behnke. Baden-Baden: Nomos pp. 263–272.
298
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics of analogous measure of opposition competitiveness index
in non-dominant African party systems and its constituting measures
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) 4.63 1.69 1.78 6.7 13
(average over third wave elections)
% Seat share runner-up (average over third wave elections) 25.39 8.62 10.88 35.06 13
Total volatility (average over third wave elections) 26.27 13.68 3.99 47.79 13
303
Figure 36: Scatter-plot of final opposition competitiveness index on seat share of runner-up
opposition party (observations are elections in African dominant party systems)
Figure 37: Scatterplot of opposition competitiveness on legacy of cleavages in African dom-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Party Elites – Survey Questions
Intro: I would like to learn what position you as an official representative of your party take
with respect to different policies and issues. Below you will find questions on several
economic, cultural and social, and other issues upon which parties in [COUNTRY]
may take different positions.
1. State role in governing the economy:
[1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic
activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining
control over key services.
[10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing eco-
nomic activity or development.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
2. Overall left-right placement:
[1] Party is best located at the “left” of the national political spectrum based
upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.
[10] Party is best located at the “right” of the national political spectrum based
upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
3. Social spending on the disadvantaged:
[1] Party advocates extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit
the less well-off in society.
[10] Party opposes extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the
less well-off in society.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
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4. Public spending:
[1] Party supports extensive public provision of benefits such as earnings-related
pension benefits, comprehensive national health care, and basic primary and
secondary schools for everyone.
[10] Party opposes an extensive state role in providing such benefits and believes
that such things as health insurance, pensions, and schooling should be privately
provided (e.g. by the extended family) or that participation in public social
insurance programs should be voluntary.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
5. National identity:
[1] Party advocates toleration and social and political equality for minority
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial groups and opposes state policies that
require the assimilation of such groups to the majority national culture.
[10] Party believes that the defense and promotion of the majority national
identity and culture at the expense of minority culture are important goals.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
6. Traditional authority, institutions, and customs:
[1] Party advocates full individual freedom from state interference into any is-
sues related to religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life, and social
conduct in general.
[10] Party advocates government-enforced compliance of individuals with tradi-
tional authorities and values on issues related to religion, marriage, sexuality,
occupation, family life and social conduct in general.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
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Partisan Voters – Survey Questions (Afrobarometer Round 4)
Partisanship:
Q97:
– If a general election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote
for?
∗ 100–899=[Political Parties of 20 African countries], 997=Would not vote,
998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data
Economic issues:
Q10:
– Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1
or Statement 2.
∗ Statement 1: The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the govern-
ment should therefore abandon its current economic policies.
∗ Statement 2: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is
necessary for us to accept some hardships now.
· 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1,
3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement
2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing data
Q11:
– Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1
or Statement 2.
∗ Statement 1: The government’s economic policies have helped most people;
only a few have suffered.
∗ Statement 2: The government’s economic policies have hurt most people
and only benefited a few.
· 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1,
3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement




– Do you think that each of the following has too little, too much, or about the
right amount of influence over your government: International businesses and
investors?
∗ 1=Far too little, 2=Somewhat too little, 3=About the right amount, 4=Some-




– Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this
country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
Statement 1 or Statement 2.
∗ Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of
leaders.
∗ Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for author-
ity.
· 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1,
3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement
2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing data
Q66:
– Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing
your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?
∗ 1=1=Decrease a lot, 2=Decrease somewhat, 3=Stay the same, 4=Increase
somewhat, 5=Increase a lot, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing data.-1=Missing data
Q67:
– Do you think that traditional leaders should sit on your local government council,
or not? If so, do you think they should be elected by the people to these seats,
appointed by government officials, or selected in some other way?
∗ 0=No, should not have seats on council, 1=Yes, should have seats elected by
people, 2=Yes, should have seats appointed by government officials, 3=Yes,
should have seats selected in some other way, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused
to answer, -1=Missing data
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Q83:
– Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [R’s national identity] and
being a [R’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?
∗ 1=I feel only (R’s ethnic group), 2=I feel more (R’s ethnic group) than [R’s
national identity], 3=I feel equally [R’s national identity] and (R’s ethnic
group), 4=I feel more [R’s national identity] than (R’s ethnic group), 5=I
feel only [R’s national identity], 7=Not applicable, 9=Don’t know, 998=Re-
fused to answer, -1=Missing data
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